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Technical Report No. 638

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ARMY ROLES, MISSIONS, AND DOCTRINE IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT (ARMLIC)

PRECONFLICT CASE STUDY 4--GREECE

15 MARCH 1970

PREPARED BY OPERATIONS RESEARCH, INC.
UNDER CONTRACT NO. DAAG 25-67-C-0702 FOR
US ARMY COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS COMMAND
INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED STUDIES
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013



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
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PREFATORY NOTE

1. This case study of the preconflict period in Greece is one of a series undertaken by the Carlisle Research Office of Operations Research, Incorporated for the US Army Combat Developments Command Institute of Advanced Studies (USACDCIAS), now designated Institute of Land Combat (USACDCILC). The purpose of the case study is to develop a better understanding of the political, economic, social, psychological, public health, scientific-technological, and military factors conducive to low intensity conflict and change of indigenous governmental control. A total of seven such studies has been completed and placed on file at the Defense Documentation Center (DDC) for authorized users.

2. The seven case studies were used as basic research for the USACDCIAS study of Army Roles, Missions, and Doctrine in Low Intensity Conflict (ARMLIC). No assumptions are made as to whether Army actions are either desirable or necessary in connection with any given conflict. It is recognized that Army capabilities to give military or civilian assistance are among those that the US Government may use or not, in furtherance of US policy and national interests, and that they should be designed and maintained to best serve the purposes of national authorities with the greatest effectiveness at the least cost.

3. The data in this report were drawn from open sources, published and unpublished, available through public institutions and Government agencies. No field work is involved, and no policy recommendations are made. The data have been checked against selected classified sources and with knowledgeable individuals. Modified systems analysis methods, aimed at determining points of tension or dysfunction conducive to low intensity conflict, were used. Basic assumptions and study method for the ARMLIC study are on file at USACDCILC.

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STUDY CONTRIBUTORS

The USACDCIAS Study Team members were Colonel Ralph T. Tierno, Jr., Team Chief, Colonel Boyce R. Meers, C. Suzanne Rebourgiere, and Lee C. Fischbach.

The following individuals of Operations Research Incorporated contributed to the study: Donald S. Bloch; Thora W. Halstead, PhD; Donald S. Macdonald; Eugene H. Miller, PhD; Jessie A. Miller, PhD; Harley M. Roberts, and James E. Trinnaman.



Figure 2. Chronology of Greek Expansion 1830-1948

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TABLE I. FACTORS CONDUCTIVE TO VIOLENCE IN GREECE

Principal factors.

1. Devastation and hardship resulting from World War I.
2. Political polarization between Republicans and Monarchists.
3. Cultural factors engendering suspicion, rivalry, and quest for status.
4. Weakened state of military and security forces.
5. Widespread Communist organization and influence.

Contributing factors.

1. Lack of popular sense of legitimacy for the monarchy.
2. General lack of civic responsibility.
3. Ineffective political and governmental systems.
4. Frustration among the growing middle class.
5. Economic problems resulting from world depression.
6. Dependence of economy on foreign finance and markets.
7. Influence of the military in politics before World War II.
8. Lack of strong national leadership after Metaxas.
9. Strategic geographic location involving Greece in great power interests.
10. Mixture of dependence and antipathy in popular attitudes toward foreign powers.
11. Growing inequalities in distribution of wealth.
12. Growing population pressure on the land.
13. Urbanization aggravated by economic and social problems.
14. Language barriers inhibiting communication.
15. Propensity to rely on improvisation rather than careful planning to solve social and economic problems.

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TABLE II. CHRONOLOGY OF SALIENT PRECONFLICT EVENTS IN GREECE

1909	Coup d'etat by military leaders establishes reform regime under Eleutherios Venizelos.
1912-13	Balkan wars expand Greek territory. King George I assassinated.
1914-18	World War I: split between King Constantine and Venizelos on Greek policy.
1921	Greece defeated by Turkey in Asia Minor. General Plastiras ousts Constantine.
1923	Exchange of populaces begins between Greece and Turkey.
1924	Republic proclaimed by Chamber of Deputies.
1925	General Pangalos establishes dictatorship.
1928	Venizelos returns as Premier. Liberal Party holds majority.
1933	Popular (Royalist) Party wins election. Plastiras coup attempt fails.
1935	Second Republican coup fails. General Metaxas purges Army in favor of Royalists. King George returns to throne.
1936	Communist-inspired general strike in Thessalonike. Election stalemate leads to Metaxas' appointment as Prime Minister with emergency powers. Chamber of Deputies prorogued.
1938	Metaxas becomes Premier for life. Cretan revolt suppressed.
1940	Italy invades Greece from Albania; invasion repelled.
1941	Metaxas dies. Germany invades; Greek and British expeditionary forces surrender. Famine begins.
1942	Communists form National Liberation Front (EAM) and Greek Popular Liberation Army (ELAS). General Zervas forms rival freedom group (EDES).
1944	Meeting at Beirut among Greek political leaders in Middle East. Germany begins withdrawal, leaving EAM in control of most of Greece.

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TABLE II (continued)

- | | |
|------|--|
| 1944 | Government returns to Athens. Warfare between ELAS and the Greek and British forces begins. |
| 1945 | Varkiza Agreement ends hostilities. Archbishop Damaskinos becomes regent. Varkiza Agreement signed and ELAS dissolved. |
| 1946 | Royalists win elections under Allied supervision. Tsaldaris becomes Premier. King George returns to Greece after plebiscite. Communists decide to renew conflict. US aid mission arrives to study economic problems. |

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SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSIONS: FACTORS CONDUCTIVE TO CONFLICT

L. Overview.

a. The preconflict period covered in this study began with the defeat of Greek military forces in Turkey after World War I and the struggle to assimilate four-fifths of a million people from Asia Minor. It ended with the second eruption of violent conflict between Government forces and the Communist-dominated resistance group which had evolved in Axis-occupied Greece during World War II. The intervening years saw economic depression after 1929, intensified for Greece by its dependence on foreign trade, then destruction and suffering in World War II. Meanwhile, the drive for modernization was sparked by a growing middle class that sorely taxed the old, oligarchic, and Europe-oriented political order which was headed by a foreign dynasty. The strain was manifested in strong polarization between Conservatives, supporting the monarchy, and Liberals, supporting the great Eleutherios Venizelos. A disproportionately strong and expensive military establishment, heritage of Greece's traditional irredentism and of Balkan rivalries, weighed heavily in politics. There were coups d'etat, frequent changes of government, and finally the Metaxas dictatorship. Such progress as had been made was largely wiped out by the economic and social ravages of World War II, and little remedial action had been taken from liberation in 1944 until the eruption of violent conflict, first in December 1944 and then on a greater scale in 1946.

b. The main factors conducive to conflict, as they emerge from the study of the preconflict period (1923-46) which follows, were the violence and extreme hardship resulting from World War II; political polarization between Liberals and Conservatives, symbolized by the controversy over republic versus monarchy; cultural factors tending to engender suspicion, rivalry, and the quest for status; the weakened state of the Armed Forces and security forces at the end of World War II; and Communist organization and influence.

c. There were many other contributing factors. The State, headed by a monarch of a foreign dynasty, had never acquired true legitimacy; there was a lack of civic responsibility, notwithstanding strong ethnic pride; the political and governmental system was ineffective; the growing middle class, including immigrants from Asia Minor after the 1923 populace exchange, was frustrated in its drive for influence; the world depression brought severe economic problems; the economy was heavily dependent on outside finance and markets; the military establishment before World War II was a strong factor in politics and took a disproportionate share of the budget; there was a lack of strong national leadership after Metaxas; the Greek attitude toward foreign powers was a mixture of dependence and antipathy; the country's geographic location made it the focus of foreign attention; there were

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growing inequalities in the distribution of wealth; growing population pressed upon the land; urbanization aggravated economic and social problems; language barriers inhibited communication; and a propensity for self-assured improvisation hindered advance planning.

d. At the same time, there were stabilizing factors in Greek society. Strong family loyalty provided a base for individual security and an informal channel of political communication and influence; there was a cultural acceptance of simplicity and frugality; social mobility retarded the buildup of class hostilities; ethnic loyalty united the Greeks against outside attack, as shown by the successful defense against the Italians in 1940; there was no land tenure problem, since virtually all large estates had been broken up; a public health program, inadequate though it was, may have alleviated tensions in Macedonia; and ethnic homogeneity prevented minority problems.

e. The Greeks had a high degree of political mobilization and communication and considerable participation in local affairs, but most of them regarded national politics as a spectator sport. For the long run, high mobilization was probably a stabilizing factor; but for the short run, it may have been somewhat destabilizing.

2. Principal factors contributing to conflict.

a. Results of World War II. Surely no other country outside the main theater of war suffered more than the Greeks from 1941 to 1944. Their daily diet was reduced to 900 calories in the famine of the 1941-42 winter. In 1946 the diet was still below that of 1938. At least 300,000 persons died of starvation during these years. Industry virtually ceased, transportation was disrupted, prewar finance and credit patterns were disrupted, and collaborationists' profits and status exacerbated tensions. The people became accustomed to a dot-eat-dog way of life to survive. Violence against the occupying forces was a patriotic duty, and the occupation forces used violence and terror increasingly as control grew more difficult. Political rivalries were exacerbated by the Germans, who fanned anti-Communist feelings among conservative elements and armed Greek "security battalions."

b. Political polarization. Political division between Conservatives and Liberals, somewhat along European lines, crystallized in the rivalry between Venizelos and King Constantine after 1914, with the former attracting the rising middle classes and Asian immigrants and the latter (and his successors on the throne) supported by the conservative elite. The politicians' preoccupation with debate over monarchy versus republic symbolized but did not resolve the tensions over reform versus status quo, powerholders versus powerseekers, and newcomers versus Old Greece. The Metaxas dictatorship aggravated and deepened these tensions. World War II added to these tensions the organized opposition of left-leaning republicans, supported and

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directed by the Communists, against monarchist elite, and of stay-at-home freedom fighters against supporters of the royalist Government-in-exile and conservative-minded collaborators. Hostility between left and right grew until communication was impossible. The bitterness projected upon the debate over the monarchy reflected these tensions, as did the eventual violence.

c. Cultural elements. The strong egalitarianism, individualism, and family-centeredness of Greek culture, together with emphasis on achievement of wealth and status for the sake of family as well as individual honor, and the tradition of seeking retribution for slights, real or imagined, to personal or family dignity, maximized intergroup suspicion and rivalry. Large-scale group cooperation was very difficult. The culture thus favored polarization and conflict rather than conciliation and compromise.

d. Weakened Armed Forces. The military establishment was traditionally powerful in Greece; its support was requisite for the survival of any government (3g below). When the Greek Government-in-exile returned to Athens on liberation, the Armed Forces had been reduced to an impotent handful by war and mutiny and identified as strongly monarchist and conservative. The internal security forces were all tainted with collaborationism. The Armed Forces had no power to support Government decisions, nor did they command respect outside conservative circles. The Government was forced to depend upon British forces to establish its control.

e. Communist organization and influence. Despite conflicting evaluations at the time, it is clear that the Communists were the main source of organization and doctrine for the major guerrilla force in Greece during World War II and its political counterpart and were largely (but by no means wholly) responsible for the aggravation of political polarization and its translation into violence against non-Communist Greek elements.

3. Contributing factors.

a. Lack of State legitimacy. The Greek State had been headed by a foreign dynasty during most of its existence and governed by a foreign-influenced elite under Constitutions drawn from foreign models. Thus, there was no tradition of indigenous and autonomic national Government before 1832. Constant constitutional change and political instability were both consequence and cause of this lack of legitimacy for fundamental political institutions. Most kings, by playing active political roles, lessened the symbolic potency of the Crown. Except for the euphoric period of successful irredentist campaigns under George I and the real but distasteful effectiveness of Metaxas, the people had little tangible evidence of efficacy which might have built legitimacy. The German-dominated puppet government during the War years was the antithesis of legitimacy.

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b. Lack of civic responsibility. Greeks had no cultural imperative for patriotism or for service to the State. Their loyalties were centered on family and community to the virtual exclusion of any higher claims on their abilities, resources, or personal freedom. Evading State responsibility, if it benefited the family, was a positive virtue. There was no cultural or emotional focus, except the generally nonpolitical church, to integrate Greeks across group and family lines.

c. Ineffectiveness of the political system. The political and governmental system before World War II was geared to a laissez-faire economy and society. Although the civil service had a prewar reputation as the best in southeastern Europe, the scope and horizon were limited and had the shortcomings usual in developing countries. For many years, the Greek Government squandered large foreign loans and burdened the nation with heavy debt service. The War inflated Government rolls, eroded morale, identified working levels with the enemy; and the aftermath of the War posed problems vastly beyond the Government's limited capacity. Channels of political communication and participation, never very effective except through informal family group connections, were inadequate. There were few indications of real concern with popular needs and desires. The structure was heavily centralized and responsive only to direction from the top. Even local authorities were under close central control after 1938. The rival Communist-infiltrated Political Committee of the National Liberation controlled much of the national territory from 1944.

d. Middle-class frustrations. The competitive urge for upward mobility, plus educational emphasis on preparation for white-collar professions, led to discontent among the emergent middle class, whose numbers were growing faster than the economy grew to absorb them.

e. The depression. In Greece, as elsewhere in the world, the depression of 1929 caused an economic decline and resultant privation, especially in the urban areas and those producing for foreign markets.

f. External dependence. Greece was abnormally dependent economically upon foreign trade and finance. The collapse of the tobacco market, for example, led to severe privation among the tobacco workers of Macedonia, and these workers were a focus of dissidence.

g. Military dominance. National defense and territorial aggrandizement were the principal preoccupation of Greek governments for a century. As in other Balkan States, therefore, the military played a prominent role and were respected professionally and socially. They received a very large share of the national budget and, thus, inhibited economic and social development.

h. Lack of strong leadership. The preeminence of the elder Venizelos among Greek leaders shows not only his stature but the paucity

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of alternatives or successors. Most Greek statesmen were political operators in the cultural tradition rather than true national leaders. Lack of real leadership appeared to be a major factor in the critical postliberation period, although the times may have been too difficult for any man.

i. Attitude toward foreign powers For generations after independence, the three protecting powers sought influence and advantage in Greece and literally had friends at court in the form of the three political groupings referred to as British, French, and Russian, which sought their own advantage through their foreign associations. Foreign prestige was diminished somewhat by the Asia Minor debacle and the Bolshevik Revolution. British influence, however, continued strong throughout the preconflict period. Such foreign bases of political support retarded the development of indigenous interest groups, led to growing nationalist reaction, and may have exacerbated resentment at the lower standards of Greek life. British support for the prompt reentry of King George II after liberation diminished his already weak legitimacy.

j. Inequalities in the distribution of wealth. The standard of living in urban areas grew faster than in rural areas, and in plains areas faster than in the hills. Social security legislation favored certain groups more than others. Imbalances were greatly aggravated by World War II. By 1946, the extremes of wealth in Athens and poverty in the rural areas, the weakened economic position of the middle class, the impoverished and rootless state of the working class had become significant issues for agitation and social unrest.

k. Population pressures. Although land tenure was not an issue, the natural growth of population led to a surplus of people on tiny, marginally productive plots, and thus to an exodus into urban areas of people unprepared for urban life and without jobs to support them. It also led to institutional changes, such as later marriage and reduction in the practice of dividing land among all children, which may have increased psychological tensions.

l. Urbanization. Life in the growing cities, particularly Greater Athens, put a severe strain on traditional culture patterns and led to a growing body of both intellectual and laborer unemployed, who were heavily swayed by radical political appeals. These, and the disadvantaged hill folk, were the main source of leftist strength.

m. Language barriers. The "demotic" Greek spoken by the villagers was different enough from the "Katharevousa" or official modern Greek to hamper their intercommunication with Government officials and elite and their understanding of Government publications.

n. Propensity for improvisation. The Greek culture encouraged self-confidence and pride of race and downgraded advance plans

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and schedules. The Greeks were therefore hindered from recognizing their own shortcomings and trusted in their ability to meet any situation without the kind of careful advance planning expected in a complex political and social system. On the other hand, this trait probably shielded the Greeks from the inroads of psychological insecurity and inferiority feelings.

4. Stabilizing factors.

a. Family loyalty. Although family loyalty largely blocked loyalty to larger social groupings (except, to some extent, the local community), it provided a solid base of individual security, as well as an informal means of communication and action. These two characteristics somewhat mediated the psychological and physical impact of wartime hardships, compensated in part for the weakness of the formal political system, and probably cushioned the unemployment problem.

b. Frugality. Greek culture frowned on expensive or extravagant living, and most desires were limited to modest improvement over what most Greeks already possessed. This attitude undoubtedly helped to reduce resentment over imbalance in distribution of wealth.

c. Social mobility. Absence of a formal class structure, and strong egalitarian beliefs, permitted considerable upward and downward social movement. This factor may or may not have moderated resentment at uneven distribution of wealth but probably operated to ease social tensions and class hostilities.

d. Ethnic loyalty. Despite lack of patriotism in the usual sense, Greeks had strong pride of race and tradition and could act together effectively in defense against assaults on them, as demonstrated by their successful defense against the Italian invasion of 1940.

e. Solution of the land reform issue. By 1930 there were extremely few really large estates in Greece; therefore, land reform in the usual sense could not be made a propaganda issue, although fractionation of holdings and poor utilization were serious problems.

f. Public health. Among the immigrants in Macedonia, the Near East Foundation and the Greek Government carried on a generally effective although limited program of public health, which was well-received by the people. This program while it lasted may have been a significant element in damping the discontent of the exchangees from Asia Minor in their new location, particularly since the Greek Government was criticized for its general lack of attention to Macedonian problems.

g. Ethnic homogeneity. The populace exchanges after World War I resulted in almost complete homogeneity of race, religion, and

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language in Greece. Minority problems existed, but except for some Bulgarian collaboration during World War II and an abortive effort by the Italians to arm the Vlachs against the Greeks, they were of negligible importance.

5. An ambivalent element: political mobilization.

a. Relatively high literacy (75 percent reported by 1951), a keen interest in politics, and the extensive system of informal communication through family ties and in village coffeehouses made for a high degree of popular awareness of political affairs at national as well as local level. Yet the Greeks seem generally to have regarded national politics as a spectator sport, despite their enthusiastic and generally corruption-free participation in elections. It appears that they were progressively disillusioned by the Metaxas regime, yet disgusted by the feckless politicking which preceded it and by the repetition of the same politicking in the face of exceedingly grave national problems in 1944 and 1945. They were embittered by Metaxas' 1939 law which ended their traditional democratic choice of local officials.

b. On balance, it may be concluded that political mobilization, although probably a long-run stabilizing factor, was destabilizing in the short run. Samuel Huntington had observed that mobilization may be destabilizing unless institutional development keeps pace with it. Such may have been the problem in Greece. The faults and shortcomings of the national Government were known to all, but the public had no belief in its ability to do anything about them through established political institutions. At the same time, the people could be readily reached by radicals and their promises.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

1. Descriptive background.

a. Geography. The Greek mainland is situated in southeastern Europe on the southern tip of the Balkan Peninsula. Many islands, such as Crete and the Dodecanese, are included as Greek territory. The Greek mainland is bounded on the north by Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Albania; on the east by Turkey and the Aegean Sea; and on the west by the Mediterranean and Ionian Seas. The country is predominantly mountainous. The land area, including the islands, is 51,182 square miles--approximately the size of Alabama. Much of the land is dry and rocky; only about 25 percent is arable. Greece has mild wet winters and hot dry summers. While there is considerable variation in climate between the southern and northern parts of the country, the temperature is rarely extreme.

(1) Politically, the country is divided into 52 Provinces (nomi) governed by monarchs or local Governors appointed by the Minister of the Interior. The Provinces of northern Greece are under the supervision of a Minister with Cabinet status. At the municipal and communal levels the mayors and presidents of communities are, and for many years have been, elected by popular vote (except during the Metaxas period).

(2) "Old Greece" is the southern part of the country, as constituted by the Treaty of 1832, comprising the Peloponnese (an area connected to the mainland by the narrow Isthmus of Corinth) and a roughly equal area to the north, now termed Central Greece and Euboea. The Ionian Islands, west of the mainland, were ceded by England in 1863. Thessaly, extending north of Old Greece nearly to the Yugoslav border, was added by the Treaty of Berlin in 1878. The Island of Crete was given up by Turkey by the 1913 Treaty of London. With the addition of Macedonia in the northeast and Epirus in the west (south of Albania) under the Treaty of Bucharest the same year, Greece doubled its area and population and reached essentially its present borders. The Dodecanese Islands were ceded by Italy after World War II.

b. People. The current population of Greece (as of 1968) is estimated at 8.7 million. The metropolitan area of Greater Athens (including the port of Piraeus) is estimated at 1,852,000; Thessalonike and its environs, 378,000. Other major cities include Patras, 102,000; Iraklion, 70,000; Volos, 67,000; Larisa, 55,000; Kavalla, 45,000; Chania, 44,000; Kalamata, 40,000; and Serres, 40,000.

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(1) Although Greece has a mobile society, approximately half the people derive their incomes from farming, and about 60 percent live in rural areas or in villages of less than 5,000. More than three-quarters of the present professional class is of recent peasant background.

(2) In Greece there is only one minority, a religious one established as such by the Treaty of Lausanne signed in 1923. This is the Muslim minority which constitutes roughly 1.3 percent of the total population. In addition, various bilingual groups comprise about 1 percent of the population. The Greek Orthodox Church, to which 98 percent of the population belongs, is the established religion in Greece. The church is self-governing under the spiritual jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul. It is, however, under the control and protection of the State, which provides the salaries of the clergy.

c. History. Greece, a rugged country with rugged, proud, independent and talented people, has a history and tradition known to the entire Western world. This tradition, known and revered by all Greeks, includes democratic ideas which underlie western European and US governmental institutions. Yet Greece, in common with other developing nations, found great difficulty in applying these institutions in its evolution as a modern state.

(1) National development did not begin until Greece won independence from Turkey in 1832, with assistance from Great Britain, France, and Russia. A monarchy was established in 1833 under the tutelage of these three powers, with a Bavarian and later a Danish King. For most of the next hundred years, attention was focused on the "Great Idea" of extending the national boundaries to include all Greeks. Only the catastrophic Asia Minor campaign of 1921-23 changed this focus. Internal economic and social development received little attention before 1909, when a group of Army officers seized power to bring about reforms and made the great Cretan leader, Eleutherios Venizelos, Prime Minister.

(2) A disproportionally strong and expensive military establishment, an elite oriented toward Europe and its own interests more than toward its countrymen, and considerable foreign economic and political influence characterized much of Greek national life. There was a continuing struggle for power between conservatives, who supported the throne, and more liberal elements who mostly supported Venizelos. Coups d'etat, frequent changes of government, and finally the Metaxas dictatorship of 1936 manifested the tensions and instability of adaption to the modern world. Greece was proclaimed a republic in 1924, but King George II was recalled to the throne in 1933. The monarchy was reconfirmed by a plebiscite in 1946.

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(3) Greece entered World War II on the side of the Allies on 28 October 1940, when the country was invaded by Italy. Determined and effective Greek resistance drove the Italian forces back into Albania, despite Italian numerical superiority. This in turn forced the Germans to delay their invasion of the USSR by diverting forces into Yugoslavia and Greece. From 1941 to 1944, Greece was occupied by German, Italian, and Bulgarian military forces, with a puppet government in Athens under German control. The Greek King and Government were in exile. Groups of partisans fought the Germans and each other. Largest of these groups was the Communist-dominated Greek National Liberation Front (EAM), which virtually governed much of rural Greece.

(4) Following the liberation of Greece in August 1944, Communist-directed resistance forces made two attempts to dominate Greece in defiance of the Greek Government which had returned from exile. The first, in 1944-45, was put down with British combat support. The second insurgency began in the fall of 1946, with substantial assistance from the Soviet satellites, but was defeated in the summer of 1949, with extensive US economic and military assistance (the first implementation of the Truman Doctrine).

(5) The Communist Party of Greece (KKE) was outlawed in December 1947 and remains proscribed. It developed a legal political front called the United Democratic Left (EDA). From 1952 to late 1963 Greece was governed by conservative parties, principally the National Radical Union (ERE). In the fall of 1963 the Center Union Party (EK) came to power and governed until July 1965. It was followed by a succession of conservative governments or coalitions until the coup d'etat of April 1967.

(6) On 21 April 1967, a military coup took over the Government and suspended certain key articles of the Constitution. Parliament was prorogued and political activities forbidden. The coup government retained, however, the basic structure of government, that of a constitutional monarchy. Following the King's abortive counter-coup of 13 December 1967 and his subsequent flight to Rome, the regime appointed a regent as proxy for the King. The coup government has indicated publicly that it intends to return Greece to constitutional processes. A new Constitution was adopted in 1968, but elections have not yet been held.

d. Economy. Greece is overpopulated in relation to its natural resources and the present level of economic development. The substantial emigration of workers has eased somewhat the problems of unemployment and underemployment, but emigration has created labor shortages in certain areas of Greece and other sociopolitical problems.

(1) Data on the economy during the preconflict period are contained in chapter 3; the following current information reflects

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material gains over the immediate postwar period, when the Greek economy was devastated by war and hyperinflation.

(2) Per capita gross national product (GNP) amounted to about US\$800 during 1967. In that year, agriculture accounted for about 24 percent of Greece's GNP, while providing employment for close to half the labor force of three million. Agriculture also contributed 75 percent of Greece's 1967 exports--comprised mainly of tobacco (about 26 percent), cotton, wheat, raisins, currants, fresh fruit, olive oil, and olives. The industrial sector accounted for about 27 percent of GNP and employed 766,000 persons, or about 21 percent of the labor force. Services made up 49 percent of GNP and employed one million, or 29 percent of the labor force.

(3) Earnings from invisible exports, such as emigrant remittances, shipping, and tourism, partially offset the unfavorable balance of trade. However, Greece still requires a substantial amount of foreign borrowing and investment to cover the balance of payments gap. Foreign trade is chiefly with western Europe and the United States; the latter accounted for 9 percent of all Greek imports and 13 percent of exports in 1967. The Soviet Union and other eastern European countries receive 18-24 percent of Greek exports and provide 8-10 percent of imports.

(4) At the end of 1967, the Greek Government announced a 5-year economic development plan aimed at an annual GNP growth rate of 8 percent, to raise gross per capita income (at 1967 prices) from US\$710 in 1967 to US\$1,000 in 1972. The plan emphasizes modernization and development in both industrial and agricultural sectors and aims at more equitable distribution of income.

e. Foreign relations. Greece is a member of NATO, and its 1967 defense budget of more than US\$300 million, or 20 percent of its total regular budget and 4 percent of GNP, is proportionately one of the highest among member countries. An agreement associating Greece with the European Economic Community (EEC) went into effect in 1962, providing for EEC financial assistance and for progressive elimination of tariffs on trade with EEC.

(1) Diplomatic relations are maintained with all the European Communist countries except the Soviet Zone of Germany and Albania, with which latter country Greece is still in a state of war. Relations were restored with Bulgaria in 1965 after a 25-year lapse, and Bulgaria renounced old claims on Macedonia and Thrace. The Communists continue attempts to weaken Greek ties with the West.

(2) Greece has a special interest in the Middle East because of geographic location, the ethnic Greek communities, and the influence of the Greek Orthodox Church. Cordial relations are

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maintained with the Arab States and with Israel. Relations with Turkey have suffered because of the Cyprus question.

f. US assistance. US military economic aid to Greece since 1946 has amounted to more than \$3.8 billion. These funds have helped Greece to recover from almost 10 years of war and occupation and to build the base for a sustained period of economic growth. Grant economic aid to Greece was discontinued at the end of fiscal year 1962. Subsequently there has been assistance through Export-Import Bank loans and sales of surplus agricultural commodities. Grant military assistance amounted to \$44 million during fiscal year 1967. The Military Assistance Staff in Greece accounts for most of the US Government personnel and dependents in the country.

2. Political factors. Greece had a strong tradition of freedom, democracy, and national identity and long experience with local self-government. However, from the time independence from Turkey was established in 1832--owing in very large part to the support and intervention of Great Britain, France, and Russia--the Greeks had been unable to settle on the shape and symbols of the state. The monarchy had never been generally accepted as a Greek institution. Neither the Constitution nor established governmental forms were objects of loyalty or respect. Under these circumstances, the Greek political system was ill-prepared, at best, to withstand the test of four serious challenges that confronted it during the period 1923-46: the catastrophic defeat in the Asia Minor campaign in 1923; the flood of refugees from Asia Minor that followed it; the economic depression after 1929; and, above all, the extraordinary privation and suffering of World War II.

a. Structure of Government. Except for a republican interlude from 1924 to 1933, Greece was a constitutional monarchy with a Cabinet responsible to a unicameral National Assembly of 300 members, elected every 4 years unless sooner dissolved. General Metaxas dissolved the Assembly in 1936, and it was not reconstituted until 1946. The King had more constitutional power than his western European counterparts; he could and did play an active political role, supported by the numerous Armed Forces (of which he was Commander in Chief) and the civil forces allied with the monarchy, principally the Populist Party and the conservative elite. Although the Constitution provided the usual guarantees of civil rights and freedoms, these were largely in abeyance during the Metaxas dictatorship (1936-41) and during the war years (1941-44). The Constitution recognized local government institutions, which had existed for centuries; these were placed under central control during the Metaxas era. Independence of the judiciary was protected by the Constitution but handicapped by legalism and by conflicting and anachronistic sources of law.

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(1) The monarchy as an institution reached its highest influence and legitimacy during the reign of George I (1868-1913) but bore much of the onus for the Asia Minor campaign, of which King Constantine had been an active proponent. Constantine's son George II was in exile from 1924 to 1933, while Greece experimented with a republican form and a figurehead President. The unpopularity of the Metaxas dictatorship further reduced the prestige of the monarchy. The King and his government went into exile with the German victory in 1941. Although the British supported King George, objections by Communist and liberal elements prevented his return after the liberation in 1944. Revulsion from the excesses of the left gave the King a victory in the plebiscite of September 1946, when he finally returned. From shortly after liberation until the King's return, the Orthodox Archbishop Damaskinos served as regent.

(2) Greek governments were undisciplined and short-lived, subject as they were to factional infighting among elite groups and in the National Assembly, except in periods of strong leadership. Eleutherios Venizelos provided such leadership during much of the period from 1909, when he came to power through an Army coup d'etat, until his death in 1935 and did so with some semblance of constitutional procedure. General Metaxas, an able administrator but without Venizelos' charisma, disbanded the legislature and exercised dictatorial control from 1936 to his death shortly after the German invasion in 1941. A puppet administration executed the German will from 1941 to 1944, while the legitimate Government was in exile in London and Cairo. A succession of governments following liberation, staffed chiefly by leaders of the old political groupings, endeavored unsuccessfully to deal with the enormously difficult problems resulting from World War II by following the political techniques used before the Metaxas era. Changes of incumbents were frequent. Until the national elections of March 1946, Greek Governments had not had responsibility to the people's nominal representatives for 10 years.

(3) The Greek civil service, reputed to be one of the best in the Balkans before World War II, had been inflated in size and tainted with collaborationism during the War. At liberation, it had all the usual problems of a bureaucracy in a developing country, plus the accumulated unpopularity of the Metaxas and occupation years. Moreover, Metaxas had increased still further the heavy centralization of the administration by appointing the officers of local government units, previously elected by the people. The overall picture of Greek Government administration after the war, in the face of admittedly overwhelming problems, was one of great inefficiency and small accomplishment. It was further confused by a plethora of largely autonomous semiprivate agencies.

(4) The National Assembly, prior to 1936, was the major locus of political power, with control of the purse and the capacity

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to vote administrations out of office. It was representative in the sense that it was chosen in generally free and fair elections with few irregularities. However, voters selected their representatives on the basis of personal loyalties and family and group connections, not on the basis of political interest calculations. The Assembly thus concerned itself largely with bargaining among elite factions for power and status. This tendency was aggravated in years when elections by proportional representation, rather than plurality, produced many small parties and made coalition governments necessary. The deadlock of 1936, preceding the Metaxas dictatorship, resulted from virtual equality between Liberal and Populist deputies after the election, with the balance of power in the hands of 15 Communist deputies.

b. Political culture. An oligarchy of quasi-hereditary sectional clans, centered in Athens, had dominated Greek political and social life since independence. This dominance was increasingly challenged by a rising middle class, many of whom had come to Greece in the exchange of populations in 1923. Among the elite, the focus of interest was on European society and politics, rather than on domestic problems. British political influence was strong; there was some sense of inferiority toward Britain and other European countries, and attitudes toward them were a mixture of dependence, respect, and dislike.

(1) Freedom and democracy were highly valued; but small-group loyalties, competition for status and influence, and absence of the spirit of compromise, coupled with a general lack of any sense of civic responsibility, made the Greek versions of western European political institutions inefficient. There was a tendency to debate broad questions such as that of monarchy versus republic, which had only symbolic connection with the real problems of the day. Education stressed the ancient glory of Greece rather than pragmatic problem-solving or the meaning of modern political practice.

(2) Although the Greek public took a keen interest in national as well as local politics, they did not regard themselves as participants in the process; rather, perhaps, as affiliates (through family or regional connections or personal loyalties) of the political figures who did participate. The average Greek's loyalty was to his family and community, and this loyalty overrode civic obligation or obedience to law, although there was great pride in ethnic Greek identity and willingness to fight in defense of the nation. The average Greek's wants were relatively modest, and he expected little from the State. On the other hand, he cherished his liberty. There was little deference; every Greek considered himself the equal of every other Greek, although political and economic success were both coveted and admired.

(3) Greek political culture made the task of leadership exceedingly difficult, and with the exceptions of Venizelos and Metaxas,

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no preeminent non-Communist leaders emerged during the period studied. Strong leadership was especially needed to meet the country's problems after World War II, but none of the many political figures was able to provide it.

c. Political parties and interest groups. The winds of change, manifested as elsewhere in Europe by opposition of liberals to conservatives, began to blow in Greece before World War I. The conservative/liberal tension was greatly enhanced by personal rivalry between Constantine I and the elder Venizelos, their differing policies in World War I, and the tensions of the Greek defeat in Asia Minor and the subsequent massive populace exchange. All these tensions were caught up in the debate on the monarchy, and polarization of attitudes was intense between the conservative monarchists (Populists) and the Venizelists (Liberals), with assorted splinter groups supporting each. The extreme difficulty of political compromise in 1936 (together with a perceived Communist threat) was the proximate cause of the Metaxas dictatorship; it also was a large factor in the inability of the Greek Government and the guerrilla organization to make common cause after the departure of the Germans in 1944, although Communist policy was also an important element.

(1) Greek political parties--the Communists excepted--were loosely organized coalitions of factions composed of elite personages who had no political support as individuals and who competed for status and influence. There was no general membership and no real organization outside the National Assembly. The resemblance to a two-party European style was superficial and largely meaningless, except for the broad and unreconcilable difference of view between conservatives and Venizelists. One measure of the political parties' weakness was General Metaxas' policy of simply ignoring them--only the Communist Party was outlawed--while he exiled the principal opposition political leaders. Leaders and parties reemerged in Greece after liberation. The Populists and their allies gained a plurality in the April 1946 general elections but the parties' roles were no more central in responding to the different postwar problems than they had been previously, and the sterile monarchy/republic debate continued to dominate political life.

(2) Interest groups had a role in Greek politics, but with few exceptions it was a subordinate one; since the spirit of compromise was lacking, and political influence flowed primarily through family, regional, and factional ties rather than political channels of the modern type. The military establishment and the church were important interest groups; however, the church, secure in its position, was not a major actor on the political scene. Regional associations were important in representing the interests of the respective regions. Other associational interest groups, primarily economic, included labor unions; a union of civil servants; and associations of industrialists,

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shipowners, and bankers. In a sense, the royal family and its supporters constituted an interest group.

d. Communication. News spread quickly through publications, radio, and the informal networks centered around village coffeehouses and family connections. There was apparently no lack of awareness of political events. The relatively high degree of political mobilization theoretically supported democratic development, but it also heightened public discontent with the ineffectiveness of the political system in solving national problems.

e. External influences. Of the three original protectors of Greek independence, only the United Kingdom was politically influential in Greece during the preconflict period, although French cultural influence still was strong. The Soviet Union was influential in the Greek Communist Party before World War II, but the Communists at that time did not play a major political role. During the Metaxas period, German economic and political influence grew. Germany dominated the wartime Axis occupation of Greece (which comprised Italian, Bulgarian, and German forces in various areas). The UK harbored the Greek King and exile Government during the War and drew opprobrium from the liberal and Communist elements for allegedly seeking to reimpose the King on Greece. The British worked with Greek partisan forces during the War and were influential in promoting the abortive coalition between Government and partisan forces at the time of liberation. British troops landed with the Greek government when it returned to Athens. These troops fought the Communist-dominated liberation movement for control of Athens in December 1944 and January 1945. An Allied team supervised the general elections of April 1946. The Soviet Union generally followed a hands-off policy toward Greece, thus respecting its understanding with Churchill. Soviet satellites in the Balkans, however, actively encouraged and assisted the Communist-dominated liberation movement in its bid to capture control of Greece.

f. Communism in Greece.

(1) Although the Greek Communist Party was weakened by internal factionalism, and its popularity was diminished by the equivocal stand it had to take regarding a Balkan federation and Bulgarian claims to Macedonia, it was the only party to survive the Metaxas dictatorship with a functioning organization. Its survival was due to its clandestine apparatus. Communist popularity was greatest among intellectuals and the labor movement, particularly the discontented immigrants in northern Greece. In the 1930's, the Communist Party scored some electoral successes because of the proportional representation system and the use of united front tactics. In 1936, the 15-man Communist parliamentary delegation held the balance of power between the two large non-Communist contingents, and the Communists

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were able to call crippling general strikes. Fear of this influence opened the way for General Metaxas.

(2) The Communists, as the best-organized party, took the lead in organizing the resistance to the Germans during World War II. They attracted a great deal of liberal non-Communist cooperation and, by 1944, had established a political party with ambitions for taking over the Government. They fomented mutinies in the Greek Army in the Middle East, notably one in March 1944, which resulted in a purge of officers. They vacillated between assertion of control and cooperation with the exile Government--the vacillation indicating both factional differences in the Communist Party and the uncompromising attitude of the Government. The Communists' freedom of action was somewhat constrained, however, by the need to maintain control of their movement in the face of Yugoslav and Bulgarian ambitions; this factor may explain their decision to fight the British for Athens and their subsequent willingness to come to terms at Varkiza. In the end, the course of confrontation rather than compromise was chosen: the Communists and some of their political associates boycotted the elections of 1946, after having instructed their supporters to register, and fighting resumed shortly thereafter.

3. Economic factors. From 1923 to 1939, Greece had a semimodernized economy roughly comparable to that of Hungary. Greek per capita national income of around US\$60-US\$70 was higher than that of her Balkan neighbors, but Greece ranked low in per capita agricultural area and farm productivity. More than any other nation in the area, it was dependent on foreign trade and foreign income, especially from shipping, and thus highly sensitive to world economic conditions. Greek agriculture concentrated on specialized products, with needed grains imported from the Balkans or Canada. Its industry was small-scale, except for the small number of large plants concentrated in the Athens-Piraeus area. The economic growth rate up to 1939 averaged about 5 percent, despite refugee absorption in the 1920's and world depression in the 1930's.

a. The traditional sectors. Unlike many underdeveloped nations, Greece had traditional or slow-changing sectors which included many conventional modern categories: mining, foreign commerce, shipping, handicrafts, and cash crops such as tobacco. Livestock and meat, grapes, currants, sultanas, olives and olive oil, tobacco, and cotton were the principal agricultural products. Before 1931, imported wheat supplied the majority of basic food needs, but protectionist policies and price subsidies thereafter stimulated domestic production; basic cereals output increased by about 5 percent a year. At the war's outbreak, however, Greece was still a net importer for 40 percent of her wheat needs. Until after World War II, there was a good deal of disguised unemployment in the rural areas, but wartime privation and guerrilla activity drove people to the cities.

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b. Land tenure. The principal land problem in Greece was not the concentration of ownership often found in developing countries, but land fractioning. The distribution of large estates, begun under a "land to the tiller" provision in the 1911 Constitution, was virtually complete by 1932, and around half a million refugees from Asia Minor had been resettled, chiefly in northern Greece. The total area of cultivated land--around 5.5 million acres out of the country's total of 32 million--was increased by 30 percent from 1920 to 1940, partly by reclamation works carried out with foreign relief funds. Large holdings of former Turkish landlords had been divided up among the new arrivals. The average farmer's landholding was about 9 acres in the late 1930's, but these holdings were divided into numerous parcels averaging an acre apiece. According to one survey, the average distance of such parcels from the owners' houses was around 2 km. The inefficiency of such parcelization was increased by the scarcity of imported machinery and fertilizer. Grain yields were, accordingly, among the lowest in Europe. Yet according to an ECA survey after the War, land cultivation was capable of extension by well over 100 percent.

c. The modern sectors. The modern sectors' share of the national product was sizable in 1920 and remained fairly constant. Domestic enterprise benefited by the protectionism of the 1930's. In 1938, manufacturing accounted for 16.5 percent of net domestic product, and wholesale and retail trade another 11 percent, against 23.6 percent for agricultural crops and 13 percent for livestock. Most industry was conducted in small, family-sized units--partly due to Greek family traditions and character traits, but also partly due, perhaps, to the economies of doing business in units not subject to extensive Government regulation. The few large industries, concentrated for the most part in Athens and Piraeus, produced textiles, tobacco products, rubber, and paper. A small number of leading industrialists, with widely diversified interests, had important political connections.

d. Labor. Greece early enacted forward-looking measures for the protection of workers, whose number was swelled by the influx from Asia Minor after 1923. Since the number of large plants was small (only 1.1 percent of factories reported more than 25 workers as late as 1958), and plants were concentrated in urban areas, the impact of these measures for the workers' benefit was limited and uneven. Unions gained considerable strength, particularly in urban areas and among the Macedonian tobacco workers; they were penetrated by the Communists, who were able to lead a major general strike in April 1936. Metaxas established a Government labor federation to replace the previously existing labor groups--the 1942 repeal of his laws demonstrated that organized labor was a force of some political as well as economic significance. The agricultural labor force was inefficiently large until World War II. The postwar labor movement was a major arena for political maneuver and polarization; direct Government intervention in May-July 1946 overturned previous international mediation attempts.

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e. Finance and trade. Greek financial affairs were dominated by two major factors during the preconflict period: a high military budget and large foreign involvement. During the interwar period, 31 percent of the State budget, on the average, went to finance the military establishment; this percentage was lower in the early 1930's but higher under Metaxas. Another 32 percent of the budget, on the average, went to service and foreign debt until 1933, when Greece defaulted in part. In contrast, about 9 percent was allocated for social security and welfare payments of various kinds. By 1940, the external debt was around US\$600 million, or 1.5 times the annual national income; however, title to 40 percent of this amount was held within Greece. Foreign firms were active in such areas as construction, utilities, and tobacco processing. Annual trade deficits of 25-40 percent of total trade were offset by income from international shipping and emigre remittances. The deficit, together with heavy dependence upon foreign trade, made the economy very sensitive to international trends, as demonstrated by the heavy impact of the depression following 1929.

f. Impact of World War II. The war years had a drastic economic impact on Greece. Imports and trade were almost completely halted, including essential food imports (relief shipments starting after 1942); inflation reached at least 5 trillion percent; 2,000 of the 5,600 prewar villages were largely destroyed; 25 percent of all buildings were destroyed or damaged; the population was reduced by a third of a million by starvation, disease, and hostilities; and railroad lines and rolling stock were virtually wiped out, and roads heavily damaged. The Axis occupation divided Greece into three regions which were separate economically as well as politically. War-time confusion, damage, and uncertainty, combined with opportunism and profiteering, taught lessons to the public which conditioned postwar behavior and all but eliminated the influence of Government spending and credit on employment and production.

g. Postwar conditions. Postwar planning overestimated the agricultural share of Greek national product and failed to make adequate provision for the nonagricultural sector. Recovery was slower than anticipated. Relief food shipments from the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA) relieved hunger, but at the same time discouraged agricultural production. Other problems were ill-conceived price controls and financial policies, continuation of wartime black markets, insufficient imports of machinery and fertilizer, and lack of Government strength or will to implement firm economic recovery plans. Greek wartime damages and relief needs alerted the Allies to postwar requirements for recovery. British financing was considerable until 1948; US aid replaced it after 1947, and UNRRA relief was important until mid-1947. Nevertheless, Greek production

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recovered slowly, with agriculture reaching prewar levels in 1948 and industry in 1950-51. Inflation continued to be a severe urban problem, fueled by large Government deficits (30-50 percent), welfare payments, and a swollen civil service. The rigid currency "reform" of late 1944 was supported briefly by economic controls proposed by the Voulgaris administration, but overall inflation for 1945 reached 1,000 percent. Through 1946, price and currency stability was established by British financial intervention, but 1947 saw renewed persistent inflation. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Mission of 1946 labeled Greece as a "fair-weather economy." The heavy concentration of unemployed, welfare beneficiaries, and commercial profiteers in Athens contributed to the visibility of economic disparities and the gulf between hill villages and the metropole. Postwar economic "favors" from the Government helped to polarize and widen the clash of personal economic interests with national recovery objectives.

4. Sociological factors.

a. Demography. The Greek population (7.6 million in 1951) grew rather slowly during the period studied--hardly more than 1 percent a year overall. This figure, however, fails to show the stresses of the period. Birth and death rates were both among the highest in Europe. During the 1920's, population was augmented by the inflow of ethnic Greeks from Asia Minor, greatly exceeding outflow of Turkish residents in Greece. During World War II, starvation and disease took a heavy toll--one in 25 died, not counting the casualties of fighting or the liquidation of the Jewish minority by the Germans. During and after the war, the birth rate dropped somewhat because of later marriage and increase in birth control measures. By 1951, the median age was 26, a high figure for a developing country. Wartime dislocation and growing pressure of population on the land led to internal migration, chiefly into Greater Athens and central Greece, Thessaly, and Crete, leaving other areas with less population in 1951 than 11 years previously. Nevertheless, Greece in 1951 was still a country of villages. Only two or three cities (Athens, Thessalonike, and possibly Patras) compared in organization and activity with western European metropolitan centers. As a result of the exchange of populations, Greece had a very homogeneous population: 95 percent were ethnic Greeks, and the minorities--200,000 Albanians, 130,000 Turks, 80,000 Bulgars, 60,000 Vlachs (related to Rumanians), and a few thousand remaining Jews--were not a major problem in the national life.

b. Education. The Greek Constitution provided for free and compulsory elementary education; but, in 1951, 2,800 villages were without schools, 12 percent of the elementary school age group were not in school, and there was a 50-percent dropout rate by the third grade. About 15 percent of elementary school pupils went on to secondary school. Curricula emphasized classical subjects, although the exact sciences were introduced in a curriculum reform in 1912. In

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the few institutions of higher learning, emphasis was on legal and medical training. Only a small minority entered technical fields and agriculture. Control of education was increasingly centralized in the Ministry of Education. Although elementary schools had locally elected boards, their power by the 1930's was limited to matters concerning buildings and operating problems. Teachers were recruited and paid by the State, which also prescribed a countrywide standard curriculum. Literacy was about 50 percent in 1920 and by 1951 had risen to 76 percent. The net effect of the educational system was thus to increase the average Greek's ability to read and write but not to understand the problems of modern life, while a large proportion of the favored few who went on to higher education were prepared only for intellectual employment and had few opportunities unless absorbed by the Government service; hence, they were soon part of the urban discontented.

c. Communications. In 1939, there were 6.1 radios per 1,000 population in Greece. By 1955, this figure had increased tenfold to 61. In 1952, 68 newspapers had a circulation of 188 per 1,000 population. However, both radios and newspapers reached a far wider audience, through the informal communications networks centered around village coffeehouses, itinerant peddlers, family relationships (especially at periodic family reunions), and extensive private correspondence. It seems clear that information traveled far and fairly rapidly, but it also seems likely that the messages were readily distorted and sensationalized.

d. Religion. Membership in the Greek Orthodox Church was one of the two criteria of Greek identity (the other being the Greek language), and the church was an all-pervasive institution in Greek life. Its hierarchy of bishops and priests was nominally headed by the Ecumenical Patriarch at Istanbul, but in practice the affairs of the church were controlled by the Holy Synod, composed of bishops approved by the State under the chairmanship of the Metropolitan of Athens. The salaries of parish priests were paid by the State, which thus had considerable influence in church affairs. In general, the church was conservative and intolerant of change. Superstition and classical mythology were mixed with Christian doctrine in popular beliefs. There were no taboos on birth control; and celibacy was not required of parish priests, although it was required of the higher dignitaries. Only 13 percent of the parish priests had a higher education, and a few priests were illiterate. Committees of laymen assisted in parish affairs, but they were chosen by the priests and appointed by the bishops.

e. Village society. The great majority of the Greek populace lived in villages or in small towns where similar patterns of living prevailed. Pastoral villages in the mountains, agricultural villages in the plains, and fishing villages along the coasts differed

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somewhat in activities and attitudes; the mountaineers were somewhat more isolated, less educated, led poorer and more strenuous lives, and were more inclined to violence. Growth in population on the plains, as a result of the influx from Asia Minor, had caused tensions with the mountaineers, whose opportunities for part-time farming and other work on the plains were reduced. Although loyalty to one's village was a widespread attitude among the Greeks, community cooperation was made difficult by the deep-rooted suspicion and rivalry between family groups. Traditional local autonomy in political affairs had been almost wholly lost as a result of Government centralization. Aside from the church and its festivals, the principal focus of community social life for the men was the coffeehouses. There was a marked difference in culture, living standards, and language between the rural areas and the urban centers. Rural folk were aware of the difference and attached prestige to the easier and more varied city life. In general, rural folk felt little concern for national politics, although there are indications that they were aware of political developments and interested in them.

f. Urban society. Large towns and cities were market and political centers with some handicrafts and, in larger centers, some industry. Although the pace of life was quicker and Western dress and manners were in evidence, real social and economic similarity to western European cities was limited to the two or three largest Greek cities, where the modern economic sector was almost wholly concentrated. Towns were largely divided into community groupings, each with its own shops and coffeehouses and its community spirit. The older suburbs of Athens also had such communities, but not the newer suburbs, inhabited primarily by professionals. Interest groups of the modern sort--social and cultural associations, trade organizations, professional societies, labor unions--were mostly in the urban centers. In these centers, also, were the unskilled unemployed migrants from the countryside and the discontented intellectuals, both raw material for movements of dissent and reform.

g. The family. Throughout Greek society, the family was the basic social and economic unit; its requirements took precedence over individual needs, and individual privacy within the family was unknown. Family loyalties extended beyond the immediate household to include collateral relatives out to second cousins, and further in the case of powerful distant relatives. Family ties also extended to godparents and relatives by marriage. Obligations to the family and its members outranked or displaced citizenship or community obligations. The institution of the family was remarkably stable throughout the preconflict period, although there was a trend toward separation of nuclear husband-wife-child groups, particularly in urban areas, and toward greater individual latitude. Dependence on the family offset the disruptive effect of increased mobility, propaganda, and war casualties. It also helped to bridge the gap between country and city and

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between social and economic classes. On the other hand, the strong influence of the family inhibited larger loyalties necessary in a modern state and led to fragmentation of land, because of the custom of dividing it among the children.

h. Class structure. The Greeks generally lacked class consciousness, although they respected economic and social success. The political and economic destinies of the country had, however, been traditionally in the hands of a small group of elite families constituting an urban aristocracy. Their control was increasingly challenged by the new rich and the growing body of professional men, as well as by the upwardly mobile group of educated people, often from the country, who were unable to find positions commensurate with their expectations.

i. Cultural traits. Although the Greeks regarded the individual as subordinate to the family unit, they also had a highly developed sense of personal worth (philotimo) which underlay the Greek devotion to freedom, made everyone sensitive to slights to his person or his family or national loyalties, and led to a strong egalitarian feeling which militated against rigid class structure but also made impersonal institutional structure difficult. Philotimo led to a sense that Greek troubles could not be the result of Greek faults. It also intensified interpersonal and interfamilial rivalry for power and status. As noted above, family loyalty took precedence over other loyalties; obedience to law was not a virtue in itself, and a man who brought gain for himself and his family through evasion of the law was highly regarded. Diligence and frugality were highly valued; but intellectual and nonmanual labor was valued more highly than work with the hands. Long-range planning and long-range progress were valued less than improvisation and short-term gain. Schedules, routine, and punctuality--all necessary for complex organizational activity--were valued negatively, if at all.

j. Public health. Prior to the confusion of World War II, the general death rate in Greece had been falling somewhat, but infant mortality remained unchanged in the 1930's, and both death and birth rates were high. Malaria was a major killer and disabler: a quarter of the population was infected with it in the 1920's, and, although malaria deaths were cut in half in the late 1930's, they rose again during the war. Other major causes of death were tuberculosis, pneumonia, diarrhea, and enteritis. The high agrarian birth rate was stimulated in the 1920's, because the Government's land distribution program assigned farmland to husband-wife units, thus encouraging more marriages. In 1928, life expectancy of 49 years for men, 51 for women, resembled that of the United States and England in the first decade of the century. Nutrition before the war, averaging 2,600 calories per day, was one of the lowest in Europe; it was deficient in dairy products and protein. During the depression of the 1930's, malnutrition was acute in Macedonia especially during periods when tobacco crops

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could not be sold. During World War II, there were 300,000 deaths from starvation, and child mortality reached 90 percent in some areas. Reform of public health programs was undertaken after World War I with assistance of the League of Nations, but it made slow progress through the period under study. One-third of the 1935-36 health and welfare budget was spent on pensions and assistance to war victims--another example of the large share of Greek resources taken by war and military activity. The average Greek apparently was not consciously aware of, or concerned about, deficiencies in public health measures. Worsening conditions were partly responsible for the fact that Communist guerrillas drew their greatest support from people most severely affected.

5. Military factors. Balkan political conditions and Greek irredentism engendered a disproportionately large military establishment with high prestige and a politically conscious, influential, well-educated officer corps. Military officers often held civilian politicians in low esteem. The Armed Forces became not the servant of the civil society but an important political force in it. Officers were called upon to occupy civil administrative positions and to serve as Cabinet Ministers of War and Navy. The Armed Forces controlled a large proportion of the State budget and most of its coercive power. Under these circumstances, in times of social change within Greece, it was hardly surprising that the military played an active political role, either by supporting one or another civilian group or, as frequently happened, in seizing power themselves. A Military League functioned as a political interest group from 1909 on. After the purge of 1935, however, the military were less of a factor in civilian politics.

a. A compulsory service system gave the Greek Armed Forces access to all trainable males. From these conscripts, Reserve officers were selected competitively. The officers served with a regiment and then passed to reserve status to pursue civilian careers. Regular Army officers came from a 4-year military academy and a 3-year school open to noncommissioned officers. The progressive school system, consisting of branch schools, general staff school, war college, and assignment to foreign military schooling, assured professional competence and was an added factor in military influence.

b. The Greek Army, organized along French and British lines, was primarily defense-oriented during the period studied. It garrisoned the defense sectors of the country with infantry troops which were organized, equipped, and trained primarily as frontier guards. Strengthened by the King and by Metaxas in the late 1930's with French training and German equipment, the Army gained in morale and effectiveness, recovering from the low state which had followed the defeat in Turkey. On the eve of World War II, it comprised two corps and 14 divisions: four of the divisions were little more than reinforced brigades. It successfully resisted the Italian invasion of 1940 but fell before overwhelming German forces in 1941 despite British assistance.

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c. The Greek Navy consisted of approximately five squadrons, each with one cruiser and 20 destroyers, plus submarines and coast artillery. It was weakened by political involvement and by obsolete equipment but gained in capacity with British training and served with distinction under British command during the war. A small separate Air Force, constituted during the 1930's, was organized to support the Army and Navy.

d. The Axis occupation gave rise to the unconventional warfare concepts of creating units supplied and directed by Allied liaison officers to harass the enemy. At the same time, the chaotic conditions created by the war fostered the formation of a Communist-dominated liberating group and fighting force, dedicated to establishing a new Communist-oriented regime. This force, ELAS, with its parent organization, EAM, did much to eliminate other Greek resistance fighters and put itself in position for a takeover. Although inhibited by British control of logistic support, it gained arms and equipment from the surrender of Italian units. The German forces were unable to exert complete control in Greece because of the requirements of the Soviet front.

e. A small military establishment, rebuilt by the Greek Government-in-exile, assisted Allied forces in the Mediterranean. As a result of two mutinies during the war, this force was purged of nonrightist elements. It returned to Greece with the exile Government, supported by British troops. In 1946, it was hastily reorganized, with British advice, to meet the threat of insurgency.

f. After attempts at coalition between the contending forces of right and left in 1944 collapsed, ELAS sought to wrest Athens militarily from the British and Greek forces, in December 1944, to secure control of the country. This attempt failed. Miscalculation on the part of the Communists as to when the time was ripe for confrontation, together with polarization between right and left and the support given the opposing sides by the British and Americans and by the eastern Europeans, respectively, set the stage for the 1946-49 conflict.

g. Civil control up to 1940 was maintained by a Gendarmerie organized along military lines to maintain law and order throughout the country, supplemented by a city police force on the British model for four cities (Athens, Piraeus, Patras, and Corfu) and a rural police established in 1938 under the Ministry of Agriculture for farming communities. The Gendarmerie, numbering about 20,000 in 1940, was under control of the Ministry of Public Order and administered by the War Ministry. It was a carefully selected and well-trained force, distributed among 1,500 stations and posts. The cities' police had upwards of 4,000 personnel, mostly in Athens. The role of the security forces was increased under the Metaxas dictatorship, particularly

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by the 1938 law for safety of the social order, which severely circumscribed civil rights.

h. During the war, the Axis-dominated puppet government established "security battalions" to resist extension of ELAS control. These units became a source of serious contention after liberation, because they became for many a symbol of collaborationism and rightist repression. They were disbanded by the Greek Government on its return, but their personnel continued active against the liberation front for some time thereafter, a fact which aggravated the conflict between right and left. The Gendarmerie and police were reorganized with British assistance in 1946.

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CHAPTER 2

POLITICAL FACTORS

Section I. Political Culture and Socialization.

by Donald S. Macdonald

6. Historical background. Before 1832, Greece had never been a nation-state, although Alexander of Macedonia conquered an empire and Greek culture later dominated the Byzantine Empire. Nevertheless, the tradition of the classical Greek city-states, and their great political philosophers, and the imperial sway of Byzantium gave the Greeks both in the homeland in the "dispersion" a feeling of national greatness. This sentiment was constantly encouraged after independence by the schools' emphasis on the classical traditions.

a. The Turkish era. The Turks ruled their subject peoples, including the Greeks, as quasi-autonomous national groups identified by their religious affiliations. Thus, Greeks throughout the Empire were governed in part through the hierarchy of the Orthodox Church under the Patriarch in Constantinople and in part through local leaders chosen by the Greek communities themselves. Church officials were hostages to the central Turkish administration for the good behavior of the Greeks, which tended to make the church both conservative and complaisant. On the other hand, the church became the leading symbol of Greek nationalism during these four centuries, since it was the one institution which embodied Greek identity in a heathen environment. At the same time, the decentralized character of Turkish administration engendered a firm tradition of community home rule.¹ Both church officials and local heads and councils were chosen by elections of sorts, although the specialized requirements of the jobs--e.g., for local or provincial administrators, the ability to deal successfully with Turkish officials on behalf of the community--tended to keep them within families with established connections or considerable means.

b. Independent Greece. The weakening of the Turkish Empire permitted the Greeks to assert their independence, inspired by the examples of the American and French Revolutions. Independence was first proclaimed by the Bishop of Patras at Kalavryta in 1821 (a town massacred and gutted by the Germans in 1943), but disunity of the Greeks among themselves and the intervention of Mohammed Ali of Egypt on behalf of the Sultan would have made their struggles unavailing except for support given by Great Britain, France, and Russia--support which began a long history of foreign involvement in Greek affairs. Although somewhat visionary Constitutions had been drawn up by the revolutionaries on the French model, the Government finally established

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in 1832 with the aid of the three protecting powers was a monarchy without a constitution. A young Bavarian prince named Otho was given the throne, and brought a group of Bavarian officials to administer his kingdom.

c. The monarchy. The choice of the monarchical form, and of a foreign monarch, was made partly because at the time almost all the countries of Europe were monarchies of conservative bent, and no other form would have attracted the outside support necessary for the new State's survival.² The original territory of Greece was less than half its present extent; it could not have held its own against the Turks on its northern boundary without the support of the three protecting powers. In addition, the Greeks--although they had had an ethnic Greek diplomat in Russian service (Capodistrias) as President during the revolutionary era--recognized the difficulty of maintaining national unity under the leadership of any of their own principal figures, because of the rivalries among them.³ However, nothing about the monarchical regime gave it any indigenous source of legitimacy, let alone patriotic support. The autocratic administration of Otho and his Bavarian associates roused his subjects to revolt, abetted by the British and Russians. The King was forced to accept a Constitution and an elective Assembly in 1843; but continued autocracy provoked his eventual rejection by the Greeks and the importation in 1863 of a Danish prince in his place, who as George I established the present Gluecksberg dynasty. For many years, the Greek political factions were identified chiefly by their foreign connections as the British, French, and Russian parties.

d. Reign of George I. George I was quite successful in his long reign, partly because of his impartiality and willingness to follow constitutional procedures, and partly because the dream of a Greater Greece, which would bring all Greeks into a single nation, was largely fulfilled during his reign: Thessaly was acquired in 1881; Crete in 1913; and Macedonia, Thrace, and Epirus in the two Balkan wars of 1912-13 (figure 2). An uprising by military officers in 1909 inaugurated an era of reform under the leadership of the Greek statesman, Eleutherios Venizelos. While the new order did not immediately challenge the monarchy, it heralded an era of military preeminence in politics.

e. World War I and its effects. George I was assassinated in 1913 as he was touring the capital of the newly acquired Macedonia. His son, Constantine I (called "The Bulgar-slayer" for his military role in the Balkan Wars) was soon at odds with Venizelos regarding policy in World War I. Both men were strong and antipathetic personalities. Constantine, who was married to the Kaiser's sister and had been educated in Germany, wanted to preserve Greek neutrality; while Venizelos, both from pro-British sentiment and by calculation of Greek national advantage, wanted Greece to fight with the Allies. Constantine, who did not maintain his father's wise detachment, had the

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support of the conservative and moneyed interests, while Venizelos had the support of the rising urban middle class. In 1916, Venizelos, with Allied encouragement established a rival Greek government in Thessalonike; Constantine was eventually obliged to abdicate in favor of his second son, Alexander. Constantine returned to the throne on the latter's death, to be ejected anew after the Asian Minor defeat and a military coup d'etat by General Plastiras, which led to establishment of a republic in 1924. Venizelos, for his part, lost the election of 1920, despite his diplomatic successes in the postwar territorial division of Turkey, but he returned to power in 1928. The deep division of the country and its people between royalists and republicans came in large part from the tensions of the war and the rivalry between Constantine and Venizelos, although Venizelos himself probably favored reduction of the monarch's power rather than abolition of the monarchy.

f. Defeat in Asia Minor. One of the most traumatic episodes of Greek history, which ended King Constantine's second reign, was the abortive Asia Minor Campaign. Constantine and his Prime Minister--again with Allied encouragement--in 1921 launched a Greek Army in Smyrna (Izmir) on a campaign which scored a series of initial successes against the defeated and demobilizing Turks. Kemal Ataturk, however, was able to rally the Turks against the Greeks, as their supply lines and forces became extended, first to hold against them and then to throw them back into the sea. Bitterness over this ill-starred adventure led to a dictatorship by officers of the defeated Greek Army, with General Plastiras as Premier; to the final abdication of Constantine; to the establishment of a republic in 1924 (after a brief reign by Constantine's son, George II); and to the execution of six members of the cabinet which launched the Asia Minor Campaign. The result was intensification of the royalist republican differences.

g. The interwar period and restoration of the monarchy. The republican regime did not solve Greek political problems, which were aggravated by the depression of 1929. There were military revolts in 1933 and 1935, neither of which succeeded; but the latter one led to a royalist Government which held a plebiscite, heavily falsified, and restored George II to the throne. The 1935 revolt, with which Venizelos had associated himself in a bid to return to power, also marked the end of his career.

(1) Elections in the following year resulted in an even division of the new Assembly between the republican (Venizelist) and the royalist forces, with a 14-man Communist contingent holding the potential balance of power. At the same time, General Metaxas, who had been named War Minister to purge the Army, succeeded to the premiership through the natural death of the Prime Minister. (Three other elderly Greek political leaders also died at about the same time.) A prolonged political deadlock ensued.

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(2) After 3 months of unsuccessful negotiations to form a government, Metaxas asked for extraconstitutional emergency powers, which the King gave him. Greek democracy thus ended in the face of conservative fears of growing Communist political power, as demonstrated both in the 1936 election results and in the general strike in April of that year. (Another general strike was scheduled for the day following Metaxas' acquisition of dictatorial power.)

h. The Metaxas dictatorship. Metaxas was motivated not only by a conservative fear of communism, but by disgust at the traditional Greek political game and by a genuine desire to reform and vitalize the country's administration and economy, as well as by the taste for power. In the beginning, the King certainly, and Metaxas possibly, saw the dictatorship as a temporary expedient for enforcing needed reforms; and the people, weary of the perennial political charades in Athens, were prepared to acquiesce. So were the British, who were influential in Greek affairs. Initial reforms had a favorable impact.

(1) As time went on, however, the dictatorship appeared more permanent, more dictatorial, and less acceptable. The King, who had set out to reign as a constitutional monarch, was increasingly linked with the Metaxas regime. Metaxas himself, though dedicated and honest, lacked the inspirational qualities essential for anyone in Greece asserting such sweeping authority. The usual police-state apparatus (though mild by comparison with the German model) became steadily more entrenched. There was censorship of press and education and an attempt to develop a national ideology. A national youth movement appeared with Nazi overtones.

(2) No single political party like the Communist or Nazi was established, but several corporative organizations were set up, including a labor federation. Parliament, which was prorogued after the 1936 elections, never met again; local elections were abolished; and the civil service ranks were purged. Many political leaders were exiled. Opposition, though muted, was growing, and revolt broke out of Crete.⁴ However, Metaxas' foresight in preparing the nation for war, and his courage in the face of an Italian ultimatum in 1940, secured for him an honored place in history.

i. World War II and enemy occupation. The Italian defeat by the Greek Armed Forces in 1940 caused the Germans to march against Greece in 1941 and occupy Athens and other strategic places, while the Italians and Bulgarians occupied the rest of the country. (Successful Greek resistance to the Italians upset Hitler's timetable, and in some historians' view may have been a factor in the failure of his campaign against the Soviet Union.) King George and the Government went into exile, and the Germans established a subservient Greek regime in Athens.

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(1) A few Greek military officers and units fought with the Allies, while large numbers of Greeks organized into guerrilla bands against the Germans. Violence and bloodshed were increasingly commonplace, as guerrillas fought the Germans and the Germans exacted reprisals, often brutally.

(2) Greek political rivalries also led to small-scale civil war between guerrilla units of differing persuasions--although the majority of the effective units were absorbed, with varying degrees of willingness, into the left-oriented resistance organization known as EAM and its military arm, ELAS. By the end of the occupation, EAM/ELAS had established a quasi-governmental structure in much of Greece, held elections, and established a central administrative organ.

(3) In 1943, the occupation government established German-armed "security battalions" to combat ELAS. The Germans apparently capitalized on Greek political differences and the conservative fear of communism to promote dissension. Establishment of the security battalions was one reflection of their success in this objective.

j. The Government-in-exile. Continuing political rivalries also beset the Greek Government-in-exile and its Armed Forces. There were mutinies in 1943 and 1944. A British-sponsored conference in Cairo in 1943 among Ministers of the exiled Government, resistance leaders from the Greek mainland, and representatives of the pre-Metaxas political parties foundered on the issue of the King's return. The exile Government and the British supported his immediate return, but EAM/ELAS (supported in varying degrees by the other Greek participants) wanted it deferred until after a plebiscite. Underlying this difference was the struggle for political power in the postwar regime, as well as the long-standing controversy over the monarchy. Following the 1944 mutiny, a conference of the various Greek political elements in Beirut succeeded in working out a formula for cooperation which brought EAM representatives into the Cabinet, but the arrangement soon broke down.

k. Liberation and revolt. The Germans began evacuating Greece in August 1944, and the Greek Government moved back to Athens with a British military contingent to promote and harass the German withdrawal. There was general rejoicing at reestablishment of independence; but political emotions and power struggles, plus the sufferings and destruction of war and the abysmal economic conditions, created an exceedingly complex, delicate, and confused situation.⁵ Royalists were ranged against republicans, resistance fighters against those they considered collaborators with the enemy, left against right, victims of wartime violence against those they considered the perpetrators. The British, rightly or wrongly, were believed by most Greeks to support the King at all costs.

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(1) Various elders, political leaders jockeyed for position in Athens, paying little heed to crying economic and social needs, while the EAM continued to dominate much of the areas evacuated by the Germans. "The old-line politicians like everyone else, were intellectually and morally unprepared to cope with the radical perturbations of the socioeconomic order which the war had brought to Greece."⁶

(2) Police violence against an EAM-sponsored demonstration in Athens precipitated an EAM attempt to capture Athens and other centers, which was defeated by the British and Government forces in over a month of bloody conflict. Elections under Allied observation were held in March 1946 but were boycotted by many EAM supporters. Polarization of sentiment grew, as did the resort to violence by Government and rightwing forces, until the conflict became full-scale civil war.

7. Political values and orientation. Observers of the Greek scene all agreed on the high interest in politics exhibited everywhere by people of all social levels. When the newspapers were free, they were filled with national politics and political commentary--often sensationalistic and highly partisan--in contrast to US newspaper emphasis on local happenings. Politics was a favorite topic for long and animated discussions, even in village coffeehouses. Though the literature is not explicit on the point, it would appear that, for most simple folk, politics was a spectator rather than a participator sport. Woodhouse says that although politics is indeed the "national sport" of the Greeks, the peasant "does not understand it as played by professionals."⁷ However, political power was eagerly sought after and struggled for by those who had the necessary abilities or resources. One of the reasons given for the short life of Greek cabinets was the large number of political outs wanting to have their turn at a Ministry.

a. Efficacy. The average Greek seems to have had supreme confidence in his ability to fill a political role. Every Greek was his own best Prime Minister.⁸ He believed in his capacity to improvise to meet any situation or problem. At the voting level of political participation, it can be inferred that the citizen regarded his vote as important, although he voted for people rather than issues. Lee believed that the absence in Greece of political bosses, such as were found in US cities, was due to the Greek's belief that his vote was "too personal, too much bound by personal loyalty [to a candidate] to be bound by self-interest."⁹

b. Nationalism and patriotism. Greek national pride was strong and universal--an extension, it would seem, of the Greek's individual pride and identity. It was manifested in resistance to Italian and German invasion; in wide support for the 19th century "Great Idea" of a Greater Greece; in the general belief in the rightness of military

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duty; and in countless oral and written tributes to the greatness of Greek culture and tradition.* But this pride and patriotism were connected hardly at all with the State, the monarchy, the law, or other governmental institutions in the abstract. Individual leaders could evoke patriotism, as Venizelos did, but because of their personal stature rather than because of their institutional roles. However, many ordinary Greeks appeared sincerely to support the King and the monarchy, even before the fear of the left drove many to regard him as their savior.¹⁰

c. Group loyalty. The primary Greek loyalty was to his family, which traditionally was quite extensive. Family responsibility took precedence over abstract concepts of honesty or impartiality (chapter 4, section II). To a lesser extent, similar loyalty operated toward one's native village. There were numerous cases of Greeks who throughout their lives, even though they moved to Athens or overseas, continued in contact with their native villages and felt responsible for aiding them. Considerable numbers of schools throughout Greece, for example, were paid for by wealthy sons of the communities so favored. In the light of this cultural orientation, what the American called nepotism or favoritism, or even profiteering and black-marketing, became simply duty, since loyalty to any institution broader than family and village was weak or nonexistent.

d. Individualism. Dorothy Lee dwells extensively on the importance of *philotimo*, one's personal worth and dignity. She records that many of the cases before the Court of Common Pleas involved offense to *philotimo* in the sense of explicit or implicit personal slights. This concept appears to have underlain the Greek individualism in politics and social life which was noted by every observer, and the general feeling that all men were of equal worth, even though they might achieve differing degrees of success and power (chapter 4, section I).

e. Inferiority. There are two possible sources of Greek feelings of inferiority: the long centuries of Turkish suzerainty, and the advanced material progress of western Europe. Pollis' comment on attitudes of the Greek elite toward foreigners is illustration. One extreme observer compared Greek political and social attitudes with

*The Greek Ambassador to the United Kingdom told an audience in 1943: "This is in brief what ancient Greece means to the modern Greek: An inexhaustible source of inspiration in all circumstances. Whenever the modern Greek knows he had responded to the urge of the Hellenic tradition he is at peace with himself whatever the cost. In the literary and artistic treasure-house of Ancient Greece we modern Greeks find our categorical imperatives."¹²⁷

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those of blacks in the United States and ascribed the parallel to Turkish domination.¹¹ The widely noted Greek assertion of pride in his own heritage could be interpreted in part as compensation for inferiority feelings, and the inclination of the Greeks to look for and utilize foreign influence and advice has been noted by several writers. As for material inferiority, a number of writers noted the unhappiness of students and other travelers abroad who saw the unfavorable contrast between Greek and western European conditions;¹² yet it seems doubtful that this translated into cultural inferiority feelings. Rather, it probably acted as a source of dissatisfaction with political and economic leadership, the impact of which was mitigated by the Greek cultural propensity toward simplicity and frugality in living.

f. Public morality.

(1) Although reports of corruption in Government multiplied after World War II, this does not seem to have been a large problem previously. There was great competition for political power and position, and the spoils system pervaded the Government service, but apparently the game was played for its own sake as much as for material profit.¹³ The Greek Prime Ministers, for example, mostly died poor.

The great difficulty was not corruption per se, but the lack of responsibility toward the body politic that would have impelled Governments and administrations to work for general progress and prosperity, and the priority given to family and community responsibilities over those to the State.

(2) When Geoffrey Chandler (a British Army officer) made this point to an old Greek colonel, the latter remarked that Chandler simply did not understand Greek politics, and proceeded to explain them: "My politician is in power--I eat, you starve. Your politician is in power--you eat, I starve. That is what really happens."¹⁴ According to the same source, many village committees entrusted with distribution of critically needed UNRRA supplies "favored their friends and discriminated against their political foes," leading to Greek demands for the British to do the distributing.¹⁵ Woodhouse (a British officer who served with the Greek resistance) comments that there is "no contrast of ethic between public service and private enterprise."¹⁶ (One analysis of corruption in developing countries makes a similar point about Nigeria, and notes that in England itself a special ethic for public service was a late 19th century development.)

g. Irrendentism--the "great idea." According to the talented Greek scholar, Kaltchas, the main object of the Greek State from its inception was seen not as improving the welfare of its citizens, but as extending its boundaries to include all Greeks.¹⁷ The attention of statesmen and people alike therefore was fixed on the international scene, and the country engaged in costly unnecessary, and embarrassing

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military enterprises in the 1860's, 1880's, 1890's, and 1920's" for "the romantic dream of rebuilding the Byzantine Empire."¹⁸ Not all the consequences of this preoccupation were bad, but the costs were heavy in terms of internal development, from which both resources and attention were diverted. Even in 1945, a Greek journalist was enlarging on the theme of unredeemed territories, and a bishop could evoke a spontaneous outburst of enthusiasm from his congregation by demanding that Sofia should be Greek.¹⁹

h. The political use of violence.

(1) During the centuries of Turkish rule, a tradition developed of bandits or andarte in the hills, who symbolized national independence and opposition and operated--ideally, at least--in Robin Hood style. A 19th century French observer said that the population

. . . saw itself robbed by the brigands as a woman of the common people feels herself beaten by her husband, while admiring how well he strikes. The loyal moralists complain of the excesses committed in the country as a father deplures the pranks of his son.²⁰ One complains of it on the surface, one loves it beneath.

The Greeks distinguished themselves as sturdy fighters for their country's cause. Political assassination had not been uncommon, and blood vengeance was taken when a family had been seriously wronged.

(2) Yet internecine fighting does not seem to have characterized the Greeks before World War II. Ambassador McVeagh in 1936 commented that the Greek, when his basic wants are met, "dislikes violence and loves talk more than any blessing which can only come through bestirring himself at risk of life and limb."²¹

(3) It would appear that the violence in Greece during and after that war resulted from a combination of the old andarte tradition with resistance to the Germans, the latter's brutal tactics of suppression and reprisal, the tensions born of the Metaxas dictatorship, the drastic privations of the wartime period, the influence of Communist doctrines of force, and growing political polarization aggravated by fear of communism. But "it is hard to place a finger on the trait (of Greek character) which led to torture before murder and which killed by mutilation," though "the actual murderers were probably few."²²

(4) Waymack, a thoughtful observer of the Greek situation, offers this explanation:

From 1936 until 1946 democracy was denied all chance to practice. Devotion to it was driven underground

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The habit of deciding things, however heatedly, by ballots was replaced for ten years, by the dictatorship, the war and the occupation--by the technique of the bullet and the knife. Ten years in which violence was the only possible recourse of anti-totalitarians inevitably gave the lead to extremists²³

Chandler notes also that motives of revenge "often understandable but never permissible among the forces of law and order, played a large part in persecution and political discrimination" after the Varkiza Agreement of 1945.²⁴ Such actions provoked retaliation in kind, and consequent escalation.

i. Freedom and democracy. The deep-seated dedication of every Greek to freedom, for himself and for Greece, was widely noted. He was willing to fight for it and was culturally oriented toward courage, firmness, fortitude, and physical strength and agility. He regarded himself as the equal of every other man and had independence of mind and spirit. Yet the Greeks themselves often said that they needed a dictator to meet national problems.²⁵ Moreover, Chandler noted "the docility with which crowds could be manipulated and the readiness with which they could be induced to shout for some cause or other of which when questioned they showed little understanding."²⁶ "The strength of Greece lay in the people and their vitality; but the individualism from which it sprang . . . meant that for lack of direction this vitality was dissipated like the autumn rains"²⁷

j. Attitude toward government, law, and authority. The quality of deference toward established authority, which Bagehot emphasized in The English Constitution as an important element of British parliamentary democracy, was largely lacking in Greece outside the family and locality. Moreover, group activity of the sort taken for granted in the United States cannot easily proceed in Greece, unless it is definable in family-like terms or based on interpersonal relations. A Greek feels no obligation to respect the law or impersonal authority. Even the quality of honesty is not necessarily a virtue outside of family, friends, and community. The emphasis is on cleverness in obtaining one's own or one's family's objectives, irrespective of constraints like abstract loyalty or honesty.

The concept of an institutional role has been nonexistent and the person occupying an institutional position has been viewed as serving his own interest and the interests of those he represents which are never the interests of the nation.²⁸

(1) Moreover, although Kaltchas cites a preindependence example to show that even the peasantry understand the significance of a Constitution,²⁹ the institutions and forms of Greek Government have

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constantly changed throughout history as politicians debated the merits of this or that system, drawing their arguments more from political theory than from indigenous experience. Chandler notes that even in the heat and urgency of the situation in 1946, political leaders responded to their problems with sterile constitutional debate for or against the monarchy, rather than with constructive action to meet the current political and economic emergency. This was a form of protection in the psychological sense, doomed to frustration because the object of their attack had virtually nothing to do with the real causes of the situation.

(2) Government in Greece was therefore weak, not only because the Greeks preferred lofty discussion, improvisation, and personal dealings to objective planning and organization, but also because their attention was constantly preoccupied with the forms of Government, which never became firmly settled, rather than with the issues which the Government, whatever its form, should set itself to resolve. This situation had a regenerative effect: the inability of Government to cope with the difficult problems of the thirties led to popular disillusionment and further reduction of popular support and participation, rather than to the intensification needed for effective action. The Metaxas dictatorship was a result.

(3) Yet, as a number of observers have noted, the politicians learned nothing in 10 years of forced inactivity, and when they returned to liberated Greece, the weary old debates and political games began all over again. It is this situation, in part, which Chandler had in mind when he suggests (correctly or not) that the basic British error in the postwar period was not what it did, but what it failed to do in forcing more effective Greek action on the acute economic, social, and security problems it faced.³⁰

(4) In one sense the Greeks had a problem in the thirties somewhat parallel to that of the United States: a serious economic crisis called for Government action, yet the long laissez-faire tradition of largely untrammelled private enterprise provided little basis on which to institute such action. The United States was far more successful than Greece, not only because of its economic insights (the Greeks had good economists, too), but because the American people were willing to cooperate with their Government, while the Greeks were distrustful and even contemptuous of theirs.

h. Attitude toward foreign countries. Lee suggests that the Greeks rationalized their acceptance of foreign assistance by comparing it to the beneficence of a relative, which was expected and proper, but that they were resentful of a patronizing attitude or of impersonal treatment. Whether this is a correct explanation is perhaps open to question. Aside from the family image, Greeks, from the inception of their State, have realistically placed great importance on their

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international relations. Additionally, following their brave and unexpectedly strong resistance to the Italians and Germans in World War II, the Greeks believed--not without reason--that they had sacrificed much in the Allied cause, and deserved Allied help in postwar reconstruction--more than in fact they got until 1947, when the United States commenced its assistance.

(1) A remarkable early illustration of the acceptance of foreign support is an act by a group of revolutionary leaders in 1825, voluntarily surrendering Greek sovereignty to Great Britain--an act that Lord Castlereagh found embarrassing and which was never followed through. (Mohammed Ali was attacking Greece at the time, and British philhellenism, promoted by Lord Byron and others, doubtless influenced the Greek action.) Yet the Greeks have asserted themselves at times. When the British began to advise King George against the Metaxas dictatorship in 1939, the effect was to drive the King for the time being closer to Metaxas.³¹

(2) Despite this latter example, however, Greece and Great Britain were closely associated for a century, the British had great influence in political and economic affairs, and the words of even the humblest Briton in Greece were weighed for their policy import. This was particularly true in the immediate postliberation period. Moreover, according to one observer, the Greek elite considered that it had more in common with European and American upper strata than with ordinary Greeks and "having accepted the authority and superior status of the foreigner as legitimate, assumed the traditional deferential and submissive attitude toward them."³²

8. Political socialization. From the very beginning, the Greek Government deliberately put a great deal of emphasis on the cultural heritage of ancient Greece as a means of unifying the people and giving them a sense of pride and identity. In both village schools and institutions of higher learning, rote teaching of classics was a large part of the curriculum--so much so that under the Metaxas regime it was found necessary to delete such items as Pericles' funeral address from the school course content lest the pupils be roused to immature thoughts of democracy. While this classical emphasis apparently served its purpose, it accomplished little or nothing to focus the Greek citizen's attention on contemporary problems and the means for solving them.

a. The Metaxas regime set out to correct this lack somewhat heavy-handedly through the improvisation of a national ideology (perhaps of no more problem-solving power than classical lore), through modification of school curricula, and through establishment of a national youth movement. Whether these actions would have contributed to national strength seems doubtful, in the light of the growing unpopularity of the regime, but in any case Metaxas' death and the war ended the experiment before it could have proved itself.

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b. The Orthodox Church was a second source of political socialization, especially since church authorities had had a role in Government and education for centuries under the Turks. It may be supposed that the church was generally a force for conservatism and submission to authority. Yet many priests and even some bishops joined forces with EAM in the wartime resistance--a testimony more to the general will to resist, probably, than to a new clerical liberalism.

c. Foreign influence in Greek political culture originally came in the spread of ideas following the French Revolution--largely by way of Greeks living in European capitals, such as the writer Alexander Koraes in Paris, the revolutionary Rhigad Pheraios in Vienna and eastern Europe, and a considerable group of intellectuals and businessmen. Subsequently, continued contacts of Greeks abroad with their homeland, European and American-sponsored schools in Greece, and a steady stream of young Greeks to European schools insured a constant inflow of European ideas. A major source of contemporary political ideas was the stream of emigrants returning from the United States to their native villages all over Greece--a total of around 175,000. There seems to be no estimate of their precise impact, but it must have been considerable.

d. In the light of many observers' comments on Greek society and culture, however, it would appear that much of the foreign importation was irrelevant or imperfectly understood insofar as its application to current Greek affairs was concerned. There was no genius like Atatürk, with an adviser like the Turkish sociologist Gokalp, to reinterpret and filter European ideas to fit local requirements--to bridge the gap of centuries which had accumulated between the industrialized society of Europe and the peasant communities of Hellas while the latter were dominated by the Turks.

9. The political system and political attitudes. There is a paradoxical flavor in analyses of Greek society and politics which at the same time insist on Greek egalitarianism, individualism, and lack of class distinctions, yet emphasize the political domination of Greece by an Athenian oligarchy consisting of the royal family and political leaders, senior military officers, the higher clergy, the shipowners, and the great trading houses (plus, in an earlier day, the large landowners). But it seems clear that throughout the period under study, the political game was played by the elite few in Athens; and that the elite related to the outside world of London, Paris, and Rome more than to the mass of the Greek peasantry.

a. There were neither cultural nor institutional means of applying pressure to the political leaders to respond to the public interest; they therefore acted in their own interests or those of the people they were related to by blood, friendship, economic interests,

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or community ties. The great mass of Greeks watched the political contest, supported the figures to whom they had personal ties or with whom they identified, and expected that these figures would look out for the personal interests of their supporters and followers. Presumably provincial politics repeated the same pattern on a smaller scale, except that the appointive Governors General and civil servants tended to reflect the interests and attitudes of Athens rather than those of the locality--hence the frequent criticism about the overcentralization of Greek Government.

b. The dominant elite, however, was divided in its views, not only by interpersonal and intergroup rivalries, but by a variety of international ties and by the same conservative and liberal tendencies which characterized European political life. There seems to have been a tendency for the conservatives to ally themselves with the monarchy and with a ruling as well as reigning king to guard their status and interests, while the liberals favored either a republic or a "crowned democracy" as the best vehicle of reform. The military were on both sides at different times.

c. Although the issue of monarchy versus republic is frequently noted at the fundamental issue in Greek politics, in reality it was more a symbol of many different overlapping issues. The mass of the people do not appear to have either strongly supported or strongly opposed the monarchy until World War I, and indeed George I seems to have won himself some real affection by a relatively wise and impartial exercise of his functions. When the King alined himself clearly with one side--as Constantine did, and as George II did with Metaxas--he then lost whatever capacity he might have had to symbolize and strengthen an impersonal State system.

d. So long as Greece remained largely an agrarian and trading nation, with largely self-contained communities and a low degree of economic integration, the shortcomings of the political system did not seriously affect the population, who continued to live more or less as they had always lived and were cheered by their national independence and territorial growth. But growing industrialization, urbanization, and in particular the massive influx of refugees after the Asia Minor debacle, created new problems and new interests.

The suggestive theory that this malaise was symptomatic of a somewhat belated drive of the Greek middle class for political power is perhaps too simple an explanation of a complex phenomenon. It is nevertheless true that the new ferment was prevalent in the urban centers, that it affected the mercantile and professional classes and the more advanced intelligentsia, and that it finally crystallized into a revolt of "new men," that is, a younger generation of mostly middle-class politicians, against the

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oligarchy of quasi-hereditary sectional clans which had managed to retain throughout the nineteenth century a disproportionate share of political power.³³

e. The military revolt of 1909 was for the declared purpose of economic and social reform, and Venizelos in his earlier years ably responded to the demand for revision of existing political institutions. But he attracted the following of a new class of people--the rising middle class, the urban workers, and above all the new citizens from Asia Minor. Although he himself favored a crowned democracy, his rivalry with King Constantine, the personal antipathy between the two men, the strain of choosing sides between the Allied and the Central Powers in World War I, and above all the catastrophic failure of the expansionist policy in Asia Minor with which Constantine had associated himself led to a surge of republican sentiment among the Venizelists and their Liberal Party and to the sharp polarization of political sentiment between royalists (Populists) and republicans that continued thereafter.

f. This polarization was further exacerbated by the Metaxas dictatorship. Like the 1909 revolt, it sought to correct the glaring inadequacy of the Greek political system and its leaders to meet the difficult problems of the depression; but, unlike 1909, it imposed a distasteful discipline on the freedom-loving people; and, again unlike 1909, the King was willy-nilly identified with it. Although Metaxas himself made the decision to fight the Italians, and although the successor government went into exile, nonetheless the administration which remained behind was tarred with the collaborationist brush, as were all conservatives who sought to protect their positions and property by temporizing with the occupation.

g. A further polarizing factor was the growth of communism. The new ideology had attractions for some of the urban groups and particularly for the tobacco pickers of Macedonia; almost all Asia Minor refugees, they initially had been favored by Government policy sufficiently to become more discontented than the average when adverse economic conditions caused widespread unemployment. A general strike in northern Greece in April 1936, probably Communist-inspired, evoked violence by the police and drove conservatives and liberals more than ever apart. The national front organized by the Communists in 1936 was the seed from which the EAM of wartime sprang, and the conservative-liberal confrontation mingled with resistance to the Germans. As Chandler remarked, the ensuing violence in Greece was the outward sign of the political fires within.

h. Up to the outbreak of full-scale civil war in 1946, the political system and attitudes above described remained virtually unchanged. The only possible exception was the EAM administration within Greece of the areas it liberated from the Germans. Stavrianos

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and others, partisans of the liberal cause, describe this administration in lyric terms as having forever broken the tired old pattern of political games and self-interest in Athens, substituting for it responsible administration, local participation and initiative, and improved locally administered justice. There is probably some truth in these claims, although there is convincing testimony on the other side that the EAM made free use of violence and terror in extending its control and suppressing rivals. It is probably fair to say that the EAM, in addition to its experienced energetic Communist elements, did in fact represent an attempt by liberal thinkers, especially the younger men and intellectuals, to take advantage of the wartime conditions to revolutionize Greek politics and society before the old leaders returned with the exile Government and its British supporters. Viewed from this standpoint, the sterile arguments about the status of the King can be seen as symbolizing a far more profound issue; and the conflict between Greeks during and after World War II can be seen as an anguished extension of the problems which first emerged into prominence in 1909.

i. There were thus many divisive political factors in Greece, and few unifying ones.

Many controversies divide the Greeks, and almost none of them cut across each other. The attitude a man takes toward one of them is expected to determine his attitude towards all of them: it is the sum of those attitudes that places him in politics on the left or the right or (if he is able to compromise) at the center. What all [lists of divisive issues] omit is everything fundamental to social life at its lowest . . . [The politicians] want, left and right alike, to play the same fascinating game of politics that is played in the rest of Europe and America; but a more primitive game indigenous to the Balkans.

The categories of Western politics ought not to apply in Greece. Great problems are organic rather than political: the problems of starvation, homelessness, illiteracy, lack of communications, disease, destitution, lawlessness, superstition, vendetta³⁴

j. Accordingly, as Chandler points out, moderation was lost in the split between left and right:

Genuine Liberals were caught in that dilemma that remains one of the tragedies of Greece today--the feeling that it is necessary to support what you believe to be bad in order to fight what you consider worse. Immediate fears to prejudices obscured long-term issues. The Populist Party came in on a platform of King and anti-Communism³⁵

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k. To this equation was added the ideological appeal of communism, and its antithesis in the unreasoning fear of communism by the conservatives. Woodhouse, himself a conservative, commended that EAM/ELAS

. . . differs from the rest of the Greek political world rather as early Christianity differed from the rest of the ancient religious world. There is one parallel, and no more, between Communism and Christianity: that both came to alter not this or that detail, but the entire structure of life. Communist thought, however good or evil it might be, had made a clean break with the past in which the rest of the political world continued to dream and stagnate. Because the rest was plainly moribund, and EAM/ELAS represented something that was at least alive, however frightening it might be, it . . . looked as if it were the only thing in Greek life that did have a future.³⁶

10. Political expectations. Although the literature is not explicit on the point, the expectations of the bulk of the Greek people do not appear to have been particularly ambitious; freedom, national and personal worth, order, satisfaction of the essential needs of existence, frugality, fortitude, simplicity, and acceptance of things as they are--these characterized Greek attitudes.

a. Lee comments that Greeks "do not place a value on unlimited progress; what they want is the better than the present, or than the known. Modern Greek has lost the superlative of ancient Greek" ³⁷ Again, "Greeks accustom themselves to inconveniences and cope with them: they do not do away with them." But they are "tenacious and resourceful in making the best of what they do have." ³⁸ Success--economic and political--is admired; yet, according to Chandler,

. . . there was little place for envy of the successful man in the Greek make-up . . . democracy was instinct in all personal relationships and in a sense of individualism and equality which thought no man better than another until he proved it. This was strengthened again by an unfailing courage and cheerfulness of spirit which surmounted the physical hardships . . . wide and friendly curiosity, a deep-rooted sense of humor, a basic self-knowledge³⁹

The general strike of 1936 was provoked, not by aspirations for something better, but by protest against deprivation of benefits already enjoyed.

b. On the other hand, there seems to have been desire among Balkan intellectuals to "bring the country up to a par with the Great

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Powers." Roucek, a student of Balkan affairs, describes the situation in the Balkans as a whole, though he does not say to what extent it applied in Greece:

Balkan patriots are painfully aware that the standard of living is far below that of Western and Central Europe Delayed in their advance, the Balkan nations have been trying to make up for loss of time and to reach with greatest dispatch the level of industrialized countries The Balkan intellectual resents being identified with what the term 'Balkan' has come to connote.⁴⁰

11. Political communication. During the period under review, the prime means of political communication were the newspapers and word of mouth. Newspapers spread throughout Greece; they were eagerly read, and read aloud to those who could not read. As already noted, Greek family ties are close and far-reaching, connecting those in the cities with their country relatives and emigrants abroad; these ties served as important vehicles of communication. Indeed, family connections may well have been the principal means through which the ineffective political system met critical needs, as aggrieved peasants sought out their relatives in power to redress wrongs or allocated needed resources. According to Pepelasis, in the relatively stable 19th century Greek society, "the traditional great families of landowners, big merchants, and local leaders, who had now moved to the political arena of Athens, often protected the peasantry against government oppressions"41

a. Byford-Jones, a British staff officer in Greece in 1944, notes that informal word-of-mouth communication was systematically used by well-to-do Greeks, who "employ 'contacts' to keep them in touch with political developments . . . who secured advance information from clerks, politicians, and sometimes from Cabinet ministers."⁴² Every village had its coffeehouse where men gathered for hours of discussion, often political. The same observer notes that news of the German's intention to mobilize workers in 1943

. . . had leaked out through a worker who saw the draft order . . . when it was taken to the printing works At once the news was spread, not by casual gossip but in the systematic way which all parties developed during the occupation. A great crowd then gathered to demonstrate against the order.⁴³

b. Given the generally recognized high level of Greek intelligence and political interest, the existence both of an active press and a network of word-of-mouth communication, and the absence of the inhibition which would have come from class distinctions and deference patterns, it seems safe to conclude that political communication was

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not a major problem in Greece, although the quality and content of communication probably were often deficient and misleading.

12. Summary and conclusions.

a. Greek society and culture, despite the universal Greek respect for the classic tradition of democracy and liberty, as of 1946 were actually unsuited for the operation of modern democracy, at a time when the society was strained close to the breaking point by the ravages of war. The outward appurtenances of parliamentary democracy, prior to the Metaxas dictatorship, had been little more than arbitrary and changing conventions for the conduct of a political struggle among a small oligarchy in Athens, whose activities were only coincidentally related to the welfare of the people as a whole. There was neither inclination nor incentive for the kind of large-scale cooperative organization, planning, and action required for a modern state. This inadequacy was increasingly demonstrated as Greek urbanization, industrialization, and education proceeded and as the problems of economic depression and war called for action which the leaders could not provide.

b. As in other parts of the world, the conservative elite failed to respond to changing conditions, both through inertia and through lack of understanding. The polarization of Greek political attitudes was promoted, not only by this failure, but by old rivalries dating from World War I, by the animosities arising out of the Metaxas dictatorship, by the growth of communism, and by the tensions and tragedies of war. These were the cultural factors which, despite the apparent traditional Greek taste for political violence, provoked the internecine warfare of 1943, 1944-45, and 1946-49.

Section II. Government: Political and External Influences.

by Eugene H. Miller, PhD
James E. Trinnaman

13. Government organization and performance. In 1946, the vital year in the preconflict period of this study, Greece was a constitutional monarchy with a Prime Minister and Cabinet responsible to Parliament. Each of the 21 Ministers was supreme in his Department and operated it almost as his private domain. There were five provincial Governors General. The nation was further divided into 47 nomoi, administrative districts similar to counties; 150 eparchies or election districts; 169 cities; and 5,642 small communities. Nomarchs, or prefects, were appointed by the Government. Since, in most areas, local elections had not been held since 1939, interim mayors had also been appointed by the Minister of the Interior. This lack of self-government

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on the local level highlighted the fact that the Greek Government was "one of the most completely centralized in the world"—practically every decision was made in Athens.⁴⁴

a. Executive branch. The Chief of State was the King. His position was described in the phrase, "the regime of Greece shall be that of a Crowned Democracy"⁴⁵ in which all powers were "derived from the nation" and "exercised in the manner determined by the Constitution." The list of the King's powers--to propose laws to Parliament, to appoint and dismiss Ministers, to command the Armed Forces, to declare war, to conclude treaties of peace, to execute the laws, to appoint and discharge civil servants, to convene Parliament, to assent to laws passed by Parliament, to pardon and commute sentences, to confer decorations, and to coin money--was impressive.⁴⁶ However, as in the case of the President of the Third French Republic, whose Constitution served as a model for the Greek Constitution, "no act of the King shall have force, nor shall it be executed unless it is countersigned by the competent Minister who shall be rendered responsible by his signature alone."⁴⁷ The Greek Crown and its constitutional rights were hereditary and passed to the descendants of King George I "by order of primogeniture, preference being given to males."⁴⁸ Every successor to the throne must profess the religion of the Eastern Orthodox Church. Article 50 left the question of a regency to be regulated by statute.

(1) The Prime Minister was head of the Government. He and his Ministers (no member of the royal family could be appointed Minister) had to enjoy the confidence of Parliament. Upon its formation the Government was required to, and at any time might, ask for a vote of confidence. There were several provisions to prevent precipitous action of a motion of confidence or nonconfidence. Unlike the British Parliament, Ministers did not have to be Deputies. However, even those who were not members had "free access to the meetings of Parliament and shall be given a hearing whenever they ask for the floor." Only those who were members might vote. An order of the King, written or oral, "under no circumstances released Ministers from responsibility."⁴⁹ Rather elaborate provision was made for the impeachment of Ministers.

(2) Government operation. Each of the Ministers was supreme in his Ministry. What cooperation existed within a Ministry or among Ministries was accomplished through committees. Unlike the United States where chairmen are powerful, committee responsibility in Greece was diffused.

The fact that members receive pay for every committee meeting attended helps to make the committee system a popular institution in an impoverished country; it also helps to explain why decisions are reached only after great deliberation and numerous meetings.

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Action on a highly controversial matter or one in which a Minister is personally concerned might be postponed indefinitely. Lethargy and timidity on the part of many officials also took their toll, so the overall picture was one of "great inefficiency and small accomplishment."⁵⁰ The Ministers did not have the help of administrative assistants and competent secretaries, characteristics of developed countries. In theory, they were subject only to formal policy control by the Cabinet. Nevertheless, "relatively simple matters often required the formal action of first the Minister and then the Cabinet." Even more time was consumed in responding to the requests of hundreds of petitioners. In addition to the burden of decisionmaking, the Minister had to sign all the Department's communications. Many were members of Parliament and leaders of their political parties--either position representing a full job load in addition to the hours spent in the work of the Ministry.⁵¹

(3) Civil service. The regular civil service had many more employees than it needed--80,000 on the rolls in 1947. This unsatisfactory situation grew out of the war. Before 1940, Greece had the most efficient civil service in southern Europe, but there was great deterioration during the German occupation. Thousands were added to the rolls at that time, as a relief measure and to harass the invaders. The political instability following liberation resulted in further inflation of the number of employees. Each time another administration took office, the new Ministers appointed numerous relatives and supporters. Padded payrolls and limited office space made efficient work almost impossible. Many employees came to the office only to claim their paychecks. There were 35 Government holidays a year, and the average work load was 25 hours a week--0900 to 1300. Civil servants who returned to work from 1700 to 1900 were paid overtime. Examinations were rarely held, and promotion was strictly on a seniority basis. Serious inflation and low pensions induced many to work beyond normal retirement age, so promotions for younger employees were very slow. The lack of incentive produces a lethargy that makes the service almost inoperable.⁵²

(4) Other Government agencies. Other administrative problems plagued the Greek Government outside the province of a Ministry. There were hundreds of irresponsible "legal entities of public law," semiprivate agencies receiving State aid and carrying on programs of a public or semiprivate nature. They employed almost as many people as the civil service, and there was no policy control over their work or real financial check by any Minister. A fetish for legal forms and red tape and the conflict and duplication of work by numerous competing units resulted in the most frustrating kind of inefficiency.⁵³

b. Parliament. The Chamber of Deputies was the basic branch of the Government until 1936. Its four main functions were to amend the Constitution; to pass laws; to form, through its majority, the

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Ministry; and to supervise, by means of votes of confidence, the work of the Cabinet. Under the Constitution of 1911, there was no second house. Upper chambers provided by the Constitutions of 1844 and 1927 were not a success. There was really no reason for one, either on the basis of class or of regional representation, and its existence greatly complicated the enactment of legislation.⁵⁴

(1) The membership of the single Chamber was "determined by law according to the population, but the total number of deputies shall in no case be less than 150 or more than 300."⁵⁵ There were 300 members during most of the period. Salaried civil servants, active military officers, mayors of cities, notaries, registrars of mortgages and transfers, and employees and members of boards of directors of semigovernmental agencies were ineligible.⁵⁶

(2) The Chamber met each year on 15 October and was in session no less than 3 months. It sat in public but might "debate in camera upon the request of ten members, provided a decision to this effect was reached in secret session by a majority. . . ." Parliament could not debate unless at least one-third of the total number of its members were present, nor could it make any decision without an absolute majority of the members present, which majority could under no circumstances be less than one-fourth of the total number of deputies. Every bill was required to have an explanatory report and to be submitted to a Parliamentary Committee.⁵⁷

(3) Parliament had unlimited authority on nonmoney bills. However, its financial powers were somewhat restricted by the Ministries, especially the Minister of Finance and the General Accounting Office. Thus, each year the Chamber voted the budget, but every bill entailing expense or a diminution of public receipts had to be accompanied by a report signed by a "competent minister" and the Minister of Finance. Furthermore, no bill that entailed a burden on the budget could be introduced unless it was accompanied by a report from the General Accounting Office.⁵⁸

c. Elections. Elections for the Chamber of Deputies were held every 4 years, unless the administration in power fell from office before the end of the period. Prior to 1926, only the plurality system was used. Greece then alternated between that and proportional representation in electing its deputies. In 1926, 1932, and 1936 the latter system was employed, while in 1928, 1933, and 1946 plurality was in operation. In each election, changes were made in the electoral law with an eye to helping the incumbent party. As in other countries that tried proportional representation, Greece discovered that the advantage of the representation for minorities carried with it a grave disability. The number of parties entitled to seat in the Chamber of Deputies grew to the point where coalition Cabinets were necessary. The resulting instability was a serious blow to effective government.⁵⁹

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(1) Elections were administered by the Ministry of Interior and conducted under the supervision of judicial committees in the various districts. "Generally speaking, they are handled with dispatch, the voters are orderly, and there is little evidence of the kind of skulduggery associated with highly organized machine wards in the United States." Each polling place was adequately guarded by the local gendarmerie--sometimes by soldiers of the regular Army. There was little or no disorder. On the minus side, the registry was often out of date. Many persons who had lived in Athens for a decade were not added to the voting lists because of the Greek predilection to consider one's birthplace as his legitimate home and voting district.⁶⁰

(2) Elections were also held for local councils, in accordance with a tradition predating independence; but the powers of local Government were increasingly subordinated to the centralized bureaucracy, and local elections were abolished under Metaxas in 1938.

d. Judiciary and legal system. The court system consisted of a Supreme Court, a Court of Appeals, and Courts of First Instance. Judges of these bodies were appointed by the King for life. The positions of other personnel--prosecutors, assistant prosecutors, justices of the peace, justices of petty sessional courts, clerks and assistant clerks of courts and of the offices of prosecutors, notaries, registrars of mortgages and of transfers--were permanent.⁶¹

(1) Greece followed the continental system in having special administrative courts headed by the Council of State, which had the power to elaborate regulative decrees, to "try lawfully submitted differences regarding contested administrative jurisdiction," and to annul acts of administrative authorities that were beyond or in violation of the law. To safeguard the independence of the Council of State, the Constitution granted the members life tenure. Their apolitical character was encouraged by the provision that

. . . the duties of the members . . . shall be incompatible with the duties of any civil, municipal, or ecclesiastical officer whatsoever excepting the duties of professor of a Law Faculty in the University or professor of law or economics in equivalent schools.⁶²

(2) Special courts were established for particular purposes "in accordance with modern tendencies of specialization and the Greek need for popular representation within the judiciary." Thus, the Constitution entrusted "authorities exercising police duties with the trial of police offenses punishable by fine" and "agrarian security authorities with the trial of misdemeanors relating to farm lands and the personal claims arising therefrom." In both cases, decisions were subject to appeal before a judicial authority. Juvenile courts

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could be set up, and peoples' judges might participate in courts that try "all kinds of labor disputes."⁶³

(3) Jury trial was given "to criminal and political offenses as well as offenses of the press, whenever such offenses do not concern one's private life, and to any other offenses which may by law be made liable to trial by jury." For trial of press offenses, mixed courts made up of regular judges and jurors, the latter in the majority, might be used. Special laws regulated courts martial of the Army, Navy, and Air Force as well as piracy, barratry, and prize courts. Civilians might not be brought under court martial "except for punishable acts affecting the security of the armed forces."

(4) The right to trial by jury and protection for civilians against court martial might be suspended by the King, on recommendation of the Council of Ministers, "in case of a state of war or mobilization due to external dangers." Under such circumstances, a "state of siege" might be declared and extraordinary tribunals established. Parliament's permission was required for implementation of these decrees. Other "Public Rights of the Hellenes" that might be suspended under article 91 during a state of siege included the right to habeas corpus, the right to bail for persons detained for political offenses, the guarantee that

. . . no person shall be withdrawn without his consent from the jurisdiction of the judge assigned to him by law, the right to peaceful unarmed assembly, the right of association, the inviolability of a man's house to search "except when and as the law directs," freedom of the press, and "the secrecy of letters and of correspondence by any other medium whatsoever." There are exceptions to the guarantee of freedom of the press: seizure of a paper after publication is permitted because of an insult to the Christian religion or to the royal family, or if military security is compromised.⁶⁴

The foregoing list of civil liberties that could be suspended during "a state of siege" indicates a serious flaw in a democratic Constitution. "States of siege" have been too easily declared during periods of political turmoil. In normal times, the provisions for tenure and an independent judiciary operated to keep the courts relatively free from politics.

e. Local government. The Constitution contained only brief references to local government: "the administrative organization of the State is based on decentralization and local self-government as determined by law" and "the election of municipal and communal authorities shall be effected by universal suffrage." The Metaxas dictatorship nullified these provisions. Elected local councils were dismissed and replaced by councils of Metaxist appointees (law of January 1938).

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The period of World War II was not conducive to the restoration of local self-government, and local elections were not held in most areas between 1939 and 1946, except for the "elections" held by the Liberation Front (section III below). Interim mayors were appointed by the Government. Elected or not, the powers and functions of local government were increasingly circumscribed.

f. Evaluation of the Constitution. Harold Alderfer describes the Constitution of 1911 as a document "within the tradition of 19th century European liberalism," universal suffrage, representative Government, limited monarchy, a Bill of Rights, and an independent judiciary fall within the Western concept of a democratic state. However, individual rights could be, and in fact were, easily suspended. The Constitution could be amended without a popular referendum, and there was little protection for local self-government. The relationship between Parliament and Cabinet was not clearly defined, and the language of some other articles was "neither lucid nor clear in meaning."⁶⁵ Nevertheless, the 1911 Constitution did provide a framework of government that helped to preserve the Greek State in face of heavy internal pressures and external threats from 1912 to 1946.

14. Political parties. Observers of the Greek political scene agree, for the most part, that before 1909, when Venizelos became prime minister,

. . . political control was largely in the hands of patriarchal families descended from the revolutionary leaders, wealthy Greeks who came back to their homeland after independence, the "nouveaux riches" and a sprinkling of the intelligentsia who congregated in Athens.⁶⁶

Adamantia Pollis and William Hardy McNeill aptly describe this situation as patron politics. Aristocratic families who had sold their land moved to Athens where they dabbled in politics. The peasant who had stayed in the village continued to look on his former landlord as his patron and voted for him at election time. In return, he expected and received his personal intervention whenever help was needed in dealing with the Government.⁶⁷

a. Toward the end of the 19th century, strains began to develop in the traditional social organization. The growth of population resulted in a shortage of land. Some peasants emigrated. Others moved to the towns where they became artisans and small traders or entered some occupations. A few went to the university only to find the professions overcrowded. Thus, a marginal group of restless townsmen developed. At the same time, the peasantry was becoming increasingly discontented because of the growing shortage of land. "Patron politics" was unable to cope with the changing economic and social situation.⁶⁸

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b. At this point, Eleutherios Venizelos arrived from Crete. Specialists in Greek government date the development of true political parties from his formation of the Phileleftheron Komma (the Friends of Liberty) usually translated as the Liberal Party. Venizelos preached a fiery nationalism, demanding the inclusion in the Greek State of all ethnic Greeks in the Balkans and in Asia Minor. Their program of territorial expansion appealed to the marginal groups in the towns, particularly the ambitious and impecunious lawyers. Greece's victories in the Balkan Wars made the Liberal Party and its irredentist leader a real power in the land. Very few of the old families associated themselves with the new political group. They found their traditional leadership in jeopardy from Liberal successes and met the challenge to their position by rallying round the King. They established the People's or Popular Party with Constantine in fact, though not in name, the party leader.⁶⁹

c. World War I contributed to this polarization of the political climate. Constantine's pro-German policy met Venizelos' pro-Allied stand head-on. In the light of this confrontation, there is some disagreement on whether or not the Liberals should be labeled republicans and the Popular Party, monarchist. This orthodox view is challenged by both McNeill and Sweet-Escott. The latter argues that Venizelos himself believed in constitutional monarchy. "What he opposed was autocratic rule by Constantine and his family, and his opposition was expressed by support for the republic." Likewise, "it would not be true to say that all members of the Popular Party . . . were convinced Royalists." The very existence of the republican regime generated an opposition that hoped to come to power by its overthrow and who therefore opposed what Venizelos seemed to stand for--the Republic. "First and foremost the Popular Party was anti-Venizelist rather than monarchist."⁷⁰ Nevertheless, the fortunes of the monarchy had both a direct and indirect effect on the political situation.

d. Venizelos and the Liberals found no difficulty in coexisting with Alexander, whom the powers placed on the throne to replace his father in 1917. However, a plebiscite returned Constantine to the throne on Alexander's death in 1920, and he led Greece into the fatal war with Turkey. This adventure discredited not only Constantine personally, but the monarchy as an institution. It also led to a considerable augmentation of the strength of the Liberals. The 1.5 million refugees who were repatriated to Greece under the exchange of populations plan had little sympathy for kingship. These new citizens, who were generally loyal to Venizelos, settled in the half-vacant lands of Macedonia and Thrace, which became almost solidly Liberal. Other thousands moved into the larger towns, where their presence weakened the comparative strength of the Popular Party. Only in the south, particularly in the Peloponnesus, did the conservatives retain leadership.⁷¹

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e. The republic that was proclaimed on 23 March 1924 saw 8 years of political confusion, in which two military dictatorships seized power, but the period ended with 4 years of constitutional government (1928-32) under Venizelos. Proportional representation, which was introduced in 1926, resulted in a further fragmentation of a political system that traditionally had been prone to factionalism based on the attraction of individual leaders. After 1932, in particular, the rough two-party system revolving around Venizelos and the Liberals, on the one hand, and the Popular Party or the royalists, on the other, broke down.

f. In the election of January 1936 (the first national poll after the restoration of George II to the throne in 1935), the seats in the Chamber of Deputies were about equally divided between the right (Popular, National Union, Party of Free Opinion, and Reform Group) with 143 out of 300 seats, and the liberal groups (Liberal, Republican Coalition, Agrarian, Old Republican, New Liberals) with 141 seats. The Communists with 15 seats held the balance of power.⁷² One answer to the impasse might have been an administration formed by the various groups revolving around the Popular Party and those affiliated with the Liberals. However, the legacy of bitterness from the struggles over the monarchy in 1922 and 1935 made such an accommodation difficult, and the personal factor, always so important in Greek politics, played a negative role. The leaders who might have formed a grand coalition--Venizelos, Tsaldaris, and Kondylis--died during the spring of 1936. Recognizing the Communist danger, the major parties acquiesced in the formation of a government by General Metaxas, whose Party of Free Opinion had only seven seats.⁷³

g. The Communists did not fade away in the face of a strong administration. Rather, they called a general strike. The new Prime Minister, in turn, did not retreat. He persuaded the King that it was necessary, in view of the Communist Party (KKE) threat, to suspend the Bill of Rights and to dissolve the Chamber. Until his death in January 1941, Metaxas governed as a dictator.

The machinery of totalitarianism was introduced with an almost Teutonic efficiency: censorship, the secret police, the ban on strikes and public discussion--all that was absent was the creation of a one party system.

Although political parties were not officially suppressed, many opponents of the regime, Communists and Venizelists alike, including many experienced military officers, were exiled or imprisoned on the Islands, and the parties played no political role. Metaxas successfully fought off the Italians in 1940, but the patriotism evoked by that invasion only papered over the deep fissures in Greek politics created by Metaxas' iron rule. These cleavages came dramatically to the surface in the period of Nazi conquest and occupation.⁷⁴

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h. During the occupation years, 1941-44, there were three "governments"--a puppet regime in Athens, a Government-in-exile, and a National Liberation Front, dominated by the Communists. The latter group technically was a political party. In practice, it exercised administrative control over the areas its guerrillas occupied and challenged the authority of the Government-in-exile that the King had set up, first in London and later in Cairo. George II, while in exile, restored the civil liberties that had been abrogated by Metaxas and in principle reinstated constitutional government. After liberation, the former political leaders and their groupings reemerged, some contending for power in the returned Greek Government and others working with the Communists in the Liberation Front (EAM). Parliamentary elections, the first in 10 years, were held in March 1946. However, the Communists and the EAM boycotted them for the most part, and Moscow declined to join the Allies in observing the elections as provided by the Yalta Agreement concerning the liberated territories in eastern Europe. The refusal of the local Communists and of the Soviet Union to cooperate in the rehabilitation of constitutional processes in Greece proved an omen of the insurgency that erupted shortly after King George's return to Athens in the fall of 1946.

15. Organization and internal factions. Alderfer is the authority for the statement that

. . . Party arrangements are extremely sketchy, especially in the provinces. There are no paid yearround workers and few permanent offices, no hierarchy of local-regional-national leadership and organization, no door-to-door campaigns . . . no card index system of local electors and their political and other propensities.⁷⁵

Similarly, Adamantia Pollis affirms that aside from the Communists, party loyalty had little meaning; there was no party organization outside the legislature, no mass membership, and no local party organization or constituency groups.⁷⁶

a. On the surface, Greece seemed to have a European style two-party system with the Liberals and the Populists dominating the political scene. However, they were really coalitions of various smaller groups and, for the most part, did not exercise responsible power for any significant length of time. Breakdowns of parliamentary government were frequent, especially beginning with the republican period in 1924. There were five coups d'etat during this time: Pangalos, 1924; Plastiras, 1932; Venizelos, 1933; Kondylis, 1935; and Metaxas, 1936.⁷⁷

b. Adamantia Pollis, who propounds the thesis that Greeks are not individualistic in the Western definition of the word, but rather are group-oriented, explains the failure to develop two

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well-integrated parties in the following terms. She contends that even "the formation of new references groups in the urban centers" did not alter "the individual's self view." Therefore "no basic transformation has taken place in the nature of Greek parties. . . . Mass parties within a democratic framework imply individual relatedness which in turn presupposes individual autonomy." In the absence of true individualism, attempts by Venizelos and the Communists to form mass parties failed.⁷⁸

c. Pollis further observes that this group-oriented view of the world vitiated democratic norms and institutions which depend on objectivity and impartiality. In the West, ascertaining facts is vital to democratic decisionmaking. In Greece, on the other hand, "exposure of the facts or truth engenders feelings of shame since it constitutes betrayal of group loyalty." Another ingredient in the concept of free party governmental institutions--compromise--is foreign to Greece. In Washington or London, compromise is regarded as a pragmatic resolution of differences between parties. In Athens, it is seen as a betrayal of group loyalties, since it destroys the inviolability of the group.⁷⁹

d. The Anglo-American concept of democracy, majority rule with respect for the rights of the minority, guarantees the latter the opportunity to survive and to win another day. The Greek commitment to intergroup rivalry precluded respect for the loser. Rather victory at the polls was regarded as an opportunity to destroy the loser and to impose the winner's will on the entire population. Similarly, in the case of political leaders:

Norms of behavior do not alter with their role change from party leaders to government officials. The British conception that a party leader who becomes Prime Minister is responsible primarily to the nation, not the party, or the American conception of the President as a national leader, is incomprehensible to and inapplicable in Greece. The Premier of Greece remains a representative of his group interests, and both behave in terms of, and is expected to behave in terms of, these group interests. To the extent that the concept of the Premier as a "national" leader exists, it is equated with the group interests of the ruling elite.⁸⁰

Pollis' analysis would seem to indicate that although political parties appeared to perform the traditional functions of nominating candidates, drawing up platforms, and conducting election campaigns, in the context of Greek culture they did not play the roles expected in the West. Instead of change within a framework of stability, the party system contributed to an environment in which the citizen was filled with a pervading sense, not of alienation, but of "despair at the failure of authorities to fulfill their roles in an appropriate fashion."⁸¹ A

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citizenry frustrated with contemporary political institutions, particularly the politicians and their parties, was fair game for a "party" bent on insurgency.

16. Interest groups. Interest groups that attempted to influence the Government for their own special benefit existed in Greece as in other countries. The earliest manifestation of such groups was perhaps the pro-Russian, pro-British, and pro-French factions of the 19th century that tried to persuade the administration to follow a foreign policy tied to the nation which they alleged would best promote Greek goals.

a. The palace. In contrast to Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries, where the Crown merely symbolized the authority of the State, the monarchs in Greece were "partisan contenders for political power," similar to the English kings of the 16th and 17th centuries. The royal family in Athens was "a subgroup within the larger group of the traditional political elite" and was "active in feuding for control of the government."⁸² The problem of the royalists as a special interest group is linked to the role of the military, whose loyalty to the King was direct and personal, not merely symbolic. Political interests of the military are discussed in chapter 5 and annex C.

b. The church. Unlike the Army, another powerful traditional institution, the church, has for the most part not been politically oriented. The Eastern Orthodox Church of Christ was the established religion of Greece under the 1911 Constitution, although freedom of religion was guaranteed. This legal protection of religion apparently gave the church a sense of security that reinforced its apolitical stance.

c. Economic interest groups came to the fore as Greece moved in the direction of commercial and industrial development. Thus, a Seamen's Union was organized as early as 1914, and a Confederation of Labor Unions established in 1919. They were influential in the enactment of favorable labor legislation in the 1920's. That they had achieved a degree of strength was demonstrated by Metaxas' assumption of control over the Confederation in his drive to monopolize power. Agricultural cooperatives, initiated by the tobacco growers, set the pattern for various farm groups who worked, with some success, for price supports. The Greek Federation of Industrialists, the shipowners, and the bankers organized to promote their interests, as did the civil servants. The latter utilized the weapon of a strike when ordinary lobbying tactics failed to gain their objectives.

d. A peculiarly Greek phenomenon was the setting up of Regional Associations in Athens, which were active in promoting the interests of the people of the respective regions. The lobbyists

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maintained in Washington by individual State governments might offer a very rough parallel. The various wartime resistance groups were also, in a sense, interest groups.

17. Political leadership. The political leadership throughout the period studied is characterized as factional and opportunistic. Up to 60 parties could be expected to enter elections at any one time. Except for the relatively small Communist Party, political parties (as noted above) were formed around the personalities of their respective leaders rather than on platforms directed at the current economic and social issues. Political alliance or competition was a function of personal accommodation of rivalry between or among individual political personalities.⁸³

a. In the Greek context, the ideal political leader was one who successfully protected and augmented the interest of, first of all, himself and his family, next his friends and political allies, and finally his constituency, whether it be defined regionally (home village and district) or functionally (tobacco growers, merchants). In terms of making progress toward solutions to the serious economic and social problems of an impoverished country, the ideal political leader would have been one of such political stature as to be above the divisive aspects of politics, able to reach and command the respect of a wide and highly diverse constituency. Or, alternatively, he would have been a military leader in firm control of the Armed Forces, willing and able to use these forces to achieve power and force compliance on the population.

b. Eleutherios Venizelos came close to the former ideal. He was born in Crete in 1864, educated in Syros and the University of Athens, and returned to Crete to practice law. He took part in the revolt against Turkey in 1896 and soon became a leading figure in Cretan politics. When popular discontent gave rise to an insurrection by the Military League in Athens in 1909, Venizelos was called from Crete to become Premier. With something of the mystique of the klepht (a traditional fighter against Turkish domination), because of his leadership against the Turks, and a great gift for statesmanship, Venizelos inspired confidence as the ideal man to heal the political rifts and create a health economy. He charmed other world leaders at Versailles after World War I and substantially realized the irredentist aspirations of his countrymen. He was called upon to assume the Premiership on several occasions subsequently, but failed each time to make lasting progress on the country's internal problems. His electoral defeats in 1920 and 1932 left him embittered, and the growing animosity between monarchists and republicans went unchecked throughout the remainder of the preconflict period.⁸⁴

c. General Jean Metaxas approximates the second type of political leadership. He established a reputation early in his career as a gifted military leader. At the Kriegsakademie in Berlin, he

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became known as "The little Moltke." He was Assistant Chief of Staff during the Balkan Wars and Chief of Staff in 1915. The Allies banished him to Corsica for attempting to form a resistance to their landing at Thessalonike in 1916. He returned to Greece in 1920 but refused to become involved in the Asia Minor adventure. He was forced to flee again in 1923, because of his involvement in an attempted monarchist counterrevolution, but resumed his political career in 1924.⁸⁵

d. Metaxas was never a popular political leader. However, in 1935 George II appointed him Premier and after several unsuccessful attempts to form an administration, he assumed dictatorial powers with the tacit approval of the King. With a strong-willed, no-nonsense policy, Metaxas bypassed the political stalemate and began to make genuine progress in social and economic areas. However, his experiment never reached completion; the advent of World War II and his death shortly thereafter ended the Metaxas period.

e. No great political figures were present to assume power after the liberation of Greece. The elder Sophoulis, leader of the liberal-republican coalition of the 1930's, and Tsaldaris, leader of the monarchist-populist coalition, emerged after the war to take up their respective roles. However, neither they nor the old general-politician Plastiras nor the younger generation of politicians succeeded in establishing a stable government. Conflict with the Communists, the severe postwar social and economic conditions, and the multiparty system which gave rise to a succession of short-lived, unstable coalitions were insurmountable obstacles to postwar progress and beyond the abilities of the politicians. Varvaressos, as Deputy Prime Minister, began to make significant economic progress in 1945, but his assertion of power was not supported by other politicians, and he resigned.⁸⁶

18. External influences. During the preconflict period, Greece was subject to considerable and diverse foreign influences, from Turkey and the territorially contiguous Balkan neighbors, from central Europe and the Mediterranean, and from the great powers. In addition, the nature of these influences changed substantially in three periods: before World War II, during the war and the occupation, and immediately after the liberation and the end of the war.⁸⁷

a. Neighboring countries. Turkey was popularly regarded as the foremost enemy of Greece from 1830, when Greece succeeded in gaining its independence, to 1923, when the last of a series of the irredentist struggles with the Turks came to an end. The Greek defeat in Asia Minor in 1923 and the subsequent population exchange ended the Greek pursuit of the "Great Idea," the recreation of a Byzantine empire with Constantinople as its capital. Venizelos made reconciliation with Turkey a major foreign policy objective in his 1928-32 Premiership, and subsequent Administrations followed up this effort. By

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the Metaxas period, mutual suspicion had subsided at the governmental level. Although popular feeling remained somewhat hostile, official relations became cordial. The 1930 pact between the two countries was followed by a treaty in 1933, and in 1934 by the Balkan Pact in which Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia, and Rumania mutually guaranteed frontiers and promised consultation on common problems. However, with the outbreak of World War II, Turkey concluded a nonaggression pact with Bulgaria which was preparing to allow German troops to pass through to attack Greece, exposing Greek forces occupied in Albania to attack from the rear. After the war, it soon became apparent that the principal threat to both countries came from the Soviet Union and its new Balkan satellites, and efforts at mutual cooperation were gradually resumed.

(1) Before World War II, among Balkan countries, Bulgaria held almost unbridgeable hostility for Greece and Yugoslavia for its loss of territorial recompense for its participation in the Balkan Wars against Turkey. Greece regarded Bulgaria as being equal in power and a distinct military threat. Bulgaria regarded Western Thrace and Eastern Macedonia as rightfully hers, and this hostility forced Greece to seek agreements with the other Balkan countries to contain Bulgarian expansionist interest. Yugoslavia's economy and military forces were regarded as stronger than those of Greece. Common struggles in the Balkan Wars and in the Entente coalition of World War I provided some community of interest. But Yugoslavia's continued interest in an outlet to the Aegean hampered relations between the two countries. Albania was cause for Greek concern because of the predominant interests of Italy in that country; additionally, Greece had maintained territorial claims in Southern Albania (called Northern Epirus by the Greeks) since the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Greece's greatest concern during this period was that Yugoslavia and Bulgaria would unite against her; most Greek diplomatic efforts in the 1920's and 1930's were aimed at forestalling this eventuality.

(2) After the fall of Greece to the Germans in 1941, Albania and Bulgaria joined Italy and Germany to occupy the country. Albania occupied the Provinces of Yanina, Thesprotia, and Prentza. Bulgaria took over Western Thrace, Eastern Macedonia up to the Struma River, and the Islands of Thasos and Samothrace. The Bulgarian occupation was perhaps the most onerous. They expelled much of the Greek populace from Thrace and began a policy of genocide in the Aegean region. They made Bulgarian the official language and began to colonize among the Macedonians of "Bulgar origin." Wartime relations of the Greek resistance with the Yugoslav resistance were generally friendly, although there were a few skirmishes between armed partisans. The Albanian resistance was largely a creation of the Yugoslav movement and followed Yugoslav policy closely. Little appears to be known of relations between Greek and Bulgarian movements, but there is some evidence that the Greek Communists agreed to make East Macedonia and Thrace the Bulgarian Communists' sphere of partisan operations.

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(3) Immediately after the liberation, the Greek Government returned from exile to a country largely under Communist control, bordered along the north entirely by new Communist-controlled countries. The worst fears of prewar Greece had materialized: her Balkan neighbors had now formed a united bloc against her and the traditional menace of pan-Slavism, supported by a powerful Soviet Union, had reemerged. Tito's subsequent break with Stalin and the ensuing deterioration of relations between Yugoslavia and her Communist neighbors provided Greece with some relief, but this came too late to forestall the conflict in Greece.

b. The Mediterranean and central Europe. Greece has always considered itself more a Mediterranean nation than an eastern European or Balkan one. For this reason, Greece was acutely sensitive to changes in the commercial, military, and naval balance of power in this area. The rise of Fascist Italy in the 1930's was of particular concern to Greece, especially after the Abyssinian dispute. The Balkan Pact of 1934 was directed largely against Italian efforts to exercise greater influence in the area. The Italian invasion of Greece from Albania in October 1940 drew Greece into World War II, and the surprising Greek successes at driving the Italian Army back into Albania may well have been unified Greece's finest moment, if not Fascist Italy's most embarrassing.

(1) Although fearful of the growing German might, Greece attempted to maintain amicable relations with Nazi Germany in the 1930's. Germany rapidly became a principal outlet for Greek products during this time, and in return German currency control forced Greece to accept Germany as a principal source of supply. German National Socialist ideas obviously influenced the Metaxas dictatorship. The German attack on Greece in April 1941 did not come as a surprise, although Greeks held some dim hope until the end that Metaxas would be able to dissuade the Germans. German documents after the war revealed that Hitler had already decided to attack the Soviet Union and, to protect the southern flank, had to have firm control of Greece and the Balkans before proceeding with the Soviet invasion.

(2) During the early part of the war, the Germans occupied Central Lemnos, Mytilene, and Chios and supervised the Greek Governor at Evios near European Turkey and the Greek puppet government for Thessaly and the Peloponnesus. The Italians occupied the remainder of Greece outside of that given to Albania and Bulgaria. The Italian sphere expanded while the Germans were occupied with their eastern offensive, but contracted after guerrilla warfare began and the threat of an Allied invasion emerged. Italy's capitulation in 1943 forced the Germans to intern Italian forces in Greece and take over the administration of this part of the country.

(3) The Greeks suffered incredibly during the occupation; starvation and destruction were severe, especially during the

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first year of occupation. As the resistance movements gained momentum and the occupiers became more frustrated over their inability to exercise control over larger areas, they sought to retain their grip by the use of terror and murder as reprisal. After the liberation, Greece generally failed in efforts to seek reparations from the former occupiers or to satisfy outstanding territorial claims against Italy, Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria.

c. The great powers. Czarist Russia was one of the guaranteeing powers which prevailed on Turkey to accept the independence of Greece. In the early independence years Russian influence was great, stemming from a common religion (Eastern Orthodox Christianity), dynastic ties between the royal families, and mutual interest in the Greek communities in Russia. However, by the late 1890's Russian support for the creation of a Greater Bulgaria was seen as a pan-Slavic threat to the existence of Greece in the Balkans, and relations cooled rapidly. After the Soviet revolution the last of the former ties were severed.

(1) During World War II the Soviets expressed some interest in Greece in relation to their ideas of postwar settlement and the establishment of respective spheres of influence in Europe and the Balkans. But Greece was not high on the Soviet list of priorities; Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, eastern Europe, and Germany were their principal concerns. Wartime agreements suggested that Stalin was inclined to permit Great Britain a relatively free hand in dealing with postwar Greece. However, Soviet communism had strongly influenced the Greek Communists, who established themselves and their front groups well during the occupation and had de facto control over most of the country when the German armies withdrew.

(2) Soviet policy toward the Greek Communists in the postwar period and into the conflict period appeared to offer moral encouragement but little practical support, in order not to unduly alarm the Americans and British and endanger the more important postwar prizes acquired elsewhere.

(3) Great Britain was the second guaranteeing power of the independence of Greece (France was the third, but French influence dwindled appreciably after the turn of the century). The extensive British interests elsewhere in the eastern Mediterranean caused Britain to remain generally alert to events in Greece. Despite the adverse impact of 19th century British support of Turkish resistance to Russia, the British blockade and invasion of Greece during the Crimean War, and the landing of British forces at Thessalonike in 1916 during World War I, British support for Greek pressure for a Constitution in 1843 and the ceding of the Ionian Islands to Greece in 1863 created much good will in Greece. British influence increased greatly between the World Wars and, as the threats from Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany grew in the 1930's, the United Kingdom gradually assumed preeminent great power

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status in Greece. The high point in influence came on the eve of the German invasion when the United Kingdom, already hard pressed in the North Africa campaign, sent military units to reinforce the Greek effort against the German thrust.

(4) After the fall of Greece, the United Kingdom became the supporter and protector of the Greek Government-in-exile. During the war, great power agreements tended to confirm that the United Kingdom had primary responsibility for the Greek liberation and postwar settlement. The British landed forces in 1944 to support reinstallation of the Government-in-exile, bringing them into conflict with EAM which erupted into violence in December. In the confusion at the time, there was severe recrimination of the British (both in Greece and elsewhere) for what appeared to be their heavy-handed treatment of the still internationally popular partisan forces, as well as for their apparent support for early return of the King. However, British action and support of the new Greek Government was the principal factor in denying the Communists control of Greece in the postliberation period. At the end of the war the United Kingdom found itself industrially and militarily exhausted; as the 1946 conflict with the Communists in Greece began to emerge, the British were obliged to inform Greece and the United States that they could no longer sustain their role in the area. At this point the United States began to assume the responsibilities that the British could no longer maintain.

(5) Prior to World War II, official US influence in Greece was not great, although immigration to America, growing American financial interest in Greece, the small American missionary effort in Greece, and the work of the Near East Foundation after World War I were encouraging popular interest and appreciation. Efforts of the United States to help relieve the suffering and starvation during the Axis occupation contributed further to favorable attitudes among the Greeks. However, US policy during World War II and again at the outbreak of the first conflict period was to regard Greece as a problem within the traditional British sphere of interest. Evidence suggests that the Greeks resented to some degree the apparent US disinterest and detachment during the first period of hostilities with the Greek Communists.

19. Conclusions: areas of stress and tension.

a. Except for the relatively short period of Metaxas, the preconflict history of Greece is one of considerable political instability and ineffectiveness which caused general unpreparedness to meet the growing social and economic needs of the population. World War II not only destroyed what little progress had been made in the previous decade, but subjected Greece to extremes of deprivation and destruction perhaps without equal in any other country. The measure of the destitution of Greece and the bankruptcy of her political institutions is to

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be found in the extent of the threat that a small group of highly organized Communists was able to produce.

b. At the same time, there existed some fundamental elements of cohesion in Greece, which many other countries in its position have lacked. The Greek people have a highly developed sense of identity with the Greek national entity. Centuries of Ottoman rule never destroyed this identity; the Axis occupation never brought it into question. Even the Bulgarian efforts to absorb portions of Greece during the occupation met with no success. Also, Greece did not have minorities of any number whose sense of national identity lay outside Greece.

c. None of the monarchist or republican administrations were able to translate this general sense of national identification into a practical popular commitment to the State. As Woodhouse points out, the Greeks simply lacked the centuries of preparation of common political ground, unquestioned rules of political procedure, and commonly accepted political institutions.⁸⁸

d. The leading Greek political personalities themselves were inclined to abide by the system only so long as it satisfied their own requirements. Therefore, administrations fell rapidly, and coups and counter coups were common. There were 48 administrations between 1920 and 1928. With the reinstitution of the monarchy, nine Premiers tried to make a go of it in a 7-month period. Most writers agree that the major unresolved political problem since 1923, the basic political issue among the contesting parties, was the type and structure of Government itself.⁸⁹

Section III. Subversion: Communist History, Organization, and Doctrine.

by James E. Trinnaman

20. Introduction.

a. The history of the Communist Party of Greece in the pre-conflict period is largely one of an outcast minority organization, handicapped internally by disorganization and intense personality conflicts and policy disputes and externally by the imposition of Comintern policies and propaganda which were diametrically opposed to the intense popular views of Greek National interests. The unhealthy state of Greek politics and economy during the 1930's would have provided very fertile ground for Communist penetration, had the party been able to pursue its social and economic programs free of the taint of foreign control and the unpopular espousal of Macedonian autonomy. Without the coming of the Metaxas dictatorship and the subsequent occupation of World War II,

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the KKE would probably never have been able to play more than a minor, if worrisome, role in the national life of Greece.

b. Although severely crippled, the KKE was the only political organization able to maintain itself during the Metaxas period, principally through its fairly well-developed clandestine apparatus. With the onset of the occupation and the flight of the Greek Government, the KKE found itself uniquely prepared to mobilize the people and form a national resistance movement. Through the formation of massive front groups which disguised the extent of KKE control, the party was able to create a truly national popular movement which, after the liberation, almost succeeded twice in capturing the Greek State.

21. Beginnings and internal struggles to 1931. Some socialist and Marxist thought had become popular in Greece before the success of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia, especially among Greek intellectuals and the small but growing labor movement. In Thessalonike, a group of Socialists known as the Federation had emerged and was actively engaged by 1912 in politics and antiwar propaganda. It soon affiliated itself with the Second International in Berne and claimed a membership of 20,000 by 1918. Among the Federations' leaders were M. Benarogias and Z. Ventoura, who subsequently were instrumental in the founding of the Socialist Labor Party.

a. The labor movement during the same period had begun to organize, but the movement was not strong. By 1918 there were only about 80,000 union members in some 320 unions throughout Greece. The largest group were the 40 unions among the tobacco workers in Thessaly and Macedonia.⁹⁰ The first success at unifying the labor movement came in October 1918, when 214 unions representing 64,000 workers formed the General Confederation of Greek Labor (GSEE). The Marxist-oriented groups managed to achieve control of the Confederation over the efforts of the other leftists, socialists, and anarchists, but the movement remained generally nonpolitical until 1928-29. The Communists then succeeded in splitting the Confederation and establishing their control over the major faction.⁹¹

b. In November 1918, a Socialist Congress was held for the purposes of forming a unified party and joining the Second International. The Congress created the Socialist Labor Party (SEK). Its initial membership was listed at 400.

c. Intense disputes characterized the workings of the Socialist Party from the beginning. The first dispute centered around the problem of whether to join the Second International, as originally intended, or the Communist International (Comintern) which was organized in Moscow in March 1919. The party moderates believed that the former organization would permit a freer expression of their Greek

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national aspirations; they were fearful of the more narrowly revolutionary and Soviet-oriented policies of the latter. However, the extremists finally won out at a second party congress in April 1920, and the Comintern recognized SEK in September.

d. The second dispute was over Lenin's "21 points" which every party was required to adopt; the points stressed the revolutionary role of the party. The extremists, led by Ioannis Papanastasiou, the leader of the Party Control Committee, maintained that this revolutionary doctrine should be adhered to; the moderates, led by Ioannis Petsopoulos, argued that the weakness of the party in Greece necessitated a period of working within the legal framework of politics until the party's position with the Greek masses was strengthened. This dispute lasted until 1922, when the pro-Comintern faction was finally strong enough to expel Petsopoulos and the other moderate leaders.

e. The third dispute centered around the issue of a possible Balkan Federation. Official Comintern policy viewed the Balkan problems as one created by the great powers in league with the Balkan bourgeoisie; the solution was a Balkan Federation ". . . based on completely democratic institutions, and guaranteeing the full and actual political, national and linguistic freedom of all nationalities. . . ." This solution clearly suggested that in such a Federation, Greece would lose Macedonia and Thrace to Bulgaria. From the beginning, the strong and cohesive Bulgarian Communist Party was highly active in the Comintern (two of its members), Vasil Kolanov and G. M. Dimitrov, were in the high Comintern councils) and closely supported Soviet policies. The Soviets chose to adopt policies favoring the Bulgarian party at the expense of the weaker and faction-ridden Greek party. The Comintern eventually forced the Greek party to accept the Balkan Federation idea as policy; this was clearly detrimental to the party's popular standing in Greece and was tantamount to treason against the Greek State.⁹²

f. After the Greek Socialist Party purges in 1922-23, a new Central Committee was formed, which included Serafim Maximos (who had studied in the Soviet Union and had returned to take over the labor section of the party), Thomas Apostolidis, and Georgios Siantos, who was to become the party leader during World War II. Because of the weakness of the Greek party, the Comintern began to take a more active hand in Greek affairs. In 1923, it set up an office in Thessalonike, known as the Thessalonike Bureau, to direct propaganda at the Asia Minor Greeks settling in Macedonia and to keep the Comintern informed on the operations of the Greek party.

g. In 1924, the Comintern ordered the Greek party to reorganize itself to the pattern of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), adopt the cellular structure to strengthen ties with the masses, eliminate factions which still refused to adopt Lenin's 21 points and

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Comintern decisions on the Balkan Federation, and step up the "fractionalist penetration" of the labor unions. Maximos was directed to take charge of this reorganization, the party was renamed the Communist Party of Greece--Greek Section of the Comintern (KKE-ETKD). In addition, the Comintern began to place Kommunisticheskii Universitet Trudiashchiksia Vostoka (KUTV) graduates in leading positions in the KKE; among these were Nikos Zachariades, Kostos Sklavos, and Nikolidis, the latter two elected immediately to the new Central Committee. The Comintern also periodically sent Czech and Bulgarian party trouble-shooters to try to make some organization out of the chaos that was now the KKE.⁹³

h. In June 1925, the Pangalos dictatorship declared the KKE illegal. It imprisoned the leaders of the party and the party's youth group (OKNE), closed the party's newspapers (Rizospastis and Avanti), and suppressed the party's union organization (GSEE). Stavridis rose to head the new clandestine party, which began to build its underground, and established an Agitation-Propaganda Section to supervise the further indoctrination and self-criticism (aftokritiki) of the party membership.

i. When Pangalos was overthrown in August 1926, the older party leaders were released. This immediately created a three-way split in the party leadership: the left wing, which centered around Andronikos Khaitas and included the KUTV graduates and the youth organization headed by Nikos Zachariades; the centrist group led by Serafim Maximos; and the Trotskyite-separatists led by Poulipoulos. By 1928 the left wing had succeeded in discrediting the separatism of Poulipoulos and had forced Maximos and his supporters out of the party.⁹⁴

j. The years 1928-29 were devoted entirely to the further formation of the party underground, creation of a permanent apparatus, and attempts to penetrate the Armed Forces and peasant organizations. Membership drives aimed at increasing the party to 5,000 were proceeding very slowly. By 1927, the party acknowledged a membership of 860; in 1930, the figure had reached only 1,500.

k. Continued party emphasis of the Balkan Federation idea at the insistence of the Comintern exposed the party as a tool of foreign intervention. The KKE was, therefore, highly unpopular in Greece at the very time when Greek unrest over Western intervention, the overburdening foreign debt, and unstable economic and social conditions could have been turned most easily to the party's advantage. In 1929, Comintern directives to exploit the situation caused by the economic crisis gave rise to a new split in the KKE. Andronikos Khaitas argued that the party was not organized to exploit the situation; Konstantine Theos and Georgios Siantos maintained that further organization would be a hindrance and ordered a series of disastrous general strikes. Khaitas was dropped from the party, and like Poulipoulos and Maximos

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before him, he began to organize a new leftist party in opposition to the KKE.⁹⁵

22. Growth of the party after 1931. In 1931 the Comintern again intervened in the KKE, reorganized the Central Committee, and placed Nikos Zachariades in charge. Although only 29 years old, Zachariades had been trained in the Soviet Union at the KUTV and at Moscow University, where he was regarded as a brilliant student. In him the Comintern believed that they had found the impersonal and dedicated Communist who would carry out Moscow's orders with a minimum of direction and without danger of deviation.

a. The elections in September 1932 demonstrated that Zachariades was making some headway at unifying the party and organizing workers and peasants unions. The party's greatest electoral strength lay in the north among the tobacco workers and the peasant-refugee groups; its united front led the lists in Kavalla, Volos, Larisa, and Edessa and came in third in Athens, although it made a poor showing in Piraeus. Aided by the proportional representation system, the party elected 10 deputies to Parliament. In combination with other independent groups, it now held a 40-seat margin, without which neither the Populists nor the Liberals could form a majority government.

b. Tsaldaris (Populist) formed a precarious government which lasted only 6 months, until March 1933. The Communists took every opportunity to embarrass the Government. They called for strong social legislation, abolition of taxes on the poor, and disarmament and liquidation of the Armed Forces and backed up these demands by strikes and walkouts which brought workers into battles with the police.⁹⁶

c. After the 1933 elections and the abortive Plastiras coup, Tsaldaris again took office, but this time with a majority; a return to the majority system of electoral computation assured that no Communist deputies were returned to Parliament. By November 1933, several hundred party leaders were in jail or in exile and several hundred more were obliged to operate underground. Party emphasis was again placed at organizing the clandestine apparatus, anti-Fascist self-defense groups, and cells within the Armed Forces and civil service.

d. Limited ability to operate for itself led the KKE to adopt front group tactics in 1934. After negotiations with various leftist and socialist elements, a "United Anti-Fascist Front" was declared in October, led by KKE members Kostas Varnalis and Demitrios Glynos. Similar efforts with agrarian interests led to the creation of the Agrarian Party of Greece under Kostas Gavrielidis, the leadership of which the KKE rapidly infiltrated.

e. Because of their supposed non-Communist affiliation, both fronts were able to draw fairly strong support from a wide political

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spectrum.⁹⁷ In the June 1935 elections, the anti-Fascist front polled 110,000 votes (as opposed to the KKE vote in 1933 which totaled only 34,000). In the January 1936 elections (again by proportional representation), the total vote for the KKE and the fronts dropped to 94,000, but this was enough to return 15 Communist deputies. With the monarchist deputies numbering 143 and the Liberals totaling 142 deputies, the Communists once more clearly held the balance of parliamentary power.⁹⁸

f. This unstable situation held until April 1936, when the Chamber was prorogued for 5 months and Metaxas was empowered to govern in the interim. Until Metaxas assumed dictatorial powers in August 1936, the KKE attempted to capitalize on the threat of dictatorship, calling for a general national front against fascism and for massive strikes. In this period, 244 strikes were called involving 90,000 workers; over one-half of these strikes ended in violence.

g. Metaxas used the disruptive effects of the Communist tactics to justify his assumption of power, and the mass general strike which met his declaration of dictatorship in August gave him the necessary justification to move directly against the party. Party headquarters were seized, Zachariades was sentenced to jail, and other leaders such as Porfyrogenis, Theos, Glynos, and Manoleas were exiled. The party's fronts and unions were abolished; the new Government-sponsored National Confederation of Greek Labor was declared the only legal representative of the working class, and compulsory arbitration was imposed.⁹⁹

h. Until the German invasion and the death of Metaxas, the Communist structure was systematically dismantled, its leaders jailed or exiled, and its membership hounded by police or pressed into Government-sponsored organizations. Nevertheless, the party just managed to maintain a skeleton structure at the lower levels, while the organization and morale of the other traditional parties in Greece completely disintegrated under the dictatorship. With the German occupation and the escape of the Government into exile, the only major political organization which remained in Greece, badly mangled as it was, was the KKE.¹⁰⁰

23. World War II: The occupation, creation of EAM.

a. Re-emergence of the Communists. The KKE was able to regroup its forces fairly quickly in 1941. Although Zachariades was sent to Germany by the Gestapo and held in a concentration camp until the end of the war, Georgios Siantos and more than 300 other Communist leaders were released. In addition, because of the German-Soviet Pact, the KKE was able to operate legally and openly until the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June. The release of its leaders and a scant 2 months of relatively unrestricted operation were sufficient to

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revive the KKE and to prepare for the next phase. This came after the German invasion, when Moscow ordered all parties to organize national liberation fronts, uniting all "democratic" elements against the invader.

b. Creation of liberation front. A Greek National Liberation Front was established on 27 September 1941, called "Ethniko Apelevtherotiko Metopo." The initial members of EAM were the KKE under Siantos, the Agrarian Party of Greece under Constantine Gavrielides, the Radical Republic Party of Michailis Kyrkos, the United Socialist Party of Greece (ESKE) under Demitrios Maroggos, the Agrarian Group of Vogiatzis, the Popular Democratic Union (ELD) under Professor Alexander Svolos, and the Socialist Party of Greece (SKE) under Demetrios Stratos. Only the Agrarian Group, the ELD and the SKE, were in any way independent of the Communist Party at the time of EAM's formation. Each of these parties held one seat in the Central Committee of EAM, the supreme policymaking body of the organization.¹⁰¹

c. Front organizations. In rapid succession, the KKE also organized functional fronts to appeal to various sectors of the population. These were Ethniki Ergatiko Apelevtherotiko Metopo (EEAM) the workers' EAM; Ethniki Allileggyi (EA), National Solidarity, successor to the KKE Workers' Aid; and Ethniko Apelevtherotiko Metopo Neon (EAMN), the Youth Front, which eventually became Eniaia Panelladiki Organosis Neon (EPON), the Panhellenic Youth Organization. These organizations were soon operating throughout Greece. To these was added Organosi Prostatios Laikou Agonos (OPLA)--Organization for the Protection of the Peoples Struggle--in October 1943. Originally it was intended to be a counterterrorist unit directed against the gendarmerie and security battalions, but gradually assumed police and strong-arm functions in liberated areas. So as not to reveal the control of the KKE, respected non-Communists were recruited as much as possible to provide a respectable front for the workings of the above organizations.¹⁰²

d. Formation of People's Liberation Army. In April 1942, the Communists felt secure enough to proceed to the next step; the creation of a guerrilla force to actively resist the occupation. EAM announced the formation of Ethnikos Laikos Apeleftherotikos Statos (ELAS), the National People's Liberation Army (ELAS is a pun on the Greek name for their country, ELLAS). Driven by starvation and the cruelties of the invaders, and by something of the recaptured glamour of the klepht resistance to the Turks, thousands eagerly joined ELAS. A volunteer had to be recommended by the EAM leader (ipefthinos) of his home village or district; if the local ELAS band had the necessary weapons and supplies, the ipefthinos' certificate of good character was accepted and the recruit was sworn in as a soldier.¹⁰³ ELAS acquired its first large quantity of weapons when the Italian Pinerole Division under General Infante surrendered at Larisa.

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e. Struggles with other resistance forces.

(1) By December 1942, ELAS controlled almost one-third of the Greek mainland. EAM adopted the policy that all other resistance forces were to submit themselves to EAM and ELAS control. Thus, armed and organized, EAM and ELAS began to force a policy of consolidation or liquidation on other resistance movements. At the end of 1943, EAM sent its organizers into the Peloponnese--a generally conservative area of southern Greece--and shortly thereafter ELAS succeeded in breaking up the Panhellenic Liberation Organization (PAO) in Macedonia. In 1944, Psarros' partisan band of 22,000 men was broken up and Psarros was murdered. The PAO in the Thessalonike area was destroyed in October 1943, and one of its commanders, Mousterakis, was absorbed into the ELAS command. As Woodhouse comments with great insight, Mousterakis was declared ". . . in the usual (Communist) process, successively a traitor, a collaborator, a prisoner, and a divisional commander in ELAS."¹⁰⁴

(2) The largest non-Communist resistance organization was the National Republican Greek League (EDES), commanded by General Zervas. Although Zervas' leadership qualities were somewhat questionable, the British chose to back him and EDES as a counterweight to ELAS. In 1943, ELAS held one end of the Metzovon Pass between Ioannina and Kalabaka, EDES the other; the Germans were intent on regaining control of the area. Although there is no evidence to suggest collaboration, the Germans and ELAS struck at the EDES positions almost simultaneously in late 1943. The fighting lasted until February 1944. Zervas lost 1,500 men, who deserted to ELAS; thereafter, EDES was confined to the central Epirus area and was of no significant threat to ELAS.¹⁰⁵

f. Plans for political control of Greece; relations with exile Government. As EAM and ELAS control widened throughout the country, the KKE began to lay plans for the eventual departure of the Germans and the test of political strength which would come with liberation. In September 1943, Despotopoulos submitted a memorandum to the Politburo which recommended the creation of a mountain government supported by ELAS forces, so as to present a de facto government to the Allies and the Greek Government-in-exile, making allied occupation of Greece politically and militarily unnecessary. As a result, on 10 March 1944, EAM declared the formation of the Politiki Ethnikis Thenikis Apeleftherosis (PEEA)--Political Committee of the National Liberation--as a provisional government of liberated Greece. Colonel Eviripidis Bakirdzis, an ELAS commander and old supporter of Venizelos, was made temporary president. The Political Committee of the PEEA included Emmanouil Mandakos, a guerrilla leader from Crete and friend of Venizelos, as Minister of War; Georgios Siantos, head of the KKE, as Minister of Interior, Supply, and Social Security; Gavrielides, the AKE (Agrarian) leader, as Minister of Agriculture, Labor, and National Economy; and Elias Tsirimokos, the founder of ELD (Popular Democratic),

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as Minister of Justice, Education, and Finance. Alexandros Svolos, the ELD leader, soon became Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(1) The formation of the PEEA was accompanied by further efforts to confound and weaken the Government-in-exile prior to the liberation. Throughout the war, front organizations had been operating within the Greek Army in the Middle East. The Army was composed of units withdrawn from Greece in 1941 and Greek subjects living abroad who had been mobilized during the war. EAM was active in all branches of service and had achieved some success in mobilizing the dissatisfactions of many elements. In addition, the activities of Ellinikos Apeleftherotikos Syndesmos (EAS)--the Greek Liberation League; Epitropi Syntonismou Agonas (EAS)--the Committee for Intensification of the Struggle and two Communist members of the Greek maritime unions, Ambatielos and Karagianis, were all directed by the KKE to foment discontent among these forces. These activities came to a head in March 1944, when a group of Army and Air Force officers openly called for the formation of a government of national unity based on the PEEA. When they were ordered arrested by the Government-in-exile, the Greek troops mutinied and were quelled only by the arrival of British forces.¹⁰⁶

(2) The rationale behind the policy decisions of the KKE from this point until the outbreak of the battle for Athens in December 1944 still remains obscure. On the surface, observers reported a seeming vacillation between two policies: one, of using the forces of ELAS and the organization of EAM and the other front groups to force the acceptance of the PEEA as the basis upon which to form a new government; the other, of cooperating with the Government-in-exile and accepting some lesser position in a new coalition government. EAM, which had taken a strongly antimonarchist position, flatly refused to cooperate with Prime Minister Tsouderos' effort to bring all parties together in April 1944. Nor did they accept King George's conciliatory albeit belated offer to put the constitutional issue of the form of government to a plebiscite. However, in May the KKE sent representatives to Dur Es-Sueir to meet with Papandreou.

(3) Apparent agreement was reached with the signing of the Lebanon Charter that EAM would cooperate in the formation of a government and take the portfolios of Agriculture, National Economy, Labor and Communications. However, EAM headquarters in Greece repudiated this agreement in June and demanded a solution to the constitutional question as a precondition to EAM participation. This was followed by another ultimatum demanding six Ministries and one sub-Ministry (in Defense) in a new government, and the preservation of ELAS until after liberation and the formation of the government. On 31 July, in another sudden reversal, EAM announced its agreement to participate in the new government, demanding only the dismissal of Papandreou. The cabinet refused to accept Papandreou's resignation.

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Nevertheless, EAM leaders Svolos, Tsirimokos, Askoutsis, Zevgos, and Porphyrogenis were sworn in on 18 August as Ministers with the portfolios originally agreed to in the Lebanon Charter.

(4) This shift may have been due to pressure imposed by the Soviet military mission under Colonel Popov which arrived in Greece on 25 July. Soviet thinking at the time may have been that Communist cooperation with and participation in a new, weak, and disorganized government would soon provide the KKE with the opportunity of taking over through political rather than military action. The Soviets may have forcefully informed KKE leaders that they could expect no material support if they resorted to military force, as this might endanger Soviet efforts to consolidate their gains in Europe and elsewhere in the Balkans.¹⁰⁷

g. Liberation and conflict. In September 1944, the new government moved to Caserta and the German forces began to evacuate Greece with little serious opposition from the guerrillas. Also in September, Saraphis and General Zervas (leader of the rival guerrilla organization) signed the Caserta Agreement in which both placed their forces (ELAS and EDES, respectively) under the command of General Scobie, the commander of Allied Forces in Greece, and agreed to confine their operations to their respective spheres so as to avoid further armed conflict. On 12 October the Germans evacuated Athens and within a few days the Government returned to Greece with a small force of Greek and British soldiers.¹⁰⁸

(1) At this high point the KKE controlled an estimated 380,000 Greeks through EAM and the other front groups. Of this number, 70,000 were in ELAS, well trained and armed, and could be reinforced by units from its gendarmerie (Ethniki Politofylaki) and OPLA. By 10 November the Government had only 600-700 British soldiers in the Athens area, the newly arrived Rimini Brigade, a small police force and the few remaining loyal guerrilla bands. Enjoying such favorable odds, still distrustful of their role in the new Government, and faced with the November decree that all resistance organizations would be disarmed and disbanded by 10 December, the KKE appears to have considered once again the possibility of forcefully seizing power before the opportunity slipped away. Reportedly Siantos and Ioannidis met on the night of 27 November, and thereafter the hardening of the EAM and KKE propaganda lines foreshadowed the coming conflict. On 1 December the EAM deputies resigned, presumably over the disarmament dispute. Siantos reestablished the ELAS command and ordered a general mobilization and movement of forces on Athens.

(2) The outbreak occurred on 3 December when the KKE undertook a public protest demonstration in Athens despite its being forbidden by the Government; armed terrorists appeared to have been among the demonstrators. The police lost control of the crowds and

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shots were fired: the December Revolution had begun. A subsequent paper on the conflict periods will deal more closely with the events of this 6-weeks' war.¹⁰⁹

(3) One interesting note of speculation is on the reason the KKE chose to fight in Athens, a risky venture at a time when the British were willing and able to provide rapid reinforcements to the Greek Government and when the KKE exercised de facto control over much of the rest of Greece. Under these circumstances it is difficult to understand why the Athens revolt was not accompanied by simultaneous military action throughout Greece in one decisive stroke. Chamberlin suggests that the KKE leadership may have been fearful that extending the conflict into northern Greece would lead to an offer of aid from Yugoslavia which was suspected of looking for an excuse to move into Thessalonike. The same argument also holds to some degree for Bulgaria, which might subsequently press demands on Macedonia as recompense for assistance. Therefore, from the KKE point of view it would have seemed that a quick decisive action in Athens would put them in undisputed control of all of Greece, whereas a long struggle in the Greek hinterland might bring about the unwanted intervention of Yugoslavia.¹¹⁰

(4) The December Revolution came to an end after much bloodshed; the atrocities perpetrated by the Communist forces in a seeming rage of frustration gave rise to a wave of public indignation which wiped out the popularity achieved during the occupation years. On 10 January 1945 a KKE conference of 61 leading officials decided to accept General Scobie's offer to discuss terms. On 12 January a truce was agreed to and on 12 February the Varkiza agreement was signed. This agreement offered liberal terms to the Communists: ELAS was to be disbanded but no prosecution of the guerrillas would take place except for crimes prescribed by common law; the constitutional question would be submitted to a plebiscite; the Government would purge the civil service, police, and Gendarmerie of those who collaborated with the wartime occupiers.¹¹¹

24. The postwar period--prelude to the second conflict. As a result of the December 1944 hostilities, there was a mass exodus from the front groups and from the KKE itself. However, the Government proved to be ineffective in pursuing its advantage. It was unable or unwilling to control the right-wing bands which were intent on retribution, and could not provide general security. Many departed EAM and ELAS members were, therefore, gradually driven back to the fold. In addition, although the KKE lived up to the Varkiza agreement in turning over the required arms, it still succeeded in hiding caches estimated later by General Saraphis at 50,000 modern operable weapons. At the same time, while the lesser members of the party and front groups were being vigorously prosecuted by the Government, the leaders of the December Revolution were permitted to go free from punishment and gradually to take up again their political roles.

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a. Reorganization. As is characteristic of Communist parties after a defeat, the KKE set about immediately to analyze its errors in December and organize a plan for the new political strategy. In April 1945, the KKE declared the formation of a broad political front centered around EAM and announced its intent to resist the return of the monarchy. Its appeal was to be directed specifically at the labor movement and was to stress the economic plight of the people. EAM was renamed Ethniko Anti-Fasistiko Metopo--the National Anti-Fascist Front. The old EAM parties, the AKE, United Socialist, Democratic Union, Independent Agrarian, and Democratic Radical, became members of the new EAM, and the clandestine control of the KKE was hidden in the claims that these parties exercised political and organizational independence and equality in the coalition front.¹¹²

(1) At the same time, a few ELAS units had refused to be disbanded in accordance with the Varkiza agreement; an estimated 4,000-5,000 had fled to Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Albania or had taken refuge in the Greek mountains. Occasional clashes with the Greek national guard and operation of the right-wing terrorist bands kept up a constant flow of former ELAS members escaping to the north. By the end of 1945, some 8,000 guerrillas had been assembled at the Bulkes training center in the Vojvodina in Yugoslavia. Others were being trained at the Rubig camp in Albania north of Tirana and at Berkovitsa in Bulgaria north of Sofia.¹¹³

(2) In 1945, some dissension appeared in the ranks of the KKE over the anticipated return of Zachariades from German detention. The older members, who were resentful of the rapid advancement of those who joined the party during the occupation, looked to Ionnidis, a Politburo leader and political ally of Zachariades, to return to the older party organization and function. The younger members regarded Siantos, Secretary-General of the party, as their spokesman in the party debates. Zachariades returned to Greece on 27 May 1945 and assumed control of the party. Under his direction, the party began to develop a political platform for the coming elections; it promised a broad program of popular reconstruction and recognized the need for guaranteeing the Greek frontiers and the national independence and integrity.

(3) On the issue of Macedonian autonomy, however, the KKE was silent; for the Bulgarian Party was again pressing its predominant interest in this area in the Comintern, and the Bulgarian influence in Moscow was far superior to that of the Greek party. Portions of the KKE still smarted over the competition they had had to run with the Bulgarians in the formation of resistance groups in Macedonia. The joint Yugoslav-Bulgarian formation of a Macedonian Party (Kommounistikou Komma Makedonias) in the spring of 1945, which was to operate independently of the KKE, proved to be too much for the Greek Communists to swallow. Therefore, unable, on the one hand, to adopt publicly a

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policy espousing an autonomous Macedonia without committing political suicide in postwar Greece and, on the other, unable to satisfy the Comintern and the northern Communist neighbors with capitulation on this point, the KKE chose to say nothing.¹¹⁴

(4) To protect itself further, the KKE undertook a fundamental shakeup of its clandestine apparatus and began a secret reinfiltration of the Greek Armed Forces through Kommatiki Organosis Stratou-Somaton Asphaleias (KOSSA)--the Party Organization of the Army and Security Corps. Estimates of KOSSA membership as of September 1945 were 15 percent of the Army, 17 percent of the Air Force, 5 percent of the Navy, and 2 percent of the police. A total potential armed force of 35,000-40,000 men was estimated to be available to the KKE in the event it readopted a policy of armed rebellion.¹¹⁵

b. Preelection strategy; renewal of conflict. By mid-1945, the KKE settled on the political strategy to be pursued until the elections called for in the Varkiza agreement. All propaganda output was to be directed at discrediting the Greek Government as unstable and responsible for the terrorist activities of the extremist groups. Corresponding to this attack was the effort to rebuild the party following by espousing a positive program of popular democracy. At the same time, the party was busy building a rationale for abstaining from the election, if an electoral defeat looked probable, on the grounds that the Government was unwilling and unable to provide the necessary security to guarantee free elections. To bolster this strategy, Zachariadis ordered the creation of "mass self-defense" units, maziki laiki aftoamyna (MLA), ostensibly to counter rightist terrorist activities, but also to undertake terrorist activities of their own and create incidents for propaganda exploitation. Labor elements were ordered to undertake slowdowns, strikes, mass meetings, public funerals for victims of "rightist terrorism," etc., and to prepare for a general strike, to further handicap the series of faltering administrations during the period.

(1) At a Politburo meeting in Bulgaria on 15 December 1945, members of the KKE Central Committee met with representatives of the Yugoslav and Bulgarian General Staffs and agreed to reorganize the remaining ELAS forces and create the Greek Democratic Party. The Soviet Union is reputed to have asked Yugoslavia and Bulgaria to provide clandestine support. There were vague promises of aid, but no supplies or arms were forthcoming from the Soviet Union. In August 1946, the Central Committee of the KKE sent Markos Vaphiadis to Yugoslavia to take control of the new army.¹¹⁶

(2) In January 1946, the party instructed its members to register for the March 31 elections, but in early February announced that it would boycott the elections unless the Government restored public order. Simultaneously, the Soviet Union brought pressure to

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bear in the UN Security Council to force the United Kingdom to agree to withdraw its forces after the election. After the election, which gave the Populists a strong victory, the party loudly protested the Government's use of terrorism and fraud and claimed that 50 percent of the voters had abstained as a result of the KKE boycott.¹¹⁷

(3) It appears that the decision to return to the use of armed warfare took place during the February 1946 meeting of the Politburo, at which time the party boycott of the elections was announced. Reports of increased guerrilla infiltration began at this time, and the first major guerrilla attack took place on election day at the northern village of Litokhoru. By June the Minister of Public Order announced that guerrilla infiltration was increasing at an alarming rate and that "roaming communist bands had created a desperate situation in Macedonia." The crucial turning point came in September, however, when in the plebiscite for the return of King George, 69 percent of those voting favored the reinstitution of the monarchy. An overwhelming popular rejection of the King had been the final party hope for a political solution. However, the party did not make a public announcement on the return to armed confrontation until 8 October 1945, well into the conflict phase.

(4) In retrospect, it seems apparent that the leadership of the KKE never seriously gave up the revolutionary alternative in the 2 years between the December Revolution of 1944 and the more serious outbreak in 1946. However, before the decision to pursue the rebellion could be made, the party needed a period of legal existence in order to train its guerrilla cadres, purge its ranks of unreliable members, reconstruct an underground, reinfiltrate the Armed Forces and Government services, and regain some measure of popular support.

(5) Although nothing in the literature directly supports it, the return to guerrilla warfare in 1945 appears premature and grossly inconsistent with prevailing KKE policies. The hardening of the views of the Balkan Communist countries at this period was readily apparent; limited guerrilla operations may have begun under Yugoslav and Bulgarian sponsorship rather than KKE directive. By 1946, the KKE may have found the guerrilla conflict to have achieved such a level that to recapture the undisputed leadership of these forces, to preempt further Yugoslav and Bulgarian intervention, the party had to declare a return to revolutionary warfare well before its other organizational preparations were complete.¹¹⁸

25. Communist organization. In the early days of the KKE, organizational weakness reflected and was largely a product of the undisciplined and faction-ridden internal workings of the party. In 1924 and again in 1928-29 the Comintern ordered the KKE to revamp its organization to correspond to that of the Soviet party, but it was not until the Comintern installed Nikos Zakhariadis as head of the KKE in

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1931 that the party began to make organizational progress. The organization which developed thereafter was in accordance with the Soviet model. At the bottom of the party was the pyrin or party cell. Among the labor groups, the pyrin was located at a factory or other worksite; among the peasants, it was usually located at the village level. Although there is little in the Greek literature on this point, the evidence suggests that, within the open party structure, the number of members in any one cell was rather flexible; in the clandestine or illegal apparatus, the membership was limited to three or four. Several cells in a community were controlled by an achtida composed of the cell leaders and governed by an achtida committee. Above the achtides was a regional organization composed of the achtida leaders and governed by a regional committee. The regions were controlled by district organizations governed by district committees. There were roughly a score of district committees throughout Greece; the cities of Athens, Piraeus, and Thessalonike had their own city committees and operated on the same level in the party as the district committees. The heads of district and city organizations made up the national congress, which was governed by the central committee of the party. The permanent operating governmental body of the National Central Committee was the Politburo, made up of seven men in 1943. This hierarchy of interlocking party levels was fairly apparent in the open party structure. In the clandestine apparatus, the numbers at each level were smaller. The membership of a clandestine group at any level was kept relatively ignorant of the full membership either above or below it, and completely so of organizations parallel to it in the clandestine structure.

a. Changes during World War II. In 1943, as the KKE began to take on more the character of a mass party, some organizational changes were made. The party cell was abolished and replaced as the basic building block of the party by the party organization of the base (KOV). Although the reason for this is not apparent in the literature, it seems that this change permitted the incorporation of a larger number of members at the base level. Also, when the KOV became too large (size not suggested in the literature), it could be subdivided into sectors for more manageable application to individual party projects. The higher levels of the party remained essentially the same as before. No certain information exists as to the organization the party adopted after the December 1944 conflict, but the mass exodus of members after that war probably necessitated a return to the tighter cellular composition.¹¹⁹

b. EAM and front organizations. The organization of EAM and the other front groups was parallel to that of the Communist party. The chain of command ran upwards from the village base to the National Central Committee of each front group.

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(1) At the village base, four groups were represented: the EAM general committee, the EA to provide relief work, the EPON youth organization, and the Epimeletes tou Andarte or guerrilla commissariat (ETA). The ETA was responsible for collecting taxes, primarily for supporting ELAS units so that indiscriminate requisitioning was not necessary and peasant antagonism was avoided. The secretary of the EAM General Committee of the village was known as the Ipefthinos or responsible one; he checked identification papers, furnished mules and guides to ELAS, and acted as a recruiter for ELAS. The Communist Party took great care that EAM organizers were KKE members. It was almost always a Communist who arrived at a village, recruited for EAM and ELAS, and stayed on as the Ipefthinos.

(2) Above the village was the eparchia or district EAM committee, in theory elected by the Ipefthinoi of the villages belonging to the district. The district committee also "elected" an Ipefthinos who in turn sat on the nomos or prefecture EAM committee. Above the nomos was the regional committee whose members and Ipefthinos were "elected" in the same manner. There were about a dozen regional committees, and the cities of Athens, Piraeus, Salonika, Patras, and Volos were each represented by one delegate to the national EAM central committee, the supreme policymaking body. In practice, the Communists could readily control the committees at each level to ensure that their control at the next higher level remained intact.¹²⁰

c. Liberation Army organization. The organization of ELAS differed to some degree from those of the KKE and the national fronts. This was necessitated because of the military mission of ELAS and the added party controls required in view of this mission. The high command and every subordinate headquarters and unit was governed by a committee of three: the military commander, the "Kapetanios," and the political representative of EAM. The military commander was usually a former Army officer or sergeant with a knowledge of military tactics and often great local prestige; in practice he was the least influential of the three, for he was entrusted only with narrow tactical and other battlefield decisions. The Kapetanios was a KKE member and was responsible for propaganda and political control for the command. The EAM representative was responsible for directing relations between the unit and the civilian population and other national front organizations in the area of the unit's operations. Any important decision, in theory, had to be agreed to by all three. In practice, the Kapetanios and the EAM representative made all the important decisions; in the higher commands, both were KKE members directly subject to the instructions of the parallel party structure. As an example of this committee of three in operation, the ELAS high command consisted of General Sarafis, a high-ranking Greek Army Colonel with great prestige, as military Commander-in-Chief; Kapetanios Ares Velouhiotis, the fiery Communist of early guerrilla fame; and political representative Siantos, who was also head of the KKE.¹²¹

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26. Leadership. The early leadership of the KKE was made up largely of leftists with no particular attachment to the Soviet Comintern; they were more representative of the Greek political personalities which prevailed in all Greek parties of the period--generally nationalistic in orientation, self-seeking in the political infighting of the party, and jealous of acquired political prerogatives. The early party leaders, Poulipoulos, Maximos, and Khaitos, contributed to the high level of factionalist bickering within the party; as Comintern pressure finally forced each out of the party, they took with them their respective followers and founded new leftist parties in opposition to the KKE. Of this older generation of leaders, Georgios Siantos was one of the few to survive in the long run within the good graces of the Comintern and retain a paramount position in the party.

a. The next generation of leaders began to emerge with the installation of Nikos Zachariades as head of the KKE. Like Zachariades, they tended to be Greek only by accident of birth or language; their primary identification was with international communism and with the Soviet Union. These men rose to party prominence during the wartime occupation and included Andhreas Tzimas and his wife, Petros Roussos, Zevgos, the lawyer Porphyroyennis, the agriculturalist Gavrielides, the journalist Karvounis, and Dhespotopoulos. After the 1944 rebellion, those of the above who had been killed or had lost the confidence of the party were replaced by others such as Ioannidis, Partsalidis, Khrysa, Hatjivasileiou (the wife of Roussos), Petritis, and Theos.

b. During the creation of the resistance movement, other Communists came into prominence because of special capabilities. Ares Veloukhiotis rose to the party head of ELAS; Markos Vaphiadis and Lazanis created ELAS forces in Macedonia; and Yioryios Kissavos emerged in Thessaly--the latter three becoming better known for their leadership of the revived Communist forces of 1946-48.

c. In addition, a coterie of other prominent figures, many with no prior Communist affiliation, emerged during the resistance to play the roles of figureheads and lend an aura of legitimacy to EAM, ELAS, and the other front groups. Political figures included Svolos, Askoutsis, Angelopoulos, and Hadzimbeis, who became members of the PEEA, the Communist shadow government. Civil servants, professionals, teachers, intellectuals, bishops, and priests were readily recruited during this period. Of the high ranking Greek military officers brought into the movement, Generals Sarafis, Bakirdzis, Mandakas, and Othonaios were among the most prominent.¹²²

d. Sketches of the two principal party leaders, Zachariades and Siantos; the major non-Communist figurehead leader of ELAS, Sarafis; and the two principal party leaders of the guerrilla forces, Ares Veloukhiotis and Markos Vaphiadis are presented below as examples of the leaders of this period.

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(1) Nikos Zachariades was born in 1902 in Asia Minor. He attended a Greek school in Adrianople in Turkey and began working as a sailor on the Black Sea about the time of the Soviet revolution. In 1921 or 1922, he appears to have jumped ship in a Soviet port and shortly thereafter gained admittance to a school of Marxist studies, where he demonstrated great intellectual talents. In 1923, the Comintern sent him to Greece as a leader in the youth movement. In 1926, he was made a party member, but was arrested shortly thereafter by the Pangalos government. After the fall of Pangalos, Zachariades escaped and became a member of the Athens District Committee. Arrested again in 1939, purportedly for murdering a political opponent in a knife fight, he once more escaped and returned to the Soviet Union. There he attended the KUTV and appears to have graduated with the highest academic record of the school. In 1931, the Comintern again ordered Zachariades to Greece, this time to take over the leadership of the KKE from Georgios Siantos. His early successes at unifying the party and increasing membership caused him to be appointed to the Executive Committee of the Comintern and Secretary of the Balkan Communist Bureau. When Metaxas came to power in 1936, Zachariades was put back in jail; with the coming of the wartime occupation, the Germans interned him at Dachau. As a result, he missed the December 1944 revolt. He returned to Greece in May 1945, in time to take over the party leadership once again in preparation for the resumption of the civil war.¹²³

(2) Georgios Siantos was born in 1890 of a poor family in Thessaly. At age 13, he began to work in a tobacco factory. Characterized as an intelligent and dominating young man, he soon became prominent in the Tobacco Workers Federation. He served in the Greek Army from 1911 to 1920. After his discharge, he became a member of the newly formed Socialist Labor Party. He was among the leaders who forced this party into affiliation with the Third International, and was a charter member of the Politburo of the new Communist Party of Greece. In 1925, he became head of the party and, in 1930 entered official political life as an elected member of the Chamber of Deputies. As a result of party factionalism, Siantos was accused of party deviations, stripped of his leadership position, and sent to the Soviet Union in 1931. After 2 years of study at the KUTV, Siantos was returned to Greece to take over the Piraeus party organizations. In a nearly miraculous political recovery, he was again made a Politburo member in 1936 and exercised influence in the party second only to Zachariades. In 1936, Metaxas arrested Siantos and had him exiled, but he escaped the following year to take over the party leadership (Zachariades was still in jail). He was arrested again in 1939, escaped in 1941, and again took over the party. It was under the leadership of Siantos that the party and front organizations were developed and the December 1944 revolt took place. With the return of Zachariades in 1945, Siantos resumed the number two position in the party.

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(3) Ares (or Aris or Aries) Veloukhiotis is something of a mysterious figure in the KKE; very little is known of his background. Even his real name is disputed, although most sources give it as Athanasios Klaras. He appears to have been born in Athens of a middle-class family, was well educated, and worked in the civil service as an agricultural extension agent. In the early 1930's, he joined the KKE and went to the Soviet Union for training. He was imprisoned during the Metaxas period, after being involved in some way in the Spanish revolution, but escaped in the confusion of the German invasion. In 1942, the party directed Veloukhiotis to form a guerrilla movement in the Pindus Mountains. From there he eventually rose to become the Kapetanios of the ELAS headquarters; from that position he directed ELAS forces during the December 1944 revolt. Ares refused to abide by the KKE decision to end this revolt in January. He subsequently led a small band back into the Pindus Mountains to carry on the struggle in defiance of both the party and the Government. The KKE promptly dropped him; 3 months later the Greek National Guard trapped his band and killed Ares. Sources agree that he was a decisive guerrilla leader but was also capable of such cruelty as to repel even his followers. Many atrocities during the occupation and again during the December revolt are attributed to his personal direction.¹²⁴

(4) Colonel (later General) Stephen Sarafis was a regular Army officer who had always been closely involved with the republican faction of the Armed Forces. When Metaxas came to power, Sarafis was dismissed from the Army and exiled to the island of Milos. He returned to Athens in 1941, but was jailed by the Italians and held until early 1943. He returned to his native Thessaly and organized a small band of guerrillas. In May 1943, ELAS troops surrounded his band and gave Sarafis the choice of surrendering or dying. Sarafis surrendered and was taken prisoner. ELAS General Headquarters first condemned him to death, then suddenly made him Commander-in-Chief of ELAS, an increasingly familiar pattern of ELAS recruitment among commanders of other guerrilla units. As Commander-in-Chief, Sarafis was a figurehead; Ares and Siantos exercised the real power. Nevertheless, Sarafis functioned well in this position; he brought a sense of prestige and legitimacy to ELAS and, within his narrow limits as tactical commander, did much to make ELAS the fighting force it subsequently became. After the December revolt, Sarafis was retired; strained relations between him and Markos Vaphiadis apparently explain why he was not called upon again in 1946 to be the symbolic head of the new "democratic" army.¹²⁵

(5) Markos Vaphiadis was born in Asia Minor about 1906 and came to Greece in 1923. He soon joined the KKE and was active as a political organizer in Macedonia, until his arrest and imprisonment during the Metaxas period. He was freed with the onset of the occupation and soon became the EAM representative of the three-man command

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committee of the forces in Macedonia. The military member of this committee was General Bakirdzis, and Vaphiadis learned well the theory and application of military force from Bakirdzis. With the beginning of the creation of the "democratic" army out of the remnants of ELAS, the party considered him the most suitable choice as field commander of the new forces. In August 1946, "General" Markos was sent to Yugoslavia to take control of the new army.¹²⁶

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CHAPTER 3

ECONOMIC FACTORS

by Harley M. Roberts

Section I. Introduction

27. History. The modern economy of Greece may best be studied from the major turning points of 1922-23. After the failure of the Asia Minor campaign against Turkey and the incorporation of more than one million Greek refugees into the society, the Great Idea and expansionism lost its charm, and stable political boundaries for a Greek State emerged. These crisis years for Greece overshadow earlier events: the Balkan Wars of 1912-14 and the First World War. After 1923, Greek and international effort was devoted to settling the refugees within Greek borders and to modernizing the fragmented, backward economy. The depression and Second World War interrupted this process, as they did for all European nations. After the 1945 defeat of the Axis powers, Greece again received heavy international assistance to rebuild her economy. Yet, due to domestic civil war and the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, Greece did not fully recover her prewar economic level until 1950-51. Thus, the period from 1923 to 1951 is examined as a guide to economic factors conditioning the Greek Civil War.

a. Critical years for the economic history of modern Greece may be readily identified as those of heavy wartime expenditures, or territorial enlargement, or of crisis in financial relations with the outside world. For example, the wars of 1880-81 and of 1912-14 were major determinants for later Greek economic history and foreign borrowing. International Greek borrowing on public account may be traced back to the 1821 War for Independence. Her long history of debt defaults and renegotiations includes the 1878 and 1898 experiences with international lenders. The International Finance Commission of 1898 still retained jurisdiction over specific Greek minerals in 1953, and payment of interest and principal of the interwar Greek foreign debt was still in technical dispute by that year.

b. Analysis of the major interwar years requires the selection of critical economic turning points, to permit comparisons with political events. Thus, the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, the League of Nations loan for refugee resettlements, and the creation of the International Refugee Settlement Commission in 1924 provide starting points for an examination of modern Greek economic problems. The boom year of 1928 provides a convenient measure of the success of international and Greek efforts to integrate this 25-percent increase in population into the economy. This year saw the first de jure stabilization of the

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drachma's foreign exchange value since World War I, aided by a League of Nations loan and a large private US loan for public works and road construction. It was the year when the elder statesman Venizelos returned to political power after various semimilitary governments had come and gone. The official Bank of Greece and the Agricultural Bank were founded in 1928, by splitting their functions off from the private National Bank of Greece.

c. The critical years of 1931-32 were also related to international financial problems and to their effect on Greek export trade. In 1931, Britain abandoned the gold standard, and Greece followed suit, halting all payments on her foreign debt. In 1932, tight control of foreign exchange was required under a new "Drachmification Law," and this caused sharp reductions of imports of cheap wheat, initiated a period of Greek protectionism, and encouraged home industry and agricultural expansion.

d. In 1936, General Metaxas took over political power, rapidly assumed dictatorial powers, and began to redirect the economy into the patterns of a corporate state. He centralized State powers over Greek trade unions, manufacturers, and the rural cooperatives movement. Despite this copying of Fascist patterns and a rapid growth of German trade with Greece, close relations with Britain and France were maintained, and the Greek Army was enlarged as a counterbalance to Italian pressures on Greece. The Second World War became a Greek reality in October 1940, with the Italian invasion and successful Greek counterattack, but after April 1941, the German Army swept into Greece and established the wartime occupation period, lasting until liberation in October 1944.

e. From an economic viewpoint, the postwar period began with the 11 November 1944 currency reform which ended an enormous wartime depreciation of the currency, by a factor of some 50 billion. Recovery ended in 1951, when both industrial and agricultural output had regained their prewar peak levels of 1938. However, this postwar period may be divided into numerous subperiods, according to whether internal or external events are given higher priority. Inflation was continuous through this period, except after January 1946, when an Anglo-Hellenic Convention provided backing for the currency, and a full year of relative price stability ensued in Athens. During March-June 1947, President Truman announced an enormous Greece-Turkey aid program, to combat communism within Greece and revive the still prostrate economy. This marked the end of major British influence, replaced by US commitments. In June 1948, a similar US commitment to the reconstruction of the entire free European community of nations was made by Secretary of State Marshall, and the European Recovery Program was born. By mid-1949, the Greek Civil War was ended, major road and rail routes reopened, and US aid to Greece approached some US\$240 million annually.

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f. The purpose of this paper is to review economic conditions and trends precedent to the Greek Civil War of 1946-49. For this purpose, the British decision in December 1946 to surrender their financial responsibilities in Greece may be taken as the important dividing point in Greek postwar history. The US Economic Mission, or Porter Mission, to Greece, which studied the economic situation during December 1946-January 1947, made the recommendations which led to the Truman aid program of that year. The following study of Greek economy does not deal with the international conditions which caused these British and US decisions, although they are major factors in determining the course of the Greek Civil War.

g. Enough has been said to permit a broad description of interwar and wartime trends, however. The primary factor has been shown to be the close relationships between Greece and the Allied powers, particularly the financial relationships between successive Greek administrations and the United Kingdom. The importance of financial determinants to Greek history lay in the small size of her population and her dependence upon foreign trade, both for cash crops markets and for basic grain imports. The analysis below will stress the many economic similarities between the Greek economy of the interwar period and the postwar period. Such similarities include the relative shares of farm crops, distribution of labor between rural and modern sectors, and the financial and market importance of Athens as a metropole. But these similarities should not obscure the fact that Greece was a modernizing nation between the wars, with a growing population and output.

h. McNeill has referred to the political causes of the Greek Civil War and the progressive "collapse of the center" position, between the royalist and republican parties.¹ In a social and economic context, the same general phenomenon during the wartime postwar period may be termed the breakdown of previous economic ties between the villages of Greece and the capital of Athens. Traditionally, this connection was very close and was maintained by informal societies. Personal ties were undermined by the very rapid growth of Athens-Piraeus up to 1940, by the Metaxas effort to centralize the bureaucracy and all other private associations, and by the wartime fragmentation of Greece into various occupied zones which were not allowed to trade freely with one another.

i. The inability of postliberation Greek governments to agree upon questions of economic policy, investment, control of the currency, or credit to various devastated sectors made them vulnerable to domestic frustrations, unrest, and EAM/ELAS political attacks. Efforts by successive administrations, led by the prewar "political kosmos," were devoted to a return to prewar patterns of favoritism

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in business and credit matters. These policies not only failed to revive the economy but blocked the legitimate claims of officials to be different from the wartime puppet government, with its legacy of tolerance for inflation, its overloaded civil service lists, its ineffective rationing system, and its near-complete dependence upon a foreign occupying power.

28. Greek national income, growth, and distribution. Greek statistics for the interwar and the postwar period are subject to many reservations, despite their relatively large number and variety. Unfortunately, there are few long-term economic surveys of Greek economic conditions which examine critically the extensive available data.*² The best studies of the interwar period discuss Greece as merely one of the eight Balkan countries. According to these studies, interwar Greece had a national income of roughly US\$60-70 per capita and thus ranked somewhat higher than her three Balkan neighbors, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania. In agricultural area per capita, Greece ranked lowest among all Balkan nations; her wheat yields were also the lowest, although her fertilizer consumption on other crops averaged near the highest levels.³

a. Despite these low levels of income and farm productivity, many Greek characteristics ranked her economy as close to that of Hungary, and thus semimodernized. Some 24 percent of the 1928 population was in cities of more than 20,000, and 28.2 percent of the active population was in handicrafts and industrial employment, according to the careful 1945 study by P.E.P. in London.⁴ From such inter-Balkan comparisons, the Greek economy of about 1927 or 1929 to 1937 emerges as a partly industrialized and commercial nation, with a highly inefficient rural sector and very marked dependence upon foreign trade and foreign incomes.

b. The national income estimates produced by various Greek sources are very general and present a contradictory picture. The first such estimates were prepared by the Supreme Economic Council during the late 1930's; these are cited by Henry Hill for use by wartime Greek relief agencies and show 1939 national income running between Dr54 billion-55 billion, equivalent to US\$500 million-550 million.⁵ After 1945, a careful study of prewar income was made by UNRRA specialists and by the Greek High Board for Reconstruction. These efforts established the 1938 net geographical product at some Dr67.3 billion, and this level was used for later official calculations of the extent

*The better Greek-language studies of the economy, cited by Stavrianos, 1955 in his comprehensive bibliography, are all quite dated by modern economic standards. Good modern studies since 1950 are available in English, but deal with limited aspects or periods.

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of Greek postwar recovery in national income. An ECA postwar estimate of the 1938 gross national product (GNP) set this more-inclusive income concept at Dr86.6 billion.⁶

c. The best historical income series for 1927-38 was prepared by Evelpides in 1949 and accepted by the UN Statistical Office.⁷ This series shows that the 1928 peak national income of Dr46.1 (in billions) was subsequently not regained until 1933. By 1935, national income at factor cost was Dr55 and in 1938 it reached Dr72.3. However, it is difficult to reconcile various other official estimates for 1938 income and product with Evelpides' data, since adequate breakdowns or definitions are not available. Evelpides' estimate may be converted to about US\$650 million.⁸

d. Postwar national income estimates are extremely confusing and even misleading, due to the inflationary history of 1945-51. The following table summarizes the official drachma estimates and official index, based upon 1938 output as a normal year.

TABLE III. NATIONAL INCOME AT FACTOR COST, 1938 AND 1945-48

<u>Year</u>	<u>Billion drachma</u>	<u>1938 index</u>
1938	67.3	100
1945	655.0	31
1946	6,231.0	51
1947	9,206.0	68
1948	14,529.0	72

Source: Greek High Board of Reconstruction, taken from UN Statistics of National Income, 1952, p 16.

e. These figures suggest the very slow recovery of Greek output during the postwar period; in contrast, most European nations regained their prewar levels of production during 1948. But different sectors of the economy recovered at different rates. Greek agriculture reached prewar levels about 1948, overall industry recovered around 1951, and mining continued to lag below prewar levels in 1953.

f. From the contradictory statistics available for interwar Greece, no definite conclusions concerning the long-term growth rate can be reached. Perhaps the most realistic impression is that formed by the leading Greek economic historian, Chr. Evelpides, that normal growth approached 5 percent. This rate matches the rough calculations for interwar growth in agriculture, given below, and would represent very good performance.⁹

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g. The historical changes in the contribution of various economic sectors to national output are also not available. On the fragmentary evidence concerning employment, manufacturing establishments, and national product during the 1920's, Greece seems to have developed a modern sector quite early. In 1928-30, fully 16.6 percent of gross output came from the manufacturing and handicrafts sector; in 1938, manufacturing contributed 16.5 percent of new product; and in 1948, this share had fallen to 14.6 percent. In the more normal post-war year of 1951, manufacturing again represented 16.7 percent of gross domestic product, while agriculture and livestock accounted for about 34.5 percent. Annex A discusses these figures in more detail.

h. A modern-minded Government's interest in an active economic policy role may be marked by the regularity of its population censuses. Such censuses are basic to taxation policy, welfare programs, municipal finance and investment, or public works planning. By this crude standard, Greece has performed fairly well: the 1920 census recorded a population of about 5 million; following the inflow of some 1.2 million refugees from Turkey, a formal 1928 census enumerated 6,205,000 persons. Finally, a partial 1940 census, which was not completed due to war, showed some 7.18-7.34 million persons within Greece. The natural rate of growth in the 1930's has been put at around 1.33 percent.¹⁰

i. The 1951 census, first to cover the postwar situation, illustrates the difficulties presented by Greek statistics. It recorded some 7,633,000 persons but was promptly judged to be underenumerated by about 5 percent.¹¹ Nevertheless, population estimates for the 1946-51 period are still based upon these findings. With reservations, the 1951 estimate for the Greek "active population" may also be applied to the whole postwar period. This census showed the agricultural population was 49.3 percent of the total, and "active" agricultural population at 48.2 percent of the working age population. Nationwide, the active or employable population represented only 37.2 percent of the total populations, and only 19 percent was in industry, mining, and construction.¹²

j. For historical perspective, the 1928 census identified some 44.2 percent of the population as active. Of these employable persons, about 53.7 percent were employed in agriculture, and 28.2 percent were in industry and mining.¹³ Comparison of these two censuses, separated by 22 years, results in few conclusions about long-term trends, except that the census categories may not be fully comparable. The fall in the proportions of the population considered active, and in numbers active in agriculture both confirm an increasing urbanization which is a trend postulated by most development theories. But they do not show a very marked shift, as other data might suggest.

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The active population in industry (defined broadly) seems to have fallen considerably, and this contradicts other evidence which shows the opposite trend.

k. The overwhelming importance of Athens as a center of Greek population and production has been often pointed out and justifies its description as a metropole. In 1832, Athens was merely a large village; by 1920, she represented a capital city of 453,000. The inflow of refugees swelled this population further and merged the Athens-Pireaus cities into one area known as Greater Athens. In 1928, this city numbered 802,000; by 1940, it included 1.12 million; and by 1951, the city reached 1.38 million persons. Thus during the late 1920's and 1930's, the Athens-Pireaus metropole included 12-15 percent of the whole Greek population; some three times the share of the next city, Thessalonike. By 1951, Greater Athens contained 20.5 percent of the active population and 18 percent of the total population.¹⁴

l. These broad conclusions suggest that prewar income distribution may have been extremely unequal, due to the very low productivity of agriculture and poor land-man ratio. Unfortunately, little data on relative income shares are available. Data provided by Hill for average incomes of 1939 in different sectors show that agriculture workers received Dr13,300, while those in professions received about Dr47,500. This 1.0-3.6 ratio does not represent a wide spread, if it accurately reflects prewar rural and urban income levels.¹⁵

m. In summary, despite some contradictory statistics, prewar Greece appears to have been like other Balkan nations in terms of farm productivity and overall output of real goods. However, she was far more commercialized and urbanized than her three Balkan neighbors, approaching Hungary in this respect. The incomes gap was not extremely wide, and economic growth was adequate, although not regular. The urban population was heavily concentrated in Athens-Pireaus, a metropole and a shipping port rivaling Marseilles and Naples.

Section II. War and the Greek Occupation.

29. General. In discussing the overall economic development of Greece, special emphasis must be placed upon the wartime occupation and changes under the puppet government of 1941-44. During the 48-month period from Ochi Day to liberation, Greek imports and trade were almost completely halted; the currency was rapidly devalued by inflation; and a considerable proportion of the national capital stock in farmland, livestock, buildings, and equipment was destroyed. The total amount of wartime damages was agreed by the Paris Conference on Reparations in 1946 to total US\$8,500 million. However, the statistics to measure wartime changes are necessarily less reliable than for the interwar period.

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30. Food shortages. Perhaps the most important wartime consequences were the results of malnutrition, due to prolonged shortages of basic foodstuffs.

a. The German invasion of 1941 was followed by the administrative partition of Greek territory into three parts with numerous subdistricts. Germans controlled all of Macedonia and the north, while Italian occupation authorities held the Islands and Epirus. A puppet Greek Government in Athens was left with control over about 40 percent of prewar territory and about 3.55 million persons, nearly one-third of them in Athens. However, German commissioners effectively ruled in Athens; in November 1941, a German decree required rules of barter arrangements, limiting the flow of all goods between the various districts and setting up a requisition system to supply Athens.¹⁷ This disruption of trade, on top of German refusal to cover the import requirement for fully 40 percent of overall Greek wheat consumption, resulted in near famine in Athens during the 1941-42 winter. By January 1942, some 500,000 persons were being fed at municipal soup kitchens, and bread rations were established for 1.2 million persons.¹⁸ See also chapter 4, section III, for a discussion of malnutrition.

b. As news of this disaster spread, international agencies and private bodies joined to arrange for emergency relief measures. By mid-1942, Canadian donations of 18,000 tons of wheat monthly and medical and food donations through US Greek War Relief agencies were arranged for shipment to Greece and distribution under the International Red Cross. Through December 1943, some 292,000 tons of wheat and pulses, plus soup, milk, and medical supplies, had been shipped; and the 1941 starvation conditions in Athens were not repeated in subsequent winters. While such relief continued throughout the war and was continued under UNRRA auspices during the postwar period, no convenient source accounts for the total private and public cost of relief efforts during the occupation.¹⁹

31. Transportation. The major economic loss during wartime was in the Greek transportation system, and much of this occurred in April-October 1944, as occupying German troops progressively withdrew northward. By the time of liberation, the trunk rail connection from Athens to Thessalonike had lost 90 percent of all locomotives and cars, as well as all bridges and much track. Service on this critical line could not be resumed until 1949, due to the Greek Civil War. The highway system had deteriorated from its low prewar level, while fully 66 percent of the prewar numbers of trucks, buses, and vehicles were gone. The entire Greek coastal shipping fleet had been lost, Pireaus harbor was blocked and destroyed, and the Corinth Canal was blocked so badly that passage was impossible until 1949.²⁰

32. Agriculture and industry. The rural economy had been hit very hard by German requisitions and outright destruction. Some 2,000

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of the 5,600 prewar Greek villages were largely destroyed, and about 25 percent of the area under crops was no longer cultivated. The traditional cash crops of tobacco, cotton, and olives were particularly curtailed. In the nation as a whole, some 25 percent of all buildings were destroyed or damaged, and many urban facilities damaged. The only major utility units not harmed were the Marathon Dam and the large APEC power station serving Athens. Wartime shortages had idled most of Greek industry, and its depreciation had been hastened; however, the bulk of industrial plant and equipment had not been lost or damaged during the war.²¹

33. Monetary system. Another major economic casualty of wartime, ranking after the transport system and the stock of buildings, was the prewar Greek drachma and the entire structure of prewar financial relationships. When a new postwar "old drachma" was introduced by the returned Government in November 1944, it exchanged for 50 billion prewar drachmas, and the Athens price index was at an equivalent multiple. This enormous inflation occurred in five distinct periods; the first and mildest lasting from British devaluation of the pound in September 1939 through the Italian attack of 1940 and up to German invasion in 1941. Between May 1941 and October 1942, inflation amounted to some 13,000 percent, as German and Italian charges upon the Greek puppet Government led to rapidly expanded budgets and note issues.²²

a. From October 1942, as relief supplies began to reach Greece, and the Allied victory at El Alamein restored confidence, a slower rate of inflation prevailed until May 1943. Hyperinflation then was renewed and continued throughout the German withdrawal in 1944 and the first 2 months of liberation. Under these conditions, an entirely unofficial currency system sprang up, fueled by the gold sovereigns which prewar Greeks had favored for personal hoarding and which British liaison officers used from late 1942 to finance the expansion of Greek guerrilla bands. Later, the German occupation authorities also found it necessary to import gold sovereigns and bars to Greece to purchase essential services. The British rate of pay was at one sovereign per armed guerrilla per month; by war's end, some 700,000 British sovereigns had been brought in. Delivanis has demonstrated that the Athens price for sovereigns closely paralleled the Athens cost of living, and the total wartime addition of gold was some 2 million sovereigns.²³

b. The changes worked upon the economy by inflation and the reckless wartime spending of the puppet Government are difficult to measure but extremely important for postwar Greek conditions. The puppet Government felt morally obliged to enlarge the civil service, thus averting poverty and broadening its popularity. Some 20,000 persons, nearly 35 percent, were added to the prewar list. Relief

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supplies were sold at fixed (but escalating) prices, with Government regulations supporting the rationing system. A thriving black market in such supplies rapidly developed in Athens, as inflation undermined official prices within days. Controls of rent made it absurd to construct or maintain buildings, even when the shortage of materials did not prevent it. Thus, inflation succeeded in demonetizing the economy, encouraging private barter, and discouraging production of all kinds. Government payments or credits became the primary source of fixed incomes, but fortunes came from commerce in real goods or gold, turned over as rapidly as possible. This monetary disorder of wartime taught lessons to the public which were practiced during the postwar inflation; governmental spending and credit had lost all influence upon employment and production.

34. Foreign trade. Finally, Greece lost both her export markets and her prewar foreign suppliers during the war. In the later 1930's, Germany had purchased a steadily growing share of Greek exports, particularly tobacco; during wartime, all exports fell off sharply, but Greece continued to build up German exchange credit balances. When these were wiped out by Allied victory, official reparations payments provided only a partial and delayed substitute. On the other hand, prewar sterling reserves had been large by 1941 and remained significant in 1944-45. They were used conservatively, for immediate import needs, but were insufficient and not available to restore prewar Greek import levels. Greek tobacco exports met strong Turkish competition after the war, while invisible income from shipping was down by some 67 percent. Thus, extensive external help and time were essential, before Greek patterns of prewar trade could be reestablished.

Section III. The Traditional Sectors

35. Definition. The special features of the Greek countryside and of traditional parts of the Greek economy have been recorded by the earliest Greek writers. The rocky Greek peninsula favored the intensive cultivation of a variety of specialized crops, in regionally isolated areas and narrow river valleys. The numerous islands and long coastline created a seafaring tradition to provide needed transportation. The poverty of the soil and the sea tradition encouraged a history of emigration and of Mediterranean commerce. By the time of Xenophon's march upcountry from Baghdad to the Black Sea, Greek colonies dotted much of the Asia Minor coastline; the Athenian laws of Demosthenes required every Greek ship which traded abroad to return direct to Athens with a full load of grain.²⁴

a. This same dependence upon specialized agricultural products, a varied export trade, imports of foodstuffs, and a large shipping industry were also the marks of the Greek economy under Ottoman

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rule and to modern times. Greece experienced extensive economic and trading growth after 1715, progressively replaced Venetian merchants throughout the Ottoman Empire, and settled in city centers such as Venice, Moscow, and Marseilles. After Greek independence, Greek communities in Alexandria and Smyrna retained this mercantile leadership in Turkey and the Balkans. The major grain areas of modern Greece remained under Turkish landownership, farmed by Turkish peasants until 1880-81 and the Balkan Wars of 1912-14.²⁵

b. Modern Greece has included an unchanging political area since about 1921. The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne and the consequent exchange of Greek and Turkish populations vested the States with additional farmland formerly owned by Turkish farmers. While this population transfer added about 20 percent to the Greek population, it also provided the lands needed to settle fully 60 percent of the new residents in rural districts. This major program was carried out between 1923 and 1929. Until the modern interwar period, rural production was concentrated upon specialty crops for low-bulk export and upon livestock, particularly sheep and goats. Foreign trade was essential to convert such labor-intensive farm products into the bulk foodgrains needed for Greek cities. The traditional sectors of the Greek economy therefore included more than just the rural farming sectors and villages.

c. Mining was one of the traditional Greek output sectors. This sector expanded very slowly during modern times, despite its historical importance. External trade and commerce, as well as shipping, were clearly traditional sectors, although economic development theory conventionally considers these as modernizing and urban phenomena. Finally, the poorly defined sector known as handicrafts had been a long-term feature of Greek output and foreign trade. Thus, the traditional or slow-changing economic sectors in Greece cut across many conventional modern categories and blurred clear-cut lines of causation which apply well to most underdeveloped nations. For convenience, agricultural pursuits, commerce, and shipping are treated here as traditional sectors.

36. Land use and landownership. After 1921, the modern Greek State amounted to some 50,100 square miles or about 13 million hectares;* this approximates the size of New York State, half of interwar Yugoslavia, or 130 percent of Bulgaria. The rugged terrain of Greece is evidenced by 1938 statistics of overall land availabilities. Fully 54 percent was taken up by mountains and swamps, while a further 18 percent was in low-quality woods and forests. Of the one-quarter of her total area suitable for agricultural use, 11 percent was in pasture or miscellaneous use, while 17 percent was arable land.²⁶ Such

*One hectare (ha) is equivalent to 2.46 acres.

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statistical precision is rarely convincing when applied to Greece; more recent data for 1951 show that 60 percent of her total area was nonagricultural, and 14.5 percent was in forests.²⁷

a. During the latter 1920's, a reported 1.88 million ha were actually under cultivation. By the latter 1930's (1935-39), some 3.2 million ha were cultivated or in annual fallow, while an additional 2.3 million ha were considered potentially arable, according to ECA data. On interwar average, some 2.2 million ha were farmed.²⁸ Destruction in wartime and reluctance to cultivate cash crops are believed to have taken one-fourth of the cultivated area out of production, but by 1948-50, cultivation had apparently returned to about the prewar peak levels. The 1950 farm census showed 2.53 million ha as being under all crops.

b. Landownership conditions in Greece require some historical perspective for their description. Essentially, there had been no serious problem of concentrated landholdings or oversized estates after 1923. The Venizelist Constitution of 1911 established the principle that land should be owned by the farmer operator. Greece is generally considered to have undergone a rural land reform during the 1919-23 period; in fact, this process was begun much earlier and was completed only in the postwar period, under a 1952 law setting the maximum holding at 400 hectares. The large British-owned Lake Copais farm near Athens was expropriated by the State in 1953.²⁹

c. As early as the 1880's, the more wealthy village landlords who had accumulated local estates were noted to be selling their rural lands in order to move to Athens. However, the Greek Church, which under Ottoman rule had owned extensive estates and received official protection as a landlord, continued as such up to 1920. Meanwhile, by virtue of conquest of the Ottoman Province of Thessaly and of Macedonia, the Greek State succeeded to ownership of large amounts of public land, especially the private ciftliks or estates of absentee Turkish landlords. Thus, from 1917 the State was in a position to distribute considerable amounts of farmland, and much of this was done after 1923, when the Lausanne Treaty and population transfers vested additional land, still farmed by Turkish peasants, in the State and required the settlement of some 600,000 Greek refugees. State distribution of land continued to 1940, while the expropriation of oversized estates seems to have ended largely by 1932.³⁰

d. Landownership patterns differed considerably between southern "Old Greece" and the northern plains of Thessaly, Macedonia, and Thrace. Greek family and legal practice had long supported an equal division of farmlands among the children, including a dowry portion for daughters. In the hill and mountain villages of south and central Greece, this practice was constrained by the shortage of land,

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local custom and common sense; often a precise division was never legalized, and a single family member would operate the fields or orchards on behalf of the family. In the more fertile northern plains, larger villages and holdings were the rule; however, here also was found much of the unexploited swampland and the larger State public lands.

e. Thus, the State laws of 1917-21 which established a land reform program had widely differing applicability to each district and, in fact, appear to have been enforced very selectively. In Old Greece, inheritance practices had already resulted in considerable fragmentation of farm plots, pasture rights, and orchards, while in northern Greece, State land distribution policies were important throughout the interwar period. These State policies seem to have contributed to excessive fragmentation of farm plots, without any conscious policy intention to do more than distribute land justly. The settlement of refugees from Turkey upon State lands was largely completed with International Refugee Settlement Commission assistance by 1928-29. During 1928-32, with the help of US and League of Nations loans, an extensive State program of land reclamation and public works was started to complete this agricultural program, but the financial crises of 1931-32 caused cancellation of foreign contracts for this work.

f. During the two decades between 1920 and 1940, the total Greek cultivated area expanded by some 30 percent to reach a level variously reported as 2.6 million and 3.2 million ha.³¹ Spending by the State on land improvements accounted for 445,000 ha of this area. Some US\$35 million-\$40 million was spent on the three largest plains of Macedonia, and similar drainage-irrigation contract work in Thessaly was 80 percent complete in 1941.³² These efforts were directed at providing self-sufficiency in wheat, and they succeeded in reducing the import share of consumption from 62 percent in 1927 to 36 percent in 1938.³³ Most of the interwar growth in farm area therefore occurred in northern Greece, where State lands were distributed extensively during the 1930's. It does not appear that State expropriations or redistribution of land was significant in Old Greece after the 1930-32 sales of monastery lands.

g. It is extremely difficult to identify separate periods when a true land reform and land redistribution took place in Greece. Expropriations of various larger estates sized between 3,500 and 5,000 ha occurred throughout the 1917-32 period.³⁴ Continuing State distribution of land occurred up to 1940 and may have been marked by administrative favoritism and bureaucratic incompetence. Thompson states that land distribution was very small up to 1925 and cites one village where the only two owners were bought out in 1918, but where State distribution of lands continued until 1940.³⁵ No adequate and

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dispassionate modern study of the entire process exists. The November 1950 Agricultural Census of landholdings showed that only 2.8 percent of all holdings were larger than 100 ha, but these accounted for 28 percent of the recorded total 3.6 million ha. Just 104 holdings included 208,000 ha in the largest sized units over 1,000 ha; 1,047 of a total 1,312,000 units were over 100 ha.

h. Postwar Greece has been distinguished for the official concern with an opposite problem; namely, the excessive fragmentation of farm plots and their often irrational ownership divisions. The 1950 Agricultural Census found that some 1.01 million rural families, each averaging 4.7 members, owned a total of 3.61 million ha. Thus, the average family size was only 3.58 ha (8.95 acres) per family, or slightly less than the 9.1 acres per farm reported for 1938 by the FAO Mission of 1946.³⁶ But these small farms were divided into numerous separate plots or parcels, often widely separated. The 1950 census showed the average family farm included 6.5 parcels, each of which averaged just 0.47 ha (1.16 acres), and it is likely that prewar conditions were only modestly better. This trend toward fragmentation continued through the 1950's. Thompson reported one large sample for 1,428 farms which averaged 9.2 farm plots each, with the average distance between farmhouses and plots falling between 2.2 and 2.8 km; his own sample showed each of 11 farms averaged 13.6 plots, each plot being only 0.72 ha.³⁷ The State policy of consolidation of holdings conducted after 1950 was viewed with considerable suspicion by farmers, despite its obvious benefits.

i. Inequitable extremes in sizes of landholdings and resultant rural status and power are often considered to be primary causes of rural violence and revolt against the State. There is no evidence that Greek rural violence or the Greek civil war in 1946-49 was a response to such inequities of landownership. No emphasis upon further land expropriation, more rapid State land distribution, or the consolidation of miniholdings appears in the programs or manifestos of ELAS, the PEEA provisional government, or the postwar "andartes" leaders.³⁸ At the same time, considerable amounts of State-owned land still existed in 1946, and a few large estates remained, although most Greek farmers owned and worked an inefficiently large number of minute plots. In northern Greece, long the neglected region in Greek politics, official intentions to distribute State-held rural lands seem to have been implemented extremely slowly. In summary, while a simple claim that Greek land reform was completed well before 1930 is not tenable, the rural base of the Greek civil war was not created by backward official policies in agricultural development of landownership and reform.

37. Agricultural crops, rural markets, and labor. The traditional cash crops of agriculture in Greece have been grapes and their

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products (wine, raisins, currants), olives and olive oil, tobacco and cotton, with the last a more recent emphasis. The major field crops in the interwar period were wheat and maize, with cereals accounting for between 70 and 77 percent of the total crop area during the 1930's.³⁹ Despite this apparent emphasis upon wheat, raised mainly in the Thessaly and Macedonian Plains and making up a larger share of the Greek diet than in any other Balkan State, Greece was a steady importer of foreign wheat throughout the 1920's and 1930's; 40 percent of her wheat needs each year came from abroad in 1940, while tobacco exports provided 45-50 percent of her total export earnings.

a. Pepelasis has summarized conditions of Greek agricultural production for the interwar period as "a picture of relative backwardness and a slow rate of growth."⁴⁰ Other sources have pointed out the very low yields and low agricultural labor productivity which marked Greece as among the least developed of the Balkan nations.⁴¹ The figures in table IV provide a somewhat different picture of expanding output in cereals and potatoes.

TABLE IV. AVERAGE ANNUAL OUTPUT OF BASIC CEREALS
(thousands of tons)

	<u>1925-29</u>	<u>1930-34</u>	<u>1935-38</u>
Wheat	333	501	768
Maize	163	206	255
Barley	147	189	197
Potatoes	39	85	(1937)193

Sources: Political Economic Planning, Economic Development in S.E. Europe, p 139, from League of Nations; Sweet-Escott, Greece, p 179, from FAO Monthly Bulletins.

b. Comparison of these 5-year averages shows a considerable physical increase over these three interwar periods, which can be generalized as better than a 25-percent increase in physical output between the 1927 "average" year and 1932, with the same increase for the next interval to 1936-37. This represents an annual 5 percent and is good growth, even if started from a very low base. Difficulties in the use of Greek statistics and their differing interpretations often occur, due to the use of nonaverage base years. Thus, postwar farm output comparisons to the official 1938 base year may be biased by the choice of this excellent harvest year.⁴²

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c. On balance, it seems clear that Greek agriculture grew much more rapidly than contemporary observers believed. There were special factors which operated during the interwar period to confuse judgments as to the growth of Greek agricultural output and rural incomes, and changes in general Greek living standards. Up to 1931, Greece was relatively well supplied with foreign exchange, and her currency was fully convertible; thus Greece, like other Balkan States, imported large amounts of cheap Canadian and US wheat, which discouraged domestic production but provided ample and low-cost food supplies. After 1931, a reverse situation occurred, as exchange controls were applied and an extensive system of internal State subsidies was instituted to encourage local wheat production. This subsidized Wheat Concentration System expanded output and rural incomes, but also raised the urban cost of living. The PEP study of prewar Balkan conditions describes Greece as similar to Bulgaria, where average budgets included a 50-percent weight for food expenditure, with bread and cereals making up 36 percent of such food costs. By 1940, the subsidized internal price of wheat was 160 percent of the delivered cost per imported ton.⁴³

d. Other special considerations are the large addition to the Greek population caused by Asia Minor refugees and the large foreign expenditures devoted to them during 1923-29. Since the Greek foreign debt was in partial default, with debt payments cut to one-fourth after 1932, such foreign credits for agriculture represented a significant unrequited investment in farm area, public facilities, and equipment that was not due to Greek saving or productivity. Modernization in methods did not proceed very far; there were only 1,400 farm tractors in Greece in 1938. On the other hand, the Greek use of fertilizers per hectare ranked highest among all Balkan countries by 1938 and matched the levels of Poland.⁴⁴

e. The most important Greek interwar crop was tobacco, which accounted for nearly 50 percent of all Greek export earnings. Tobacco raising was centered in Macedonia-Thrace, with Thessalonike the major export center. Until the mid-1930's, most of this crop went to US factors to provide Turkish tobacco mixtures; however, from 1935 to 1940, Germany rapidly replaced the United States as primary market by paying premium prices. The tobacco industry, organized into tight marketing cooperatives, played an important part in the prewar economy, with 1937 output of 69,000 tons and peak exports of 40,000 tons.⁴⁵ German occupation policies restricted output, however, and after the war, Greek growers found considerable Turkish competition on the international market, which delayed recovery. Thus, a critical foreign exchange source was restored only after several postwar years; much of the 1944 crop was still in storage in 1946.⁴⁶

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f. Judged in terms of the total value of 1938 agricultural output, tobacco production amounted to 4.4 percent of the total.⁴⁷ Wheat accounted for 16.2 percent, olives and olive oil for 8.3 percent, and grapes-currants-sultanas for 9.5 percent. Livestock products, however, made up fully 31.5 percent of the total value of crops and livestock output in 1938. This last rural sector has always been a major Greek industry, and in 1938 it included some 8.14 million sheep and 4.36 million goats, plus 2.4 million other animals. Meat production reached some 111,000 million tons, or 11 percent of the value of the gross agricultural output. This sector was hard-hit by wartime conditions in Greece; in 1947, there were only 10.7 million sheep and goats recorded and 1.97 million others. Meat production, at 89,000 metric tons, was only 80 percent of prewar.⁴⁸

g. During the war, most foreign observers believed that Greek agricultural production would recover quite rapidly from wartime disruptions; since it was believed that agricultural employment engaged over half the populace and contributed almost as much to total incomes, few people anticipated a difficult recovery period.⁴⁹ In actual fact, this belief premised too large a share in national output for agriculture and underestimated rural and commercial problems of recovery. By 1948, an index of agricultural volume had recovered only to 87 percent of the 1938 level, and the 1949-52 period saw this same index vary up and down between 96 and 112 percent.⁵⁰ This delayed recovery of farm output was due to many factors, including civil violence and disruption. The continuous postwar inflation and Government efforts to hold back urban food prices reduced the price incentives for rapid rural recovery. In addition, imported inputs of machinery and fertilizer were limited, while relief imports of foodstuffs by UNRRA continued to depress local output to June 1947. Official credits during 1945-46 were provided mainly to the industrial sectors, and transportation was difficult.

h. Studies of land and labor productivity in rural Greece for the interwar period have all emphasized the existence of very low yields and of redundant or surplus rural labor. FAO data of 1946 showed that wheat and corn yields averaged less than 14 bushels per acre, or a level lower than Turkish and Rumanian yields and just slightly higher than Indian or Southeast Asian yields.⁵¹ Official Greek data show a prewar level of 903 ha for wheat and somewhat more for corn; after 1947, wheat productivity was steadily above the prewar levels. Cotton yields were also higher in the postwar period, while tobacco yields were below prewar.⁵² Not very much can be inferred from these trends and the low productivity in Greek field crops. Such important products as olives (which suffer bad harvests every second year), vineyard products, and vegetables are sensitive to variable weather and to the intensity of labor used. Fertilizers are important, and overall Greek use of this input was low, because almost none was

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used on field crops. Prewar mechanization had been very modest, with only 1,400 tractors and 700 threshers in all Greece.⁵³ However, mechanization was only appropriate to the northern plains and their wheat/cereals output.

i. The prewar land-man ratio in Greece was calculated at only 1.1 ha per rural head, and data have been given to show the large numbers of small plots which made up an average farm. All prewar data on rural labor productivity show that the rural labor force was inefficiently large. A Chatham House study concluded that 24 percent of the 1937 rural manpower and population of 4.35 million was excess to the needs of current output and represented disguised unemployment.⁵⁴ Similar judgments of surplus labor on farms have ranged from 25 to 35 percent. However, modern studies have criticized both the concept of rural surplus labor and the statistical methods used to find it. A Greek study has shown that surplus labor existed up to 1954, but that, subsequently, farm labor worked under shortage conditions.⁵⁵

j. Nevertheless, it was believed in Greece that much surplus rural labor existed, both in the interwar and postwar periods. Greek emigration at its pre-1924 peak levels had depopulated entire villages in Epirus; after emigration fell off in the 1930's, there was a steady influx of population to the larger Greek cities. And during wartime and the postwar violence, large numbers of rural refugees appeared in the cities. In 1946, the FAO Mission estimated that farm output had neared 75 percent of the prewar levels; however, full recovery beyond the 1938 level did not occur until 1949, and the 1949-52 output volume remained between 108 and 112 percent of prewar.⁵⁶ Thus, it does not seem that rural violence in 1946-49 caused a rural labor shortage or created such recovery problems.

k. An important feature of Greek farming was the prewar growth of farm cooperatives and the extension of State credits to agriculture during the 1930's. The cooperative movement was started before 1920, and agricultural cooperatives in 1936 numbered 3,700. By 1954, the rural cooperatives totaled 6,700 with 686,000 members; of these, 22 percent were producer and 65 percent were credit cooperatives. After the Agricultural Bank was founded in 1928, almost all farm credit was provided by the State and preferably through cooperatives. Also, these agencies provided a channel for the prewar farm subsidy program, and a tax collection point.⁵⁷

l. Cooperatives were most prevalent in Macedonia, the Peloponnesus, and Crete before 1940. About Dr7 billion of Dr9 billion in the total credits extended to farmers in 1935 were provided by the State.⁵⁸ In the postwar period, however, such credits were not renewed very quickly; the FAO noted that large numbers of requests were still pending in mid-1946.⁵⁹ This contrasts with official postwar policy to

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fund industry in Athens. The immediate postwar period found 6,000 active rural cooperatives of the 7,600 registered in 1946. At that time, urban cooperatives, both consumer and handicraft producers, numbered about 5,000.⁶⁰ There is no evidence that any of these groups exerted significant political influence during the postwar recovery period; the tobacco growers' cooperatives appear to have been the most independent. Funds for agricultural investment imports and rural credit were available largely after the US aid program was underway in late 1947.

m. Greek farm production responded somewhat faster than other sectoral outputs after the 1944 liberation. By 1948-49, the prewar level of crops had been matched, but further gains were slow until 1953. While Greek rural yields and labor productivity were very low, both recovered after 1945-46, and subsequently did not reflect the internal violence in Greece in any clear-cut pattern. The recovery in agriculture does not appear to have been due to easy official credits to the sector and certainly cannot be explained by any lack of suffering or destruction of farm capital during German occupation.

Section IV. Modernizing Sectors

38. Industry. The two subsectors of manufacturing and mining conventionally make up industry (Greek practice has also included electrical generation and construction work at various times).

a. Greek mining activities date back to classical times, but her mineral resources are not major by modern standards. Since 1873, a French concessionaire exploited the historic Laurium mines for silver, lead, and zinc; Greek emery was famous, and its output was earmarked for foreign debt payment after 1898. Iron ore exports were significant, and bauxite was developed after 1934; however, by 1938, mining represented only 1.3 percent of the net product.⁶¹

b. The data concerning growth in the manufacturing subsector provide a confusing and contradictory picture for Greek manufacturing, which had reached the level of 16.3 percent of the net product by 1938. There is no unified study on industrial or manufacturing growth for 1920-40, and the best recent study, by Coutsoumaris, does not agree entirely with details provided by contemporary sources. However, in broad outlines, it is clear that Greek manufacturing was already significant by 1917, employing a considerable number of workers and much capital.

c. According to data used by Coutsoumaris, the gross value of industrial output grew by 5.5 percent per capita between 1920 and 1939.

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He found that industry provided only 8-10 percent of the national income during the 1920's, but a larger share of 10-12 percent during the period of protectionist policies in the 1930's. The number of industrial establishments doubled by 1930 to 65,800, but then slowed its expansion rate sharply, adding only some 10,000 units by 1938-39. Manufacturing grew from 368,000 to 422,000 employees during 1928-38 but represented a constant proportion of 14 percent in the total labor force.⁶²

d. Thus, Coutsoumaris shows that the faster growth in manufacturing output occurred during the 1930's, but a rapid growth of small establishments occurred in the 1920's. Official sources tend to show that manufacturing was already well-established as early as 1907, when labor in this subsector was 19 percent of total employment for the 1907-28 period. Other sources show a wide range of alternative estimates from 17-28 percent.⁶³

e. Thus, statistics on labor in manufacturing give only a broad impression of the significance of modern industry. Pepelasis cites an index for manufacturing output on a 1925 base which shows that 1913 output was 29 percent of the base, 1929 was 105 percent, and 1938 was 156.6 percent.⁶⁴ In current drachma, the value of output rose from 1925 to 1938 from Dr5 billion to Dr13.5 billion. Another source states that the 1917 investment in industrial capital amounted to 200 million gold francs and had tripled by 1933.⁶⁵

f. Pepelasis provides official data for the 1928-38 period which show that output grew from an index of 59 to 100, with 1923 representing only 37 percent of the 1938 output.⁶⁶ Since Greece experienced considerable inflation during this 15 years, the data provided here are probably sufficient to show that considerable interwar growth of industry did occur, but that this sector was already important before the 1920's. The number of industrial establishment multiplied rapidly during the 1920's, but industrial employment grew rather slowly during the 1930's, as manufacturing expanded its output by nearly 50 percent over 1928-29 levels. There is considerable evidence to suggest that Greek industry was operated at low capacity use levels during the 1930's, and that international trade barriers constrained its growth. Coutsoumaris judged in 1963 that "very little structural change seems to have taken place in the past thirty years." From the scattered data available, this statement was also true of the 1920's, if the sudden population growth of 1922-24 is discounted.⁶⁷

g. An important feature of Greek industry is the heavy pre-dominance of family-sized establishments which may be termed artisan industries.⁶⁸ Thus, in 1930, 93 percent of all manufacturing establishments employed five or fewer persons, with the overall average size

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being only three persons. This characteristic remained largely unchanged for the next decades. By the census of 1958, 85 percent of all establishments were similarly sized, and average employment per unit was only four persons.

h. A few large industrial firms played a disproportionate share in the Greek economy: in 1930, about 1.1 percent of all firms employed 26 or more persons; and the leading industries were textiles, tobacco, rubber products, and paper products. The concentration of these largest plants in the Athens-Piraeus manufacturing center was already heavy in the prewar period. An UNRRA report for May 1945 showed that just six firms in the chemical industry controlled 75 percent of chemical production, three woolen-spinning firms provided 40 percent of output, and six cotton-weaving firms held 42 percent of capacity.⁶⁹ Plainly, the heavy localization of industry close to Athens was a well-established trend prior to 1940. The Athens Stock Exchange listed only 116 companies in postwar years, and all industrial credits by the State went to just seven firms in 1945-46.⁷⁰

i. Although the wartime occupation and subsequent German withdrawal in 1944 resulted in considerable depreciation and damage to transport and of machinery, not much destruction of industrial installations was due directly to wartime. However, the capital to replace industrial plant, as well as the raw materials needed from farms to revive industrial production, was not available immediately after the war's end. In general, larger firms were required to retain their employees throughout wartime and to provide them with basic foodstuffs. The industrial production index for 1945 was at 33 percent, and in 1947 reached only 67 percent of 1939's level; while the 1947 index for mining output still remained far lower, at 14 percent of prewar level.⁷¹ Most Greek analysts agree that the 1938-39 levels of industrial output were not regained in Greece until about 1950-51.

39. Entrepreneurs. The Greek people have been renowned for their individualism, their entrepreneurial initiative, and their ability to succeed in businesses outside Greece, often in a hostile environment. Pepelasis has pointed out the ability of Greek merchants to challenge the Venetian traders during the later 18th century and to establish merchant and financial communities in Constantinople, Budapest, Vienna, Alexandria, and Moscow.⁷² The large-scale emigration of many Greeks to the United States between 1895 and 1924 has impressed these business virtues upon most Americans. Why, therefore, did Greek industry have such a slow recovery after 1944? How is it possible for recent analysts to discover that the Greek economy remains quite similar to that of 1930 and 1938?

a. One answer has been provided by the data describing small-scale industry and artisan-type production, numerically the typical

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industrial establishment. Clearly, the individual Greek preferred to be an independent businessman, and many of the refugees so established themselves during 1923-30. The typical Greek establishment of three to four persons was just large enough to employ only relatives of the immediate family; despite the existence of much low-cost labor, family labor was always cheaper and more manageable. A similar tendency has been noted among the crews of Greek ships.⁷³

b. Thorough study of the typical large Greek industrialist cannot be attempted here.⁷⁴ However, the high degree of locational and financial concentration upon Athens-Piraeus, which was noted for industry in 1945, was also a feature of the Greek interwar economy. Athens became the cultural and financial center for Greece during the 19th century; by 1923 this predominance was overwhelming.

c. One link between the economic predominance of Athens and the social and political stratification of Greece may be traced through financial affairs. For example, the famous Greek industrialist Bossadakis Athanassiades controlled the large chemicals and explosives firm in Greece, the Hellenic Chemicals and Fertilizer Company. He was also noted for employing numerous political figures in his firm. Admiral Voulgaris, who suppressed the Middle East mutiny of the Greek Navy and was Prime Minister from April to October 1945, was noted as close to Bossadakis. Other political figures were also reputed to be associated with this shadowy supercapitalist, a self-made and Turkish-born man who typified the newly rich class of big industrialists.⁷⁵

d. As noted above, a handful of large firms made up the prewar large industrial sector which employed the organized urban labor force, and these were concentrated in Athens. The major branches of industry--textiles, foodstuffs, and chemicals--which were predominant in prewar years were also the earliest to recover after the war. It seems clear, although somewhat surprising, the Greek entrepreneurship and independence had resulted in a large number of commercial and artisan industry businessmen, but did not create a matching, large working force, except in Athens. Judged from the example of Bossadakis, the largest Greek industrialists established widely diversified businesses in many fields, rather than expanding the scale of operations in their original fields.

40. Labor movements.* The labor movement in Greece and its trade union history is difficult to summarize, and there are no adequate studies in English. Since labor unions have been closely involved in

*See chapter 2, sections II and III, for discussion of political aspects of labor unions.

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Greek politics, many existing materials show considerable political bias. The International Labor Office Mission to Greece, which surveyed conditions in October-November 1947, provides the best summary of postwar legal and actual conditions that bear upon the subsequent Greek internal conflict.⁷⁶

a. The Greek trade union movement may be traced to the Constitution of 1909, with right to free association provided by Article 11. Subsequent laws in 1914 and 1920 defined the nature of occupational employee associations and set up specific rules for organizing and operating trade unions. The Minister of Labor was assigned supervisory authority, and opportunities to appeal his findings through the Greek courts were established. This legislation was accompanied by many labor laws in 1917-21, regulating conditions of work and social welfare. The legal basis and rights of Greek labor were therefore established early and were very progressive in nature.⁷⁷

b. The labor movement was well-developed in Greece by the end of World War I. The first meeting of the Greek General Confederation of Labor (GGCL) took place in 1918; 385 unions were represented, with membership totaling 85,000.⁷⁸ Total union membership had hardly changed by 1936, amounting to some 70,000-80,000 within the GGCL. After 1931, all public employee unions were covered under separate legislation which limited their rights to strike and to engage in political activity. In 1947, about 1,850 unions with 200,000-220,000 members were claimed by the GGCL.⁷⁹

c. The strength of Communist party influence within the trade union movement was one cause for General Metaxas' accession to power in 1936. The independence of Greek labor unions was abolished, with union leaders directly appointed by the executive power, Metaxas. At the same time, the Government took energetic police and administrative measures to isolate members of the Greek Communist Party, such as Siantos and Zacharides.⁸⁰ The widespread resentment against this corporate state policy toward unions may be judged by the repeal of all Metaxas labor legislation by the exiled Greek Government in October 1942.⁸¹

d. The postwar history of the Greek labor movement was intimately connected with the political struggle between EAM/ELAS forces and the Greek Government during 1945-48. Likewise, the influence of foreign labor leaders was very prominent during 1945-46, with British Trade Unions Congress (TUC) representatives and World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) representatives playing an active role. This involved history is sketched in the ILO report⁸² which points out how far actual Greek practice diverged from the ideals set by legislation.

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e. No brief review of postwar events can adequately relate the labor movement to the political polarization which occurred during 1944-47. EAM members took control of all union offices in late 1944 and were provisionally confirmed in all leading GGCL posts by the Ministry of Labor. Basing its actions upon the Athens rebellion, the Government replaced all EAM labor leaders with Reformist Worker's Group (EREP) leaders in January 1945. During the next few months, outside negotiators from the British TUC and the WFTU were able to achieve a series of agreements between two sets of labor leaders and the Government. These culminated in December 1945, when the various tendencies or blocs within the labor movement agreed to hold GGCL elections at an Eighth Pan-Hellenic Trade Union Congress in March 1946.⁸³

f. The Eighth Congress succeeded in electing officers, but these rapidly found themselves under Reformist attack. An appeal to the Council of State resulted in a May 1946 decision that voided the previous governmental agreements with various labor groups. The Minister of Labor seized Confederation offices in July and appointed a new 21-man Provisional Executive charged with holding new elections. A second intervention by the Council of State voided this last decision, turned the issue over to an Athens court, and thus created the seventh Provisional Executive leadership for the postwar labor movement in Greece.*

g. Despite extensive negotiations within Greece, including international and British labor representatives, no reconciliation was possible during late 1946 and 1947. Near agreement was reached in November 1946 (the Tsaldaris-Braine Agreement) and April 1947 (the Tewson mission), but these failed, first due to Reformist opposition, and then due to Communist (ERGAS) refusal to participate and their final withdrawal. Thus, by June 1947, the non-Communist blocs controlled the Confederation and agreed upon a program and list of executive leaders which were ratified by an Athens court. Full elections were scheduled for December but postponed until March 1948 due to "abnormal conditions in certain districts."⁸⁴ When the Ninth Congress of April 1948 finally elected officers representing all nonleft factions, it did so only after acrimonious debate, much outside pressure, and Government intervention.⁸⁵

h. This summary view of postwar trade union history demonstrates the highly partisan atmosphere of internal union politics and the extensive nature of Government intervention in postwar union

*Political weights within the GGCL may be guessed from the executive memberships: five EREP, five ERGAS, three National Worker's Front, and one each Socialist Anarcho-Marxist and Social Syndicalist. EREP represented the right.

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organizational affairs. It suggests that the foreign labor advisers came close to resolving the open battle between the reformist and anti-Fascist labor blocs in April 1946 and April 1947, but that these efforts failed for a variety of causes. The only common program point, agreed to by both sides and stressed by the ILO Mission Report, was an express statement that trade unions should be free of all governmental intervention.⁸⁶

i. Labor union members appear as a group to have been rather better off during the wartime occupation and the postwar period than the average Greek citizen. However, the wartime inflation and the rapid 1945 inflation, as well as the Metaxas legacy of controlled union operations, were factors which combined to make the class interests of Greek labor very unclear and unstable. Governmental paternalism and State control of social benefits was already extensive before 1940; it seems natural that this pattern was continued after the war, and that State welfare benefits played some part in politicizing and dividing the urban labor force of the postwar period.

41. Social security. The Greek system of social insurance and welfare benefits was essentially developed during the interwar period, under a complicated series of funds covering specific parts of the labor force. While individually well-conceived, there were some 60 different funds by 1947, providing sickness and pension benefits and financed both by member contributions and by social taxes earmarked by the State. The largest of these was set up in 1934 as the State pension and sickness fund; by early 1946, it covered some 225,000 worker members and was paying some 12,000 pensions (about 20 percent of pensions granted).⁸⁷ These payments, as well as those by other funds, had continued throughout wartime and into 1947, being readjusted each month to keep up with inflation.

a. The total number so insured by all funds during 1946 has been estimated at 370,000 wage earners and 110,000 independent workers.⁸⁸ There was no provision for social insurance for agricultural workers. Total IKA payments during 1946 amounted to Dr30.6 billion, with 75 percent going to hospitalization benefits. The other pension funds, also supervised by the Ministry of Labor and providing about 80 percent of all benefits paid, operated independently of each other and provided no assurance for transfer rights between them. These administrative complexities sharply discouraged any job mobility for workers already employed.

b. State unemployment insurance was not established until 1945, in the midst of drastic inflation. Although conceived as a national system, it expanded only slowly to the districts outside of Athens-Piraeus. In 1946, this Unemployment Insurance Fund paid out

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Dr6 billion in benefits to only 9,000 persons; a number of other small and specialized funds set up before 1940 provided an additional 30-33 percent in similar benefits. It is apparent that these employment schemes provide no indication of the real extent of postwar unemployment; a disproportionate share went to benefits for the Athens region, and only about 4 percent of those enrolled in pension plans were receiving unemployment insurance. Yet, a survey by the AMFOGE staff in mid-1946 estimated that 197,000 persons or 7.5 percent of the available labor force over 14 years was unemployed but actively seeking work.⁸⁹

c. This survey shows that governmental welfare operations were a significant element in the Greek economy. Before 1940, it had been estimated that fully 9 percent of the State budget went to social welfare operations.⁹⁰ However, the numbers of beneficiaries by 1947 appeared relatively small, and inflation had undoubtedly cut down the State's ability to administer its programs fairly or to meet its legal obligations. For example, the unemployment insurance fund gained large reserves during 1946, thanks to conservative financial management.⁹¹ The State welfare programs were definitely biased to favor the Athens area and thus helped to increase the income gap between the metropole and the rest of Greece.

Section V. Government and Foreign Sectors

42. Government budget. An historical survey of governmental spending in Greece would be possible, using the numerous details provided by the extensive record of official Greek borrowing abroad. Unfortunately, there is no adequate study available to trace the long-term interconnections between Greek foreign borrowing, annual Government budgets, and the military expenses springing from past Greek wars. Pepelasis suggests that these relationships were very close. He accounted for total Greek borrowing of 770 million gold francs during the years between 1827 and 1893 by estimating that 94 percent was used for war costs or needs directly related to the Greek military.⁹²

a. This ready ability of Greek Government to find foreign creditors, willing to lend for official purposes, and simultaneously to support a large military establishment, was continued into the interwar period. Foreign debt-service payments and the defense budget represented the two largest items in the State budget during 1920-40, just as had been true prior to World War I. According to one analysis, the average State budget of the interwar period allocated 31 percent of its annual total to military purposes and 32.5 percent to foreign debt payments. Average interwar budgets further allocated some 7 percent to public health and 3.5 percent to education.⁹³

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b. Military budgets were consistently large shares of total Government spending, but it is difficult to determine any real trend for the interwar period because of the marked price inflation and the fall in foreign exchange rates over the 1923-40 period. In 1926, the Army and Navy allocations were Dr2.45 billion (about £6.5 million) and made up 28 percent of budgetary costs.⁹⁴ By 1935-36, the final budget included only Dr2.5 billion for the military departments, out of a total of Dr12.5 billion, but the following 4 years saw considerable military expenditure for a Metaxas rearmament program, planned at Dr6.1 billion and partly financed by German and British credits.⁹⁵

c. The 1938-39 fiscal year budget (to April) allotted 30.4 percent or Dr4.5 billion to defense expenditures, according to Sweet-Escott. When converted into 1952 prices, this may be compared to 42 percent allocation for 1951-52, which was 220 percent higher in numbers of drachmas.⁹⁶ The prewar, wartime, and postwar inflations make it nearly impossible to determine meaningful trends over these very different periods, but it is clear that Government spending on defense remained big, even during periods of relative calm and during the refugee resettlement period of the 1920's. According to a study for the 1950's, Greek defense costs have included only small nonpersonnel components.⁹⁷

d. Foreign debt payments during the interwar period remained high, despite the fact that, after 1933, Greece defaulted on her external debt, negotiating partial payments almost yearly of only 30-40 percent of the amounts owed.⁹⁸ The total debt payments in 1926 amounted to US\$14 million, but extensive borrowing in later years lifted the debt total to US\$515 million in 1932. In 1936, the foreign public debt totaled Dr67 billion (47.2 billion "stabilized" drachmas) and in March 1940 was a total of Dr94.5 billion.⁹⁹ The distribution of this debt between external and internal creditors is complicated, because fully 40 percent of the so-called foreign debt of Greece was denominated in foreign exchange but actually held by resident Greek citizens. These domestic payments, during currency restrictions of the 1930's, continued to swell internal spending power.

e. The Greek budget also included numerous welfare and investment categories, but no meaningful analysis is available. One estimate holds that nearly 9 percent of interwar budgets went to social welfare transfers, but this cannot be readily confirmed.¹⁰⁰ Neither can the administrative costs for the 53,000 civil servants of prewar years be identified; in fiscal 1949-50, the civil service of 76,600, which had been grossly inflated during wartime occupation, absorbed fully 13 percent of the budget.¹⁰¹ The 1938-39 budget provided for public health (7.2 percent), education (6.5 percent), agricultural programs (3.6 percent), and considerable emphasis upon transportation (11.0

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percent), but these cannot be separated into regular running costs and capital investment.*¹⁰²

f. The primary cause of Greek inflation was, of course, the continued growth of domestic money supply, and much of this was in response to State budget deficits. Again, details have not been analyzed in depth, but the 1935-36 budget was in deficit by 4.3 percent at one point, and the 1938-39 deficit reached 99.5 percent of total expenditures.¹⁰³ These figures undoubtedly understate the real situation and treat much State borrowing from the Bank of Greece as income, thus showing nominal surpluses in budget accounts.

g. The postwar inflation was primarily fueled by steady budget deficits which ranged from 30-50 percent of expenditures, on a conservative estimate. After 1948, these deficits were covered by US aid counterpart funds, which modestly cushioned their expansionary effect, but still allowed rapid inflation and monetary growth. The 1951-52 budget, for example, included a 30.2 percent deficit.¹⁰⁴ By 1951, the general price level had risen by 300-360 times over prewar levels, even after all wartime inflation was excluded, and total money expansion accounted for the major share of these multipliers.

h. It is difficult to determine the relative importance of the Greek State budget throughout this period. Treating this question illustratively, the 1926 budget of Dr8.68 billion was probably 20 percent of the total national income and compared with industrial output of 1925 of some Dr5 billion.¹⁰⁵ A postwar study shows that about 5.7 percent of total national income in 1938 (some Dr4.1 billion) was the value-added share of all public administration and State welfare spending. From 1946 to 1948, the net value-added share of Government in national income rose from 8.0 to 9.8 percent, while their constant-drachma level remained quite stable from the 1948 peak (of Dr3 billion) through 1953.¹⁰⁶ These figures appear modest enough but give no impression of the State's impact upon credit and money supplies.

43. Inflation and monetary policy. The various periods of Greek inflation have been linked directly to Government spending, but it is important to recognize that interwar inflation was quite a different phenomenon from wartime and postwar inflation, both as to its intensity and its causes. The direct intervention of foreign creditors in Greece had helped usually to stabilize monetary conditions, as in 1898, 1928, and 1946. But such temporary stability soon gave way under external financial pressures, world trade influences, and internal political

*Greek data often are used to overprove a point. See National Bank of Greece 1950, pp 92-96. This shows that State taxes absorbed 21.9 and 30.0 percent, respectively, of the 1938 (Dr72.3 billion) and 1948 (Dr53.3 billion) national incomes.

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pressures upon able monetary managers. This involved and difficult history cannot be summarized briefly.

a. Precise measures of inflation for the interwar period are lacking. Since Greece depended upon imported goods for fully 40 percent of internal consumption, and Athens was by far the population and commercial center of the nation, price levels for Athens and the total money supply provide the best, and perhaps only, guide for the period. The period from 1920 to 1928 was dominated by the demands of the Asia Minor campaign and of the refugee resettlement program; during this period, wholesale prices rose 1,000 percent, to reach 1,720 percent upon a 1914 base.¹⁰⁷ From 1928 to 1939, the price rise was about 128 percent, with 1930 representing a low point and 1937 the high at 138 percent greater.¹⁰⁸

b. The money supply expanded rapidly from 1912 through 1922, due to continued Greek wars and the shortages of World War I. When the drachma was stabilized in 1926 and 1928 at a fixed gold-equivalent related to the British pound (Dr375 = UK£1), League of Nations loans for stabilization were supplemented by further loans for public works; during 1931-32, the crisis caused by British devaluation further complicated the Greek Government's efforts to retain a reasonable ratio between internal purchasing power and the foreign exchange value of the drachma. The July 1932 Drachmification Law attempted to compel private Greek residents to convert all foreign exchange holdings into Greek currency, and a default on foreign debt was announced, followed by a renegotiation of debt service which continued through the 1930's. In 1939, the total domestic money supply ranged between Dr6.6 billion and Dr10.6 billion, compared to the total State public debt of Dr79.8 billion in 1937.¹⁰⁹ The steady expansion of the domestic money supply during the interwar period thus went a long way toward cushioning the effects of the 1929-31 world depression, but also facilitated the ever-growing importance of State spending within the economy.

c. The Greek economy operated under essentially wartime conditions from September 1939 until January 1945; during this period an extreme inflation of at least 50 billion times occurred, which destroyed the prewar patterns of Greek finance and credit and accustomed the people to living conditions, privation, and semilegal practices which represented a greater shock to the society than any previous period. The wartime and occupation inflation occurred in several distinctive bursts caused by a variety of factors. Delivanis has analyzed five separate stages within this time period and has shown that wartime prices in Athens, the total currency issue, and the price of black-market gold sovereigns all moved upward at the same rates and timings.¹¹⁰

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d. From 1939 to October 1940, while Greek neutrality continued, she received British credits that permitted an increased note issue without providing additional imports; large Greek expenditures also occurred during her actual resistance to Italy and the German invasion of April-June 1941. However, runaway inflation during the war period occurred primarily in two separate periods. During May 1941 to October 1942, inflation amounted to 13,000 percent, at a time when food shortages and occupation policies were creating near-famine conditions in Athens for the winter of 1941-42.¹¹¹

e. After October 1942, the arrival of monthly Greek War Relief and Red Cross supplies, together with the Allied victory at El Alamein, marked a period of relative price and exchange stability and optimism, which broke down after May 1943. From there through the phased German withdrawal of April-October 1944, inflation returned to its previous rapid rate of about 700 percent a month. The first months of rule by the returned Greek Government in Athens saw no slowdown at all, until the 11 November 1944 action which introduced a new "old drachma" currency, initially fixed at a rate of one "old drachma" to 50 billion wartime drachmas.¹¹²

f. The effect of this postwar reform was modest and rapidly dissipated. The essential mistake was the official effort to return to the prewar foreign exchange values of the drachma, when compared to the British pound and US dollar (Dr600 and Dr150, respectively, to 1), and to fix a rate for converting deflated wartime drachmas into the "new old drachmas." This rigid and mechanistic reform meant in practice that the wartime redistribution of funds, due to inflation and irresponsible spending by the occupation government, was ratified; that prewar debts and price relationships were reinstated; and that the Government was obliged to pursue contradictory policies of detailed controls of rents, wages, and prices while indulging in large-scale State spending that was unsupported by taxation or profits on foreign exchange operations. The natural consequence was that inflation continued through 1945.

g. During June-August 1945, an attempt was made, under the "Reform Program" led by Deputy Premier Varvarressos and the "government of technicians" led by Admiral Voulgaris, to introduce tax, price, and wage controls. Inflation was halted briefly, but again became rapid after Varvarressos' resignation in September; for the year as a whole, it amounted to 1,000 percent by January 1946. While the causes may be sought in many physical shortages, as well as occupation-time destruction, much blame must go to official policies which permitted large Government deficit spending, attempted only briefly to enforce price and wage controls, and also refused to recognize the widespread wartime dependence upon gold sovereigns.

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h. In January 1946, the Anglo-Hellenic Convention finally halted this steady monetary deterioration: British loans stabilized the currency, and two foreign members on the Greek Currency Committee assumed partial control over further issues of notes by the Bank of Greece. The Bank began to buy and sell gold sovereigns, of which some two million had been put into wartime circulation, and importers received large quantities of foreign exchange. During 1946, UNRRA goods worth \$210 million flowed in, and the Athens price index fell 10-15 percent and then rose slowly to its year-start level. Meanwhile, the total currency supply grew rapidly from Dr135 billion to Dr499 billion.

i. During 1947, while money expanded nearly twofold to Dr970 billion, the rate of resumed inflation was much more modest and averaged 2.5 percent per month. This year saw the end of UNRRA shipments for relief in May and the start of initial US aid shipments in August. US aid was directed both to development projects and to military assistance.

j. Later Greek events of 1947-53 demonstrated that inflation was a persistent feature of the economy and a consequence of public policy. In 1953 and 1954, Greece again stabilized and reformed her currency, by setting a rate of Dr30,000/US\$1, and then by clipping three zeros from the monetary unit. This halted inflation, at a level 200 times that of 1944, and introduced a 10-year period of sustained rapid growth. Thus, the Greek wartime inflation continued to condition postwar expectations and mark the recovery period even beyond 1946. The following year (1947) of price stability and some deflation also was the year when guerrilla preparations for the Greek Civil War were completed.¹¹³

44. Foreign trade, aid, and interrelationships. The Greek economy during the interwar period has been shown to have depended heavily upon foreign borrowing; the total public debt probably represented one-half more again than the total national income by 1940. From 1898, an International Financial Commission was important in the control of Greek export earnings and debt payments. From 1923 to 1933, the League of Nations was closely involved in all Greek borrowing. International interest during the interwar period was due primarily to humanitarian concern with the Greek refugees from Asia Minor.

a. The Greek Refugee Settlement Commission was established by the League of Nations Council in September 1923 to help settle about 1.5 million refugees on agricultural lands, find urban and other employment for them, and provide basic housing and farming facilities. Chaired by an American, this international commission used lands and a staff assigned to it by the Greek Government, along with funds supplied

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by international loans, to settle some 147,200 families on farmlands in Macedonia and Thrace by 1927. Only a part of the rural housing and funds was used for refugees in other Provinces or "Old Greece."¹¹⁴

b. The Commission conducted a census in 1926-27 of all urban refugees and recorded 124,483 families (485,000 persons); however, the full number of urban refugees was estimated at about 615,000 by the Commission.¹¹⁵ Commission-built housing by mid-1928 had housed some 23,000 families, or about one-sixth of the total urban refugee population--at least 35,000 families were still living in substandard housing by 1928.

c. Thus, the work of the Commission, vital as it was, represented only a part of the total effort applied to absorbing the Greek refugees: the Greek State provided lands and constructed housing for perhaps an equal number of urban refugees and devoted investment resources to additional land reclamation projects, especially the Vardar River and Struma projects in Macedonia.¹¹⁶ Both were contracted to US engineering firms, Monks-Ulen and the Foundation Company. Also, between 1924 and 1931, a number of contracts to build major and feeder roads were financed by the State. These development projects were halted in 1932 by the Greek exchange crisis and the growing international depression.¹¹⁷

d. Foreign contractors and engineers represented an inter-war continuation of foreign influence in Greece which had recurred at numerous points in her history. Greek railroads were constructed by French-owned companies and were bought by the Greek State in 1920; the Athens and Piraeus power stations were British-owned concessions. US tobacco companies maintained purchasing agents in Thessalonike, and Greek residents in the United States accounted for most of the annual emigre-remittance income of Greece, which averaged about US\$14 million yearly before 1940. Greek bonds were normally floated on the London and New York markets, yet these foreign currency securities were held widely in Greece (some 40 percent) and quoted on regular Athens markets. Thus, the presence of British troops and administrators in Athens during 1944-45 and the large-scale UNRRA operations during 1945-47 were well-precedented examples of the extensive foreign intervention in postwar Greek affairs.

e. The extent of foreign influence in postwar Greece was very great in financial terms. The official US aid extended to Greece during wartime totaled US\$79 million, of which only \$3.6 million represented early UNRRA and Red Cross relief; the rest being lend-lease grants. The total of US grants to UNRRA up to its termination in mid-1947 reached \$280 million, with a further \$36 million spent in the following year. Prior to the ERP Program, starting in mid-1948, official

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US credits and grants totaled \$583 million, or about \$275 million over and above the relief contributions of UNRRA. This gross level was exceeded by roughly 10 percent during the subsequent 2.5 years.¹¹⁸

f. The funds provided by direct US aid became important after mid-1947; until then, British funds were crucial to economic revival and total UNRRA contributions ran at higher levels than shown above. During April 1945 to June 1947, about \$415 million in UNRRA supplies were received in Greece, funded by all sources. Prior to UNRRA's startup of such relief, the British "Military Liaison" had brought fully 387,000 tons of supplies into Greece. While precise comparisons are difficult, it is useful to note that total Greek imports in 1946 and 1947 amounted to US\$380 million to \$387 million, a level over three times the prewar value of imports.¹¹⁹

g. The extensive aid given to Greece in the postwar period may be judged to represent something between 30 and 50 percent of her prewar national income, in each postwar year. Meaningful calculations of the national impact of such aid are nearly impossible to make, due to sustained inflation, but it is clear that the opportunities for governmental favoritism, waste of grant supplies, and diversion of goods to semilegal sale on internal markets were all very large. Prior to the actual outbreak of civil war in late 1946 and 1947, governmental efforts to control prices and allocate supplies were constrained by the general policy desire to reestablish private enterprise and private market channels. Stricter controls only became possible as the civil war grew in scope and as military considerations took priority.

h. This discussion has suggested that the Greek economy was far from self-sufficient and very sensitive to international financial and trading cycles. A long history of direct foreign financial intervention was repeated, after 1944, by the return of British and UNRRA "advisers," plus bankers and businessmen, and after 1946 by US advisers. The Greek administrations of 1944-47, more concerned with political maneuvers than reconstruction, used outside aid to restore living standards before encouraging production.

i. Trade relations between Greece and the rest of the world have been well analyzed in a number of studies for the interwar period; this area of the Greek economy has received much attention because of its importance to internal business conditions and official policies. Basic and continuing features of foreign trade during the interwar years were a high level of imports, an annual trade deficit ranging between 25 and 40 percent of import values, and a foreign payments balance which depended upon invisible receipts, such as emigre remittances, foreign shipping services, and commercial and financial transactions

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with foreigners. In all these respects, Greek trade patterns differed markedly from those of her fellow Balkan nations.¹²⁰

j. The shifts in trading patterns between the wars were important to Greek growth but did not alter the basic patterns listed above. In the 1920's, Greece depended heavily upon cheap imported wheat from Canada and the United States; after the 1930-31 depression and gold standard crisis, wheat imports and total imports fell sharply, and other suppliers took the lead. During 1936-38, grain imports were 17.8 percent of the yearly average of US\$127 million (roughly Dr15 billion), and all foodstuffs represented 29 percent of imports. Except for cotton yarns and textiles (14 percent) and coal and oil fuels (8.9 percent), other imports were distributed among a large variety of raw materials and manufactured goods which were not produced within Greece.¹²¹

k. Fully 48 percent of 1936-38 earnings from trade were due to Greek tobacco exports from Thessalonike, and this share was typical for the interwar period. While the United States and England were major buyers in the 1920's, Germany used numerous trade devices to become the chief buyer of the 1930's; she thus took over first place in both exports and Greek imports, with 35 and 26 percent, respectively.¹²²

l. The postwar records for foreign trade are not so well-detailed; official Greek data covers only 1948 and 1950 onward. ECA data show imports of US\$24.4 and \$32.5 billion for 1947 and 1948, with exports covering only 26 and 23 percent of these amounts.¹²³ ECA statistics suggest that these values were 200-300 percent of prewar imports; by tonnage weight, however, the 1948 level was only 83 percent of prewar imports. In 1945 and 1946, fully 90 percent of Greek imports were not matched by export earnings but funded by relief and foreign grants. Both dollar and drachma estimates for these years are made nearly meaningless by Greek price and exchange variations. The only generalization that can be safely made is that foreign trade recovered from the major disruptions of wartime at rates which matched the slow recovery of farm and industrial output. This was true despite the large amounts of UNRRA and other foreign aid shipments during the period.

45. Utilities, transport, and investment planning. As in the case of most European countries, early State intervention and investment to build the social overhead facilities needed for growth was primarily devoted to railroads. Roads, shipping, and electric utilities were left to local agencies or to private enterprise, assisted primarily through State credit operations.

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a. Private companies, usually foreign, constructed most of Greece's basic transport and utilities plant. The Greek State Railways (SEK) represented the purchase in 1916 and 1921 of French-built lines between Piraeus-Athens and Thessalonike, linking to the Belgrade-Alexandroupolis southern branch of the Belgrade-Istanbul railroad. The remaining lines, of much less importance, remained in private hands until the 1950's. By 1925, there were only 1,600 miles of track in Greece, and by 1938 the total was little changed, at 1,625 miles, of which the State owned over half.¹²⁴ The private lines, Athens-Peloponnesus and Volos-Larissa being largest, were all of nonstandard gages. The wartime occupation, guerrilla operations, and the German withdrawal almost eliminated the Greek railroad system: in 1944, only 670 km of track were usable, and 90 percent of prewar locomotives and cars were destroyed. In total, damage to 1944 and during the 1947-49 Civil War has been placed at US\$140 million.¹²⁵

b. From 1928 to 1939, vigorous debate surrounded the question of road construction in Greece. In 1928, a huge construction contract for 300 km of road was awarded, drawing upon a politically debated British loan of UK£4 million; at the time, only three Athens streets were paved out of the 9,000 km of "wagon tracks" in Greece.¹²⁶ Despite these difficulties, road transport grew rapidly and presented real competition to the State railroads; in the mid-1930's, the State decreed that long-haul traffic was a railway monopoly, and road transport firms were restricted in their distance hauls. New roads were built under the Metaxas regime, and by 1938 the State maintained 9,900 km of the 15,800 km total. However, only about 250 km were fully asphalted, and 3,700 km were surfaced.¹²⁷

c. Wartime conditions greatly deteriorated this poor road network; by the 1944 liberation, almost all larger bridges were cut, and half of all road mileage was unusable.¹²⁸ Recovery from these conditions was an early Greek and US aid priority; by 1951, 2,300 km (equivalent to 20 percent of the total trunk road national system) were fully asphalted, and small commercial roads had grown to 270 percent of the prewar road length.¹²⁹ Reliable data for the Civil War period are lacking, but recovery of road transport was assisted by UNRRA imports of nearly 8,000 vehicles. The Union of Professional Drivers received over half of these, and its near monopoly of bus, truck, and taxi operations was thus reestablished, despite the import controls existing throughout the Civil War period. The single prewar private airline was replaced by four private companies after the war, but these were combined by a law of 1951 into National Greek Airlines (TAE), with 17 aircraft, only one being used for international flights.¹³⁰

d. The electric power situation of prewar Greece, outside of the Athens vicinity, was extremely limited, as per capita availability

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of electricity was the lowest in Europe.¹³¹ The British-owned utility in Athens (APECO) supplied 75 percent of the total Greek consumption of power in 1939 and, through a lucky accident at the time of liberation, was able to restore service almost immediately and sell more power in 1946 than had been produced in 1939.¹³² By 1948, power produced in Greece was 212 percent of the 1939 level, and greater Athens accounted for 81 percent of this output. The careful plans for a nationwide power system, which were pressed by the US aid mission, through a national Public Power Company (PPC) formed in 1950, did not create additional electric capacity until 1953, when Athens' share in consumption finally fell below 81-83 percent. Little of this power was generated from hydroelectric sources, and almost all fuel used was imported diesel oil.¹³³

e. The lack of an energetic State investment program, except for the settlement of refugees in 1925-29, has been noted for the interwar period. After 1944, official energies were devoted to administration, security, and relief operations, and no investment plan was developed. The US aid program of 1947 was likewise not integrated into any overall State investment budget but represented a substitute therefore. Not until December 1948 did the Greek Government develop a 4-year "development program," in order to meet the requirements of the European Economic Cooperation Organization and qualify for Marshall Plan aid.¹³⁴ This plan was never implemented, and Greece did not have a formal development plan until the mid-1950's.

Section VI. Conclusions

46. Factors contributing to conflict.

a. The history of the modern Greek State has given a large role to military affairs and military leaders. Military men played major roles during the interwar and post-1945 periods; Metaxas and Plastiras were major figures of the interwar period, and Voulgaris and Papagos in the postwar period. The logical result of this military role in politics has been a steady emphasis upon defense expenditure within the budget.

b. More important for State policy has been the long history of reliance upon foreign borrowing for military and investment purposes. The consequence has been to make Greek financial conditions very closely linked to international financial changes. The economy before 1940 was, therefore, extremely sensitive to world conditions and trade; in 1946, the FAO Report still called it a "fair weather economy."¹³⁵

c. The review of the Greek economy above has stressed the facts of considerable adaptability and of growth during the interwar

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years. It also has stressed the major continuities in Greek economic structure and business behavior throughout the period to 1940. Refugee resettlement, growth in shipping and road transport, steady growth and modernization around Athens, and the expansion of farm and manufacturing output in step with population are the points of adaptability. Continued foreign trade dependence, high military budgets and Government borrowing, inflation, and the predominance of very small industrial and commercial production units are all adverse elements of this structural continuity.

d. The connection between economic characteristics and political trends and behavior is not clearly understood; no clear hypotheses exist, to be tested by the Greek experience. Thus, it is difficult to find the roots of the 1946-49 Civil War in the economic relationships of Greece during 1920-40. In particular, it is difficult to determine the impact of economic decisions under the Metaxas dictatorship, since this period has been inadequately analyzed by Greeks themselves. The political polarization caused by this period was important in creating the "collapse of the center," which McNeill traces through the postwar period. But such political polarization was not reflected in opposing economic programs or in efforts to modernize economic structure.

e. Industrial and trade statistics have been cited above to show that Greece represented a rather modern commercialized economy which differed from those of her fellow Balkan nations by having much urbanization, a large foreign trade sectoral share, many small businessmen and artisan shops, and an overdeveloped financial sector. Many interwar trends, such as the State's distribution of agricultural lands and encouragement to agricultural cooperatives, showed an advanced and modern policy interest in improved rural productivity and social reform. Greek economic growth to 1940 was quite remarkable and rapid, in view of the major shocks administered by refugee resettlement of the 1920's and by world economic depression and trade barriers of the 1939's.

f. It is not at all difficult to trace conditions in postwar Greece directly to the severe economic disruptions of the wartime occupation. Extreme inflation and dependence upon the State for relief and financing were typical conditions for all years, except during the 1946 temporary price stability. This interruption was due to British aid for currency stabilization, but it failed to stabilize the Government leadership or reduce the levels of political vendetta described by Woodhouse.¹³⁶ Thus, rapid inflation resumed in 1947, providing a good index to the degree of pessimism and of political confusion in Greek society. In economic matters as in politics, the numerous postwar administrations seemed concerned exclusively with the wish to restore prewar conditions with a minimum of financial, economic, or social changes. The sensitive issue of collaboration with wartime occupation authorities was

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quickly brushed aside by the State, and this further blurred the distinction between prewar life under a national dictatorship, the time of wartime hardships, and the confused postwar reconstruction effort.

g. Economic relationships between the Greek towns and the village or farming population have been described but give only a partial picture of the social divisions between the two, discussed very well by McNeill.¹³⁷ Psychological differences and hostilities between town and village were also reflected by the wide division between the poor hill villages and the well-to-do village-towns of the plains. As early as October 1947, there were already 300,000 refugees from villages who were settled near towns, some of these unwillingly removed from their houses by a Government decree designed to isolate guerrilla bands and deny them food supplies. Thus, the bare economic statistics of postwar Greece give little impression of the social hostilities and tensions of the time.¹³⁸

h. At the same time, measures of actual postwar living conditions and comparative incomes give little information about the extremes of poverty or of wealth in Greece of 1945-47. Such extremes were undoubtedly less apparent in the villages and small towns, but in Athens-Piraeus they were present and obvious to all. Varvarressos in 1951 contrasted these two worlds, "the wage earner, the pensioner and the peasant," and "the world of easy profits, of unrestricted living, of hoarding" and found this division to be a major reason for political instability.¹³⁹ Such contrasts are not recorded adequately by the dubious Greek unemployment statistics or by scanty details of income distribution.

i. The influence of the Government on the economy has been shown to be very significant; according to Bank of Greece estimates, between 30 and 50 percent of the total postwar national income was funneled through the State by taxes which fell most heavily on the poorest classes.¹⁴⁰ But these calculations do not suggest the extent to which State economic influence was unplanned, undirected, and without legally defined limits on outright favoritism. Welfare benefits of 1945-47 went to a modest list of persons, and official credits were easy for only the politically favored. An analysis of this economic discrimination by the State cannot be made from aggregate budgetary or financial figures.

j. One conclusion seems warranted by the political history of postwar Greece--the extreme poverty due to wartime disruptions of internal and foreign trade and to inflation was inadequately relieved by the modest economic recovery to 1946-47. International relief efforts were channeled through a politically minded administration which used its extensive credit and regulatory powers primarily for immediate maneuvering purposes. Up to mid-1947, there remained some hope that all political elements would be represented in a coalition government.

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The break between Sofoulis and the Communists, the arrival of a US aid mission chief, and the departure of KKE leaders from Athens to the hills all marked the start of open Civil War in Greece.¹⁴¹

k. It seems inappropriate to apply any modern development models to the conditions of postwar Greece. Economic reconstruction and relief were the main tasks of this period. National income did not recover to prewar levels until 1950 and 1951, despite the large quantities of foreign relief and aid which were introduced. For Europe as a whole, such recovery occurred by 1948-49. The Greek economy of 1938 was a blend of traditional farm and village production and of modern commercial and town life which was particularly sensitive to outside conditions and world trade; thus, postwar recovery was delayed. The 1945-49 political and economic history of Greece was closely tied to international events, and no analysis of this period can be adequate unless it recognizes this relationship.

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CHAPTER 4

SOCIOLOGICAL FACTORS

Section I. Demography, Education, Religion, Community

by Donald S. Bloch

47. Population growth. According to the Greek census, the population of Greece increased by 2,101,327 people from 1920 to 1951, representing an increase of 38 percent for the 31-year period or an annual increase averaging slightly over 1 percent. The total increase is actually somewhat larger, because it is known that the population was underenumerated in 1951.¹ The trend, however, is for an increasing population, increasing at a decreasing rate.*

a. The population increase from 1920 to 1928, in addition to natural increase, was influenced by an exchange of minorities between Greece and Turkey, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Albania. Although some 420,000 Greeks had emigrated in the 100 years before 1921, most having left Greece between 1907 and 1921,² emigration had a negligible effect on population growth from 1921 to 1946. The exchange of minorities produced a net population increase of about 1.1 million from 1920 to 1931, the great majority having been exchanged by 1928.³

b. Natural increase appears to have been the primary influence on population growth from 1928 to 1940. However, the relatively small increase from 1940 to 1941 reflects casualties from World War II and the Greek Civil War, deportation of Jews and Greeks to labor camps during the German occupation,⁴ and a decline in the rate of marriages during the war years.⁵ There was also a decline in the birth rate from 1934 to 1946, due to some practice of birth control and marrying when older.

c. The population increase, although comparatively slow, evidently put a great deal of pressure on the land. Table V indicates an

*The statistics presented in this section should be used with caution. There were major discrepancies among statistics from different sources, which implies that no source is completely accurate, including the Yearbook, which is an official source. Every attempt has been made to use a single source for statistics about any one factor, to keep any bias consistent. This was not always possible.

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TABLE V. POPULATION, PERCENTAGE INCREASE, AND DENSITY
(Census years 1920-51)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>Average annual increase (percent)</u>	<u>Inhabitants per sq km</u>
1920 . . .	5,531,474	---	36.7
1928 . . .	6,204,684	1.5	47.8
1940 . . .	7,344,860	1.5	56.6
1951 . . .	7,632,801	0.4	57.6

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Greece, 1958, p 6.

increase in density of about 21 persons per square kilometer for all Greece between 1920 and 1951. It has been estimated that only 25 percent of the land is arable,⁶ and that only about 20 percent of the total land area was under cultivation as of 1944. Since the majority of the inhabitants were dependent upon agriculture and herding through 1951, small increases in population produced great pressures on the land to provide a livelihood for the additional people. This situation was in no small way responsible for internal migration.

48. Population distribution. Internal migration from 1940 to 1951 is indicated by statistics from the censuses of those years. Table VI shows that only three of the nine departments gained population during the 11-year period. Assuming an underenumeration of about 5 percent in 1951 spread equally among all departments, Macedonia and Epirus would have had increases rather than decreases in population, but the trend in internal migration would be the same. Without data for prior years, however, it is not certain whether the long-term trend is for population to migrate to central Greece, Thessaly, and Crete, or whether the statistics indicate influences of the German occupation of Greece during World War II and of the civil war. Migration from areas of guerrilla activity during both periods of violence, relocation of about 750,000 villages to towns and cities during the civil war,⁷ and differential casualty rates could account for much of the variation. The general urban trend since 1920, coupled with the large increase in the population of Athens and Piraeus, would help explain the movement to central Greece and Euboea, but it does not explain the movement to Thessaly and Crete.

a. There has been a well-documented general urban trend starting with the census of 1920. The Greek Government defines population centers of less than 2,000 inhabitants as rural, with between 2,000 and 9,999 as semiurban, and with 10,000 or more as urban.⁸ There were about 11,000 population centers in Greece during the period under study; 30 of these were urban in 1920 and 74 in 1951.⁹ In spite of this marked

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TABLE VI. POPULATION AND PERCENT CHANGE BY DEPARTMENT
(1940 and 1951)

<u>Department</u>	<u>1940</u>	<u>1951</u>	<u>Change (%)</u>
Central Greece/Euboea	2,032,620	2,287,019	+12.5
Peloponnesus	1,156,189	1,129,022	-17.4
Ionian Islands	250,626	228,597	- 8.8
Thessaly	590,003	628,941	+ 6.6
Macedonia	1,752,091	1,700,835	- 2.9
Epirus	332,132	330,543	- 0.5
Crete	438,239	462,124	+ 5.5
Aegean Islands	433,037	528,766	- 5.9
Thrace	359,923	336,954	- 6.4
Total	7,344,860	7,632,801	+ 2.3

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Greece, 1955, pp 10, 11.

urban trend, Greece was a country of villages up to 1951. As of the 1951 census of 10,907 population centers, there were 10,490 villages with less than 2,000 population, and 7,014 with fewer than 400 inhabitants.¹⁰

b. The Greater Athens area, which includes Piraeus and 20 other communities, grew from 453,042 inhabitants to 1,378,586 from 1920 to 1951, an increase of more than 200 percent. Greater Thessalonike also enjoyed a marked increase from 174,390 to 297,164, or about 71 percent in the same period.¹¹ These two urban areas were considered to be the only large population centers resembling Western cities. One study comments:

The other towns may contain industries or plants to process agricultural commodities, they may be small ports or centers of trade, and many are capitals of the departments; but all partake in varying proportions of the village and small town characteristics.¹²

c. McNeill finds that the pattern of migration to the cities starts at the hill villages and progresses through the larger plains and villages to the towns and cities.¹³ This brought many to the cities who had neither the skills required for urban occupations nor the attitudes required to adapt to the urban work schedule.¹⁴ The educated came or stayed in the cities to obtain white collar jobs or practice their professions. Thus, the rural to urban migration produced an unskilled group of unemployed or underemployed and an educated group, many of whom were underemployed.

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TABLE VII. PERCENT OF URBAN, SEMIURBAN, AND RURAL POPULATION
(Census years 1920-51)

Year	Number urban centers	Percent of population		
		Urban	Semiurban	Rural
1920	30	---	---	---
1928	44	30.6 . . .	14.6 . . .	54.8
1940	60	32.0 . . .	15.4 . . .	52.6
1951	74	36.8 . . .	15.5 . . .	47.7

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Greece, 1955, pp 12-13, 15.

d. In terms of age distribution, the population of Greece was relatively old for a developing nation. In 1951, the median age was about 26 years.¹⁵ From 1920 to 1951, the percent of the population 14 years of age increased from 60 to 65, and those 65 or older increased from 6 to 7 percent.¹⁶ The trend indicated by these statistics is for an increasing proportion of the population to be in their productive years during a period of increased pressure on the land and underemployment in the cities.

49. Minority groups. The repatriation of minority populations from the Balkan countries and Asia Minor, commonly referred to as the minorities exchange, that occurred from 1920 to 1928 increased the proportion of ethnic Greeks within the national boundaries of Greece from 80 to 95 percent.¹⁷ This increase in ethnic homogeneity is reflected in religious homogeneity in that only between 2 and 3 percent of the population were members of minority religions.¹⁸

a. The major characteristics which differentiate minorities from the Greek majority are religion and language. Greeks consider adherence to the Greek Orthodox Church an integral part of Greekness and look similarly upon mastery of the Greek language. The groups so differentiated are the Turkish, Bulgarian, Albanian, Vlach, Jewish, and Armenian minorities. However, the Greek language was taught in the minorities' schools, if only as a second language.¹⁹

b. There were more than 130,000 Turkish Muslims (who chose not to migrate to Turkey during the exchange) in Greece in 1940.²⁰ Most of them lived in homogeneous rural communities in Thrace. Their rights, including establishing their own schools and complete religious freedom, were protected by the provisions of the exchange treaties.²¹ Settlement in homogeneous communities tended to isolate the Turks from the Greek cultural stream. However, the Turkish minority had all the rights and obligations of Greek citizenship,²² and some culture contact

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was necessary when their young men were called into military service, when a Turk held political office, or during political campaigns soliciting Turkish votes. Despite the fact that the Turkish minority was accorded full citizenship rights and that the Greek language was taught in the schools as a second language (so that, at least, the younger Turks spoke Greek), the Greeks identified this group as Turkish rather than Greek. However, it is reported that there was little, if any, friction between the Greeks and the Turkish minority;²³ and the Turks did not collaborate with the Germans to fight against the Greek guerrillas.²⁴

c. There were some 80,000 Orthodox Christian Bulgarians who lived in small mountain villages in Macedonia, south of the Yugoslav border.²⁵ They chose to remain in Greece rather than take part in the exchange of minorities. The Bulgarians traditionally spoke a Slavic dialect similar to the language spoken in the Macedonian portions of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. However, the Greek leaders expected this group to become assimilated, since their life style was essentially the same as Greek villagers in the area; they were considered to be Greek nationals with all of the prerogatives and obligations; their schools were staffed by Greek teachers; and the younger generation spoke Greek fluently, even though they used their native tongue in their homes. There are no reports of friction between the Greeks and the Bulgarian minority prior to the civil war. However, there is one report that Bulgarians fought with the Greek guerrillas against the forces of occupation during World War II,²⁶ and another which states that they permitted the Germans to arm them and organize them into counter guerrilla bands.²⁷ It is most probable that both reports were true; that Bulgarians in different localities bowed to the strongest pressures or appeals.

d. There were two distinct groups of Albanians in Greece prior to the end of World War II.

(1) A rather small group of about 30,000 Albanian Muslims lived near the Albanian border.²⁸ These people, usually known as Tchams or Chams, were isolated from Greek culture and identified with Albania and Albanian territorial aspirations vis-a-vis Greece. Although there is no information about conflict between this group and Greeks before the German occupation, it would appear that they were too isolated, too few, and too wealthy to cause problems. The Germans and Italians tried to make trouble between them and the Orthodox Greeks during the occupation, but the Chams did not wish to risk their economic position by fighting.²⁹ After the occupation, most migrated to Albania.³⁰

(2) The other Albanian minority consisted of about 200,000 Greek Orthodox Albanians³¹ who had been brought to Greece to

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work land owned by the Turks during Greece's subjection by the Ottoman Empire.³² Having lived in Greece for many generations, they identified with the Greeks and were virtually assimilated. They lived in small rural communities in Epirus, around Athens and Corinth, and on the Islands south of Athens and were virtually bilingual. There had been no problems associated with this minority, nor was there any indication of discrimination by the Greeks. In fact, the Albanians volunteered their services as interpreters when the Greek Army pushed the Italians back into Albania in 1940.³³

e. The Vlachs or Kutzo-Vlachs were a group of seminomadic shepherds inhabiting portions of the Pindus Mountains. This group of close to 60,000 people³⁴ spoke a language similar to Rumanian; however, Greek was taught in their schools as a second language. There is some confusion as to whether or not the Vlachs are actually Greek; they adhered to the Greek Orthodox religion, and their culture was essentially the same as that of Greek villagers, but they were organized as patriarchal extended family units much larger than found in most Greek villages.³⁵ During 1941, the Italians formed a semiautonomous state of Vlachs and organized an armed force called the Legionaries to fight against the Greeks.³⁶ There was not enough discontent among the Vlachs to support the division, and the structure collapsed within a year.

f. About 68,000 Jews lived in Greece in 1940.³⁷ They were primarily Spanish Jews, most of whom had settled in Thessalonike. They were bilingual and were accorded all of the political rights and duties of Greek citizenship. During the occupation, the Germans killed or deported most of the Jews, so that only about 7,000 were left after World War II.³⁸ Most of the Jews who survived the occupation had been residents of Athens or had migrated to Athens from Macedonia to escape the Nazis.³⁹ There was little if any antisemitism in Greece; to the contrary, most of the survivors had been given false identity cards by Greek Orthodox families, or were hidden in their homes, or were assisted in fleeing the country by non-Jewish Greeks.⁴⁰

g. By 1934 there were some 25,000 Armenians in Greece.⁴¹ As traders and businessmen, they concentrated in Thessalonike and Athens. The Armenian minority had taken refuge in Greece from Turkish persecution after World War I. Many had no citizenship status in any country, and the rest were accorded Greek citizenship. About 60 percent of this minority, probably those without citizenship, emigrated from Greece after the German occupation. There evidently had been some friction or tensions between Armenians and Greeks in Athens. There was an outbreak of violence perpetrated against Greeks by Armenians in some sections of Athens during the Communist uprising in December 1944.⁴²

50. Education in the past. The Greeks have always placed a high value on education. Their high degree of intellectual curiosity has

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contributed to valuing education for its own sake; however, education has also been an important vehicle for upward social and occupational mobility.

a. While under the domination of the Ottoman Empire, the Greek Orthodox Church was given the right to establish and run Greek schools. The priests taught basic reading and writing of ancient Greek, religion, and the history of classical Greece and the Byzantine Empire; they also espoused national independence.⁴³

b. The Educational Act of modern Greece, implemented about 1836, established a State school system modeled after the French on the elementary level and the Bavarian on the secondary level. Secular teachers had already replaced the clergy, and the preindependence curriculum had been expanded.⁴⁴ The curriculum under the 1836 act was strictly academic, and ancient Greek was the language used at all levels. Primary education was theoretically compulsory under the act and was supported by each locality. The first four grades of elementary education were taught in the demotic schools, the Hellenic schools provided a middle level from the fifth through seventh grades, and secondary education consisted of a 4-year gymnasium which prepared the student for the university. Although there were several levels of administration from the Ministry of Education to the local school board, policies and curricula were prepared at the Ministry level, and the Ministry had primary authority over hiring, firing, transferring, or promoting teachers.⁴⁵

c. During the latter part of the 19th century, both financial support and control of public elementary and secondary education were concentrated at the State level. In 1911, free universal elementary education became part of the Constitution; in 1912, a major curriculum reform introduced courses in exact sciences, art, skills, and physical education in both the elementary and secondary schools; in 1917, the popular or demotic language, rather than ancient Greek, was taught in the elementary school. The development of a six-grade elementary school and a six-grade gymnasium as the secondary level throughout the country in 1929 completed the important changes made during the early 20th century.⁴⁶

d. In general, following the implementation of the 1836 Education Act, administrative and financial control (after 1922) of elementary and secondary education were centralized in the Ministry of Education, later the Ministry of Education and Religion. The Ministry also controlled and supported the schools of ethnic minorities in Greece, in accordance with the provisions of the various treaties regarding the exchange of minority populations. The Ministry formulated all policies and programs, provided financial support, developed curricula, controlled the texts and the examinations, and had control of almost all the personnel in the public educational system.

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51. Elementary education. Notwithstanding the high value Greeks placed on education, not every village had an elementary school. According to a 1930 law, villages with less than 15 children or with less than 125 inhabitants were not entitled to a school supported by the State. Consolidation of villages into school districts was not feasible because of lack of transportation and poor roads.⁴⁷

TABLE VIII. AVERAGE NUMBER OF ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS (1949-51)

<u>Type</u>	<u>Public</u>	<u>Private</u>	<u>Total</u>
Regular	8,760	229	8,989
Minority	286	---	286
Foreign	----	10	10
Total	9,046	239	9,285

Source: Antonakaki, Greek Education, p 56.

a. There were 9,285 elementary schools for the 10,907 population centers in 1951. Since there were several schools in the larger villages, towns, and cities, Antonakaki estimates that 2,800 villages were without schools in 1951. It was, therefore, difficult to enforce compulsory education without providing transportation, but some children did not attend school because they did not have adequate clothing or the money for books and supplies.

b. Although the figures in table IX should be used with caution, since they are overestimates, it is clear that more than 12 percent of the elementary school age group were not attending school. This may also apply to the 1947 figure which Antonakaki labels as doubtful. The proportion not attending is larger than would be expected from 2,800 small villages. In 1951, there were some 4,500 villages with under 200 inhabitants comprising only 5.7 percent of the population.⁴⁸ If it can be assumed that the school-age children in these villages also comprised about 6 percent of their age group, more than 6 percent of the nonattenders came from population centers in which there were elementary schools.

c. Since education was so highly valued, the villages in which there were no schools and the families that could not afford books and supplies undoubtedly felt deprived.

52. Secondary education. Secondary schools included the 6-year gymnasias, the 2-year semigymnasias found primarily in small provincial

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TABLE IX. ENROLLMENT IN ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS FOR SELECTED YEARS

<u>Year</u>	<u>Enrollment</u>	<u>Percent of age group</u>
1924	570,455	74
1926	644,359	84
1937-38	977,956	88
1941-44	600,000	65
1947	1,274,376	100

Source: Antonakaki, Greek Education, p 22.

towns, the bourgeois schools devoted to vocational training, and the commercial schools. Public secondary schools were free, except for books and supplies, until Metaxas came to power. Under Metaxas, a fee was charged for secondary education, and entrance examinations were more difficult than before.⁴⁹ Even without these new constraints, not more than 15 percent of the students who started elementary school attended the 536 secondary schools. Unfortunately, there are no statistics on attrition from the secondary schools.

TABLE X. AVERAGE NUMBER OF SECONDARY SCHOOLS, 1949-51

<u>Type</u>	<u>Public</u>	<u>Private</u>	<u>Total</u>
Gymnasia/semigymnasia	384	90	474
Bourgeois	8	--	8
Foreign gymnasia	---	14	14
Commercial	40	--	40
Total	432	104	536

Source: Antonakaki, Greek Education, p 56.

a. The emphasis of both elementary and secondary education was on academic subjects which prepared the student for study at the university level. Pepelasis deplores the concentration on classical education rather than agricultural and technical education.⁵⁰ He points out that in 1937, 86.3 percent of the secondary school students attended the classical gymnasia, 4.5 percent attended vocational and technical schools, and the others attended commercial schools.⁵¹

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TABLE XI. PERCENT OF ELEMENTARY SCHOOL ENROLLMENT ATTENDING
SECONDARY SCHOOLS IN SELECTED YEARS

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number of students</u>	<u>Percent of elementary enrollment</u>
1923	85,942	15
1926	94,192	14
1937-38	100,208	10
1947	152,835	12

Source: Antonakaki, Greek Education, p 22.

b. Graduates of the secondary schools did not want to engage in manual work and, therefore, applied for clerical and white collar positions, primarily in the Government bureaucracy, or went to college. There was an overabundance of both Government employees and applicants, which tended to drive down salaries, on the one hand, and relegate some of this educated group to menial jobs.⁵² Many believed that their salaries were not commensurate with their educational level, and others, especially those who had to settle for menial positions, felt that their jobs were not commensurate with their educational attainment.

53. Higher education. There were two major universities in Greece during the period under study: the University of Athens, founded in 1839, and the University of Thessalonike, founded in 1926.⁵³ There were several other schools of higher education: an agricultural college in Athens, the School of Economics and Commerce, the Pandias School of Politics, the School of Fine Arts, the National Polytechnic of Athens, and several foreign institutions.⁵⁴ Also categorized with institutions of higher education were the special schools for the preparation of elementary school teachers and those for the preparation of parish priests. These were 3-year schools which could be entered after completion of 4 or 6 years of secondary education.

a. Statistics on student enrollment or on major area of specialization are not available as a time series, nor are they complete in those sources which touch on this subject. One study points out that there were some 7,300 students attending the two universities in 1938, but only 500 at the National Polytechnic of Athens.⁵⁵ Stavrianos points out that in the same year, 45 percent of the university students graduated as lawyers, 33 percent as doctors, and the rest majored in science or humanities.⁵⁶ The studies point out that the general trend was for a small minority of students to major in technical fields, including agriculture.

b. Thus, it appears that law and medicine were overcrowded professions, but only because these professionals were concentrated in

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the large population centers rather than distributing themselves through the countryside. Further, many of the science and humanities majors could not find positions, and the graduates of technical or engineering schools looked for administrative positions rather than going out into the field. Thus, many of this educated group found it difficult to make a living or to get positions for which they felt qualified and became disillusioned and discontented.

54. Literacy rates. Literacy had increased considerably among the Greeks from 1920 to 1951: in 1920, only 50 percent of the population 10 years of age or older was literate, whereas 76 percent was literate in 1951.⁵⁷ And, as might be expected, the urban population had a higher rate of literacy than did the rural.⁵⁸ In view of the value placed on education and on the increasing enrollment in elementary schools, the literacy rate appears rather low. However, in 1938, over 20 percent of the enrolled pupils dropped out of school while still in the first grade,⁵⁹ and in 1951, about 50 percent of those who started the first grade actually started the third grade.⁶⁰ The high percentage of dropouts in the early grades was a large contribution to the low literacy rate.

55. Religion. The Greek Orthodox Church officially separated from the Roman Catholic Church in the 11th century. The schism developed after the Bishop of Rome claimed primacy over all other bishops, whereas the bishops of the Orthodox Church did not recognize a central authority. Except for the primacy of the Pope, the tenets of the Greek Orthodox Church are essentially the same as Roman Catholicism. Two important differences are that the Greek Orthodox Church has no proscription against birth control and permits a married man to be ordained as a parish priest.

56. Church structure. The Patriarch of Constantinople was the titular head of the Greek Orthodox Church. The church was actually governed by a Holy Synod consisting of a group of bishops with the Metropolitan of Athens always presiding. The Holy Synod was composed of a portion of all of the bishops in Greece. Membership in the synod rotated among the bishops. Changes in membership were made through submission of a list of names to the Ministry of Education and Religion, which formally approved the choices. Thus, the church was officially administered by the Government.⁶¹

a. A bishop was responsible for the parishes in his diocese. The bishop appointed the priest to a parish post; however, the congregation could refuse the appointment or have the priest transferred for cause. The parish church was administered by the priest and a committee of four or five men who served for 3 years. The members of the committee were selected by the bishop from a list submitted by the priest. The committee was responsible for the building and maintenance

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of the church and the religious school, and the treasurer made collections and supervised church funds. Money for the church was raised through collections, the sale of candles, the sale of offerings made to the church, and the sale of produce grown on church lands.⁶²

b. Traditionally, the priest was paid from contributions of the parishioners. During the period under study, the State paid the priests a salary, thus tending to reduce local control over the priest. The salary varied, depending upon the educational attainment of the priest, but the parish priest was usually poorly educated and supplemented his salary by farming or other financial interests.⁶³

57. Characteristics of the parish priest. The church permitted ordination of married men as priests, but once he was ordained, a single priest might not marry. Married priests were relegated to parishes; only unmarried priests could climb the administrative hierarchy of the church. The priest tended to become integrated into the parish. Since he was usually a married man, he might own land or a house or have money representing his wife's dowry to supplement his inheritance. (The money required to provide them with an education constituted some men's inheritance.) Thus, he might be a landowner or farmer, landlord or businessman, as well as a priest, and with the additional money received as his salary, he would rank above average in wealth in most parishes.⁶⁴

a. The prestige accorded a parish priest was based on the conduct of his and his family's nonclerical activities and his personality, as well as the fact that he was a clergyman. If his family life conformed to the village or community standard, his prestige increased; if his farm or business did well, so that he could provide his daughters with adequate dowries and provide a substantial inheritance for his sons, he further increased his prestige. As an influential member of the community, that is, based on his nonclerical activities, he may have had some impact upon the daily life of the parish. As a priest, the laity expected him to help them meet life's emergencies; to instill a love of religion in the congregation, especially the young; and to act as a peacemaker when disputes were serious enough to threaten the harmony of the community. As a priest, he was not expected to comment upon or to attempt to change the daily life of the members of the congregation.⁶⁵

b. In his official role, the parish priest was ubiquitous and had many opportunities to attempt to influence members of the community. He presided over the church committee; celebrated Sunday Mass; officiated during the holy days, during the community's saint's day, at christenings, at name days, and at weddings; was called to bless the start of an important undertaking, such as the opening of the school year and laying the foundation stone of a new house; and was asked to exorcise evil for a family that had a long run of misfortunes.⁶⁶

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c. Much of the opportunity for influence might not have been realized because of the clergy's attitudes and lack of education. Ppelasius points out that the church as a whole was very conservative and intolerant of change, and that most of the clergy were imbued with this philosophy. He also indicates that in 1951 only about 13 percent of 7,150 priests had some higher education; about 35 percent had had some grammar school education, and 30 priests could not write.⁶⁷

58. Religion and the laity. For the Greeks, religion became a blend of the classical Greek pantheon and Christianity. Former Greek deities were associated with the saints: for example, the sun god, Helios, was associated with the prophet Elias, and Athena Parthenos with the Virgin. The educated Greek equated the teachings of the New Testament with Socratic and Platonic ideals, and many less educated Greeks thought that Christ was Greek.⁶⁸ Prayers were offered to the Virgin and to the saints as if they were gods rather than intermediaries, and there was the expectation that the request embodied in the prayer would be granted.⁶⁹

a. There was a general belief in God; that He is the creator; that He has absolute power to impose His will; that He provides for and protects His children; and that He is the judge of a man's life and metes out punishment. There was also a strong belief in omens. For example, if a ewe crossed a man's path while on his way to his fields, it was not a good day to farm, or he would suffer some misfortune. The church recognized the evil eye as a weapon of the Devil, and it was believed that the Bible, religious and nonreligious sayings, the cross or amulets could protect one from the evil eye.⁷⁰ The evil eye was a force projected upon one person by another. The person passing the evil eye might not be aware of it, and since the force was attracted by that which was envied (children, for example, were considered extremely vulnerable), all members of the community who were not relatives were suspect.

b. Participation in religious services and ceremonies was usually a family affair. School children, however, were the most faithful attenders at Sunday Mass; there was a fair proportion of women and girls, but the men attended infrequently.⁷¹ The major ceremonies were attended by all in the community who were able. The Easter service brought out the entire community, along with relatives who had returned to visit their families. And although there was music and dancing in the square on Easter Sunday, many families stayed at home to enjoy the company of their relatives. The feast day of the patron saint of the village or community was celebrated by the entire community, along with relatives and visitors from nearby communities.⁷² Religious education for the young in a parish emphasized the ritualistic aspects of the

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Greek Church. The Mass was said in purist Greek rather than popular Greek and was, therefore, not really understood by the less educated.⁷³

59. Communication through mass media. There is not very much information about mass media during the period of this study. It has been reported that one State-owned radio station was in operation in Athens in 1939, and that four were in operation in Athens, Thessalonike, and Patras in 1940.⁷⁴ The number of radio receivers increased from 18,000 in 1937 to 50,900 in 1939, the latter figure representing 6.1 receivers for each 1,000 population,⁷⁵ and by 1955, the United Nations reported there were 61 receivers for each 1,000 population.⁷⁶ The United Nations also reported that there were 68 daily newspapers in Greece in 1952 with a circulation of 188 per 1,000 population.⁷⁷ These statistics do not adequately reflect the impact of mass communications on, at least, male youth and adults. Most coffeehouses, even in the smaller villages, had a radio; and the coffeehouses had become institutionalized gathering places. Radio broadcasts were heard by those gathered, newspapers were read, and then what was heard and read was discussed.

60. Other forms of communication. Informal communication among Greeks appears to have been rather extensive. The coffeehouse in the village or neighborhood has been characterized as a communication center as well as a center of recreation and a semiofficial business office.⁷⁸ The marketplace was also a center of public life⁷⁹ and, as such, contributed to the network of communication. Peddlers and tradesmen from other villages, towns, or sections of the city brought news to the marketplace, as did bus drivers, truckers, and other casual visitors.

a. Communication between people of different villages and between rural and urban areas was also effected through close family ties. Relatives who had moved from their place of birth usually returned to visit their families during Easter and for the village saint's day festival. Correspondence was evidently an additional means of communication. During 1936 some 103 million letters were sent between places within Greece, and in the unsettled period after World War II some 54 million letters were sent.⁸⁰ Considering that a fair percentage of the correspondence would have been initiated by business, it would still appear that families communicated through correspondence.

b. In the larger cities, a multiplicity of formal and informal interest organizations reinforced other methods of communication. Meetings, newspapers, and pamphlets were forms of communication for members of these organizations.

61. Language problems. Greece had three languages: demotic, a colloquial tongue heavily interlarded with Turkish and Arabic words;

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katharevousa, a purified version used in education, official communications, business, and the church; and the classical tongue, known almost as little among Greeks as among other Europeans. The great mass of the rural people spoke demotic Greek and were thus greatly handicapped in communication with educated persons, urban dwellers, and clerical and governmental authorities. Language, therefore, tended to reinforce urban-rural and governmental-popular differences. In the latter part of the preconflict period, the educated group began to speak the popular language in private conversation.⁸¹ However, official and business documents were still prepared in katharevousa which was not understood by most villagers.

62. The village. In general, there were three types of villages in Greece--mountain, plain, and coast--which were differentiated by their economic base. The mountain villagers were shepherds, depending upon the sale of sheep, goats, milk, and cheese for their livelihood. They were seminomadic, moving to grazing lands in the plains during the winter and back to the grazing lands around their villages in the mountains in the summer. What little farming they engaged in was for their own subsistence. The villagers in the plains were primarily farmers who depended upon one or another cash crop for their livelihood. Some of the more well-to-do also kept a small herd of sheep and perhaps some goats. The villagers along the coast of the mainland and the islands engaged in fishing or took jobs as sailors as the main source of their livelihood. The basic culture, values, and institutions were very similar for the three types of villages.

a. Differences seem to have been of degree rather than of kind, and many of these differences related to location and primary occupation. For example, Sanders reports that change was slower in the mountain villages than on the plains, that the mountain shepherds were physically tougher than the farmers on the plains, and that the mountain villagers were more warlike; on the other hand, the lowlanders had more refined manners and were more sophisticated than their compatriots from the mountains.⁸²

b. The relative isolation of the mountain village as compared to the plains village inhibited contact with outsiders, thus reducing contact with new ideas and promoting a tradition of conservatism and resistance to change. The constant movement, especially in mountainous terrain, required in sheepherding was probably more strenuous than farming. The shepherds also had to fight off animal and human marauders, and from time to time, they had to fight with lowlanders for grazing rights or practiced banditry among the people of the plains, producing, over the years, an outlook on life that was more fierce and warlike than that of the lowlanders.

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63. Major characteristics of village life. A typical Greek village consisted of a cluster of houses; a square or "agora" which was also the marketplace; one or more coffeehouses, which might double as stores in the smaller villages, on the square; one or more stores also on the square; a building housing government offices; one or more churches; and usually a school. The buildings that made up the village were, in effect, surrounded by farm land or grazing land.⁸³ The arrangement of streets and homes along the streets appeared to have no plan but provided for a great degree of privacy from neighboring eyes. An exception to this arrangement was along the main street, which usually ran through the village square, where all of the buildings faced the street.

a. The marketplace was the center of the public life of the village. The bus stop, if there was one, was in the marketplace; peddlers and vendors set out their wares here; Government officials and others tended to conduct business in the coffeehouses fronting on the marketplace; musicians played and dancing occurred in the marketplace on feast days and holidays. However, except for transportation and on holidays, this area was primarily for men. A woman would either call out to a peddler from the edge of the marketplace or send her children to shop for her rather than enter the area.⁸⁴

b. Life revolved around the family and its livelihood in the village. Except in the large villages, every family had the same basic occupation. In the larger villages, there was some specialization of labor; there were carpenters, masons, tradesmen, and peddlers who also serviced neighboring small villages. The basic purpose of economic activity was to enhance the honor and prestige of the family, the basic unit of loyalty and concern.⁸⁵ It was felt that each family's interests conflicted in some way with those of other families. The result was an underlying current of suspicion and hostility between families and conscious attempts to insure that information about family affairs did not go beyond the kin group.⁸⁶ The mutual suspicion, along with egalitarian values derived from the concept of philotimo, inhibited cooperation in the village.

c. The relatively small increase in population coupled with a sharp decrease in emigration during the period under study kept continuous pressure on the head of a family to provide adequately for his sons and daughters, since the laws of inheritance and village custom required that the property be divided equally among all the children. Daughters received their share of the family property as a dowry which traditionally consisted of a portion of the family's real property and, perhaps, some money. In order to prevent undue fragmentation of land and herds, a larger portion of the dowry was given as money. Sons had traditionally received a portion of land or part of the herd. More and

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more "surplus" sons were being educated through secondary school as their portion of the inheritance and would then move to a town or city.⁸⁷ Friedl states that a major implication of the pressure of population was to promote family planning, and that population pressure, along with the requirement for larger dowries, was influential in raising the age at which a couple married.

d. Many villagers perceived city life to be superior to village life. They were impressed with the fact that many occupations required little, if any, physical work, that the life of the woman was easier in the city, and with the variety of shops and places of entertainment. The prestige of city life made for easier acceptance of urban artifacts and some "modern" ideas in those villages that had reasonable contact with large towns and cities.⁸⁸ However, there was a political and social gulf between the village and the urban center. The villager was indifferent to and did not understand organized politics. He traditionally used personal and family contacts to gain political favors.⁸⁹ He also had a language problem, as pointed out above.

64. Village institutions. The formal institutions of most of the smaller villages consisted of the village government, the church, and the school.

a. The village government consisted of a village council with a president and secretary. Some prestige was accorded to the president and secretary, but little, if any, to the council members. Traditionally, the village government had been relatively autonomous. During the period under study, however, little autonomy was left. The village police were selected at the provincial level and paid by the State; the village budget had to be approved at Province level; and all decisions made by the village council had to be sent to the provincial government for approval.⁹⁰ The village council was responsible for organizing village labor for the maintenance of public roads and wells. The council found this very difficult, since members of the village would prefer to work for their own and their family's welfare; and, when a work crew was organized, members of different families watched each other, because one did not want to do more work than the other.⁹¹

b. Members of the church board were responsible for the maintenance of the church buildings. Membership on this board had a prestige value. However, perhaps its most important functions, selection and remuneration of the priest, had been taken over by the State. The school board was elected by the village, but its responsibilities were limited to maintenance of the school building and sometimes raising money for books and supplies. The teacher was selected and paid by the State, which also developed the standard curriculum.⁹² In most of the small villages, there were no other formal organizations. In the larger villages, there were cooperatives, professional associations, and the

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Boy Scouts. These organizations existed so long as they met the perceived needs of specific interest groups. They were not strong in the sense that they could exert political or economic pressure.

c. In the small villages, the only informal group was the coffeehouse clique. In the larger villages and small towns, such interest groups as hunting clubs, home economic clubs, and philanthropic groups were found. The coffeehouse was a major institution and served several functions. It was a place of recreation, a place of assembly, a communication center, and a place in which to do business. The coffeehouse was busiest in the early evening after work. If there was more than one coffeehouse, each had its core clientele, but some men would frequent both, and a son usually did not frequent the same coffeehouse as his father. Most coffeehouses had a radio, and the local and national news as well as the day's events were discussed in clique groups. Each clique had a leader who led and influenced the discussion. The owner and the waiter, who had no clique connections, diffused opinion from one clique to the other, thus tending to develop a coffeehouse stand on a particular subject. In like fashion, villagers who tended to frequent more than one coffeehouse would carry information from one to another, tending to develop a village public opinion.⁹³

d. Friedl has stated that the formal organizational structure of the village "provides neither autonomy in village affairs nor a unified structure."⁹⁴ However, members of a village developed a strong sense of community and loyalty to the village. The Greek saw his village as a unified whole encompassing his working space, his home, his family relations, his religion, and his companions.⁹⁵ He was extremely loyal to his village, even if he had moved from it. This might not be apparent when the Government, church board, or school board was trying to get community cooperation, but it was strongly evident when the safety or reputation of the village was threatened. Loyalty to the family was strongest for the Greek, but next came loyalty to his village, and only third to his nation.

65. The town and city. The only urban centers that could be classed as cities in the Western sense were Athens and Piraeus, which were included in Greater Athens; Thessalonike; and, perhaps, Patras. Athens was the major urban center in Greece. Not only did it have the largest population, but it was the center of intellectual life, political activity, business, and industry. Athens was the most Westernized city in Greece. It set the trends for the country, and it was from Athens that new ideas were diffused throughout Greece.⁹⁶

a. While the social structure and living patterns of the larger urban centers in Greece resembled those of European urban centers, McNeill contends that the similarity was superficial and apparent rather than real. He points out that the physical attributes of the larger

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Greek towns and cities--the buildings, streets, intellectual life, entertainment available, and the clothes worn--were similar to European urban centers, but the major underlying difference was that Greek urban centers had very little industry.⁹⁷ He characterizes towns as market and political centers having some handicrafts, and cities as larger market and political centers with some industry and handicrafts.

b. Life in the larger towns and cities was lived at a livelier pace than in the villages, and there was a marked increase in specialization of occupations and sufficient difference in incomes to develop obvious social strata. There were a number of squares in each larger town and city, each of which was lined with shops and coffee-houses.⁹⁸ This pattern of small communities or neighborhoods within the urban area probably developed some community spirit. The older suburbs of Athens were also considered to have developed a community spirit, but not so the newer suburbs inhabited primarily by professionals.⁹⁹ There was no evidence, however, of friction between these neighborhoods.

c. It was in the urban centers of Greece that interest groups proliferated to serve social, philanthropic, religious, cultural, and patriotic purposes. Such organizations, to the extent they brought together interested people from different social strata, may have helped to integrate a diverse society. Unfortunately, there is no information as to the composition of the membership of these groups. There were also trade organizations, professional societies, political organizations, and trade unions. These organizations, by their nature, tended to have conflicting interests; however, it was generally believed that such organizations lacked strength, because it was difficult to gain sustained cooperation from their membership. One report of a general strike in Thessalonike in 1936 indicated that the unions in northern Greece had some strength, but that they were not strong enough to extend the strike to Athens.¹⁰⁰

d. Although there are no statistics on the subject, McNeill points out that increased migration to the urban centers had produced a group of unskilled unemployed and an educated group that were unemployed, underemployed, or employed in menial--therefore distasteful--jobs. There were evidently insufficient unskilled jobs in the few industries, the many handicraft factories, or in the many stores to absorb the unskilled who moved to the cities in search of better economic conditions than they found in their villages.¹⁰¹ The educated stayed in the towns to which they went for education or congregated in larger urban areas seeking white collar positions, primarily with the Government, or opportunities to practice their professions. Further, those with some money tried to go into business for themselves, making a proliferation of small stores and shops all vying for a somewhat limited number of customers. Many urban residents therefore found it difficult to earn a

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decent living or were employed in jobs that they did not consider commensurate with their educational attainment--conditions which bred discontent.

66. Major cultural characteristics. A basic cultural characteristic of the Greek people, which permeated his personal and family life and extended to his community and nation, was termed "philotimo." It literally means "love of honor" and may be thought of as the esteem which one holds for himself, for his family, for his community, and for his nation.¹⁰²

a. The concept implies that "it is sheer being which is respected, not position in the world or achievement."¹⁰³ From this, an egalitarian view of society developed in which one individual was considered to be no better than another, nor one family, or community. Philotimo was easily bruised or molested, thus one did not disclose individual, family, community, or national shortcomings. For example, a Greek would not brag about being a self-made man, since this would imply that his family was not able to help him; further, it impelled him to deny that his community or nation could not progress because of internal or systemic inadequacies--rather, he saw his and his nation's problems as the result of influences over which Greeks had no control.¹⁰⁴ Retribution was taken against a person who attempted to discredit an individual, his family, community, or nation. Retribution might be physically violent or more subtle. The essence of philotimo was characterized by Dorothy Lee as inviolability and freedom. Thus, it was difficult to establish a hierarchical structure among Greeks; rather, their relationships were a tenuous compact among equals.

b. The implications of philotimo led to somewhat hostile relations, since everyone wanted to enhance his esteem and would not hesitate to accomplish this at the expense of someone else. Relationships within the family were exempt from such conflict. Material success was important, because this brought prestige to the family and permitted the successful individual to bestow largesse on other members of the family and his village. A Greek who achieved success through cunning and deceit was considered very clever as long as he was honest with his family.¹⁰⁵

c. Because of the strong sense of individualism and freedom embodied in philotimo, Greeks perceived laws in terms of their effect on the individual and his family rather than on the community. Therefore, if a law was contrary to his interests, he did not feel obligated to obey it and, in fact, took pleasure in circumventing such laws.¹⁰⁶

d. As indicated above, the Greeks valued education both for its own sake and as an important vehicle for social and occupational mobility. Although the majority of the population were farmers or

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shepherds, Greeks generally placed a much higher value on intellectual occupations than on those requiring physical labor. A village felt deprived if it had no school. And parents who could not afford to continue the education of their children also felt deprived.

e. The quality of diligence was valued with regard to work habits; however, diligence did not imply hurrying. Based, perhaps, on a work schedule dependent upon the growth and maturation of crops, the Greeks felt that hurrying was unnatural--one could not hurry the seasons--and somehow coercive. They would work long hours, especially when they were working for themselves, but were deliberate in their actions rather than hurried. They did not live by the clock and found it difficult to adjust to a routine of regular hours. They were unreliable by US standards in keeping appointments on time. It appears that they tried not to get caught up into a routine. A housewife, for example, would vary the time of day or day of the week during which she accomplished certain chores.¹⁰⁷

f. The Greeks placed a higher value on immediate improvement than on the more abstract goal of progress over a rather long period of time. In general, new crops were planted and new agricultural methods were accepted only after it was seen or heard that higher yields had resulted with the first planting. Therefore, there was little planning for the long-range future except for the certainties, such as dowries for daughters and providing an inheritance for sons.¹⁰⁸

g. Greek individualism tended to inhibit strong organizational development. This innocence of organizational procedure, along with the strong personal relationships developed within the extended family, influenced Greeks to seek out and trust personal relationships in all areas of their life. Nepotism was an accepted way of life, and a personal relationship with the civil authorities, along with a present at the proper time, could insure favorable treatment under the law or a turned head if some infraction had occurred.

h. The Greeks were also imbued with a strong sense of nationalism. Depending on their education, they had varying degrees of awareness of the glories of classical Greece, of the fight for independence against the Turks, and of the irredentist movement since independence. But all had some swariness and great pride in this history and were extremely sensitive about foreign claims to parts of Macedonia, Thrace, and the Islands.

67. Social factors conducive to conflict. Philotimo, a major cultural characteristic, contributed to suspicion and antagonism between individuals, families, and communities. It tended to inhibit a strong sense of social cohesion, because the concept did not support general

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collective action or civic response for the common good. On the contrary, philotimo provided a cultural sanction and motivation to violently oppose any person or group that threatened the reputation or physical well-being of an individual, family, community, or the Greek nation.

a. Population growth from 1923 to 1946 increased pressure on the land, which made it more difficult to provide adequate dowries and inheritance. Since providing adequately for sons and daughters was a matter of great pride, some tension undoubtedly developed in the increasing number of parents who found this difficult if not impossible. This also resulted in increasing the age at which a young couple married and prompted measures of birth control which could produce tension among the youth.

b. Dissident or potentially dissident groups were found in the larger urban areas. Many unskilled migrants from the villages contributed to a pool of urban unemployed. A sizable group of educated Greeks were disenchanted when they did not find positions in the cities which they considered to be commensurate with their education, and others were unhappy because they felt their salaries were not in line with their educational attainment. The skilled, the unskilled, and the educated flocked to the cities in search of economic opportunities, which resulted in overcrowding of the labor market at almost all levels, competition for jobs, depression of wages, and a marginal living for a great many urbanites.

c. Although the available information indicates that the Greeks were tolerant of minorities, relations with minorities which did not adhere to the Orthodox church or speak Greek were potentially conflict provoking. However, these small groups could not pose a serious future threat to Greece.

68. Basis for support of EAM/ELAS. The strong sense of nationalism coupled with philotimo motivated the Greeks to fight against the invaders and occupiers of Greece during World War II. The guerrilla bands that were organized in the mountains appealed to the patriotism of the recruit as well as promising increased personal and family welfare for the very poor mountain villagers. Many joined the guerrillas to relieve their families of an economic burden as well as for patriotic motives.¹⁰⁹

a. Both Woodhouse and McNeill contended that the guerrilla band a recruit would join was an accident of geography--where the band operated--or of time--which band got to the recruit first, if more than one was operating in the same general area. Their analysis seems reasonable, since the mountain villagers were more isolated and less well educated and informed than inhabitants of the towns and cities. Some

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of the youth from the plains villages also went into the hills, but the occupation forces probably made it difficult for large numbers of such youth to join the guerrillas. By the end of the occupation, ELAS was the largest guerrilla organization, by virtue of superior organization and leadership and a program of popular appeal, rather than because of its Communist ideology.

b. Most of the rank and file of ELAS had evidently been convinced that their leadership was patriotic and that their activities were in the best interests of the guerrillas and the country. Therefore, in 1944, they supported their leaders to oppose another "foreign invasion" by the British.

c. Liberation from occupying forces and the end of World War II did not bring economic relief to the mountain villages; in fact, little had changed for these families. Further, since the British had thwarted the Communists' bid for power in 1944, the country had no experience with a Communist regime. Thus, when their old friends, their wartime leaders, came back to the hills to recruit, there were many who were willing to follow.

Section II. Family and Social Class

by Jessie A. Miller, PhD

69. The family: traditional patterns. The family was the most important unit in the Greek social structure. The maintenance of its honor was a supreme social value, and to it the individual owed his complete loyalty. He was expected to do his utmost to insure family success and to do nothing to dim its reputation. It was said that a man could participate fully in the community only as the head of the household and the father of sons; similarly, a woman realized herself only in marriage and motherhood.¹¹⁰

a. The true significance of the family can be understood only in terms of the Greek concept of "self." Whereas in western Europe and America, a complex philosophy of individualism had developed, "self" as distinct from the group was incomprehensible in Greece. Nothing demonstrated the absence of the notion of an autonomous individual more dramatically than the lack of any word for privacy.¹¹¹ Furthermore, the right to privacy, one of the basic rights of an individual in the West, was lacking as a concept and was not part of the cultural pattern in Greece. Thus, "the priority of loyalty owed to membership groups" was "more than a statement about values; the very person existed only because of these groups," primarily the family, the kinship, and the village.

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b. Although there were some variations, especially between urban and rural areas, the family in general was organized along patriarchal, patrilocal, and bilineal lines. (The small upper-class elite followed the class patterns of the international social set and will not be analyzed here.) The authority of the father was clear at all times, but the mother was a powerful figure within the family and was usually consulted on matters of importance. Control of the children was tempered by benevolent affection and a deep respect for the individual.

(1) In the villages, residence with or near the husband's father was the common practice. The sons and their families frequently lived as an extended family until the father's death or retirement. In urban areas, separate homes for the elementary or nuclear family were more common.

(2) The bilineal kinship unit included in its network not only blood but "spiritual" relationships acquired through sponsors at weddings and christenings and affines or in-laws. Sponsors were chosen and marriages arranged with a view to increasing the prestige of the family and to establishing contacts with those who were in a position to assist in times of need.

c. The family formed a corporate economic entity, was a trustee for the welfare of its members, was the main agency for the socialization of the child, and was the chief source for the psychological and emotional security of the individual. In a long period in which one acute national crisis followed another, it was the one group upon which he could rely fully.

(1) As a corporate economic entity, the family members worked together to try to maintain or improve their common position.¹¹² In the rural areas, farm work was done as a group and the produce, controlled by the father, was used to meet the needs of the members. Even after the farm was divided, the brothers continued to assist each other in many ways. In the cities, most businesses were family enterprises. A Greek never ceased to have an economic claim on his family. Likewise, he never ceased to be responsible for contributing to it. It was not uncommon for a man to remain unmarried in order to support his widowed sister and her family. The need to assist relatives was one of the major causes of emigration.

(2) The family's prestige depended to a large extent on the degree to which it fulfilled its obligations as a trustee for the welfare of its members. The family conserved, accumulated, and transmitted wealth from one generation to another.¹¹³ A primary charge upon it was to arrange good marriages for the daughters (by providing adequate dowries) and to educate or give enough land to each son to enable him to support a wife and children. Property, both the man's inheritance and

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the wife's dowry, was administered by the husband as a trust--never for personal pleasure and not even, except in grave emergency, to meet living expenses.

(3) The concept of trusteeship included the duty of advancing family interests by assisting in the upward social mobility of its members. This might be done through financial aid, provision of room and board, the use of influence in gaining employment, or establishing economic or political contacts. A man who held a high position owed it to his family to find openings for his brothers and nephews. If he did not, he failed his family, he did not uphold the family "philotimo," he was not a good Greek.¹¹⁴ The family, as trustee, also had the responsibility of preserving the family honor. The male members, particularly the sons, were expected to protect the women, and all were to see that no members brought dishonor upon the group.

(4) The family was the primary agency for transmitting Greek cultural values to the next generation. Greek ethical conduct was personal. Parents agreed that children must be taught honesty, loyalty, and obedience; but this, of course, meant honesty, loyalty, and obedience in dealing with parents, relatives, and friends or people one valued as a person. Honesty in the abstract was not a virtue; it could be branded as foolishness. Profiteering and dealing in the black market were not condemned, because they circumvented only an impersonal Government. They were good in terms of the family to whom an individual owed his loyalty. Similarly, obedience was due to one's parents or older relatives. There was no obligation to obey the law; the guide here was expediency and the ability to circumvent.¹¹⁵ The importance of success and family honor, or fortitude, hardihood, and firm will was also stressed.

(5) In the process of socialization, the infant or small child received constant love and attention from other members of the family.¹¹⁶ He always was a part of the family group; he went visiting and to social gatherings with the family by day or by night. Thus, he learned to enjoy being with adults and to listen to their conversation--a conversation which was not trimmed down to meet his interests.¹¹⁷ He experienced a minimum of discipline during the first 4 years. The most common technique of social control was ridicule. A child was either admonished with the phrase, "Have you no shame?" or ridiculed as unworthy.¹¹⁸ He was also teased to make him suspicious of outsiders. More important than shaming or teasing was his observation of the behavior expected of other members of the family; for example, the deference paid the father and older relatives.¹¹⁹ From this he learned in terms of identification rather than of authority.¹²⁰

70. The Greek family: change and stability in the preconflict period. The Greek elementary family was a small, tightly knit group

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which, with the father as spokesman, faced the outside world as a single corporate entity. The patrilocal residence, the mutual aid, and shared activities created a strong community of interests. The devotion of its members to one another was not an artificial relationship. It grew out of working and being together. Thus, both its structure and its multifunctional nature gave the family an unusual stability.

a. Insofar as can be judged by available studies, the family of 1946 was surprisingly like that of 1923. The most important changes were the increasing age at marriage and the decrease in the size of the family. Both resulted from the demands of the dowry and inheritance system which, coupled with the high birth rate, were causing a fragmentation of landholding below the level necessary for even a subsistence standard of living.

b. There was a slight trend, mostly in urban areas, toward individual choice of marriage partner, more education for girls, and slightly greater contacts for women outside the family circle. Strangely, none of the postwar studies mentions any impact on the family of such war-related factors as Army conscription, the high casualty rate among the men, and youth involvement in guerrilla activities. Nor is the effect of the Metaxas youth movement discussed--a movement which urged children to inform against the "disloyal" activities of their parents. One might think these events had never occurred. Did they leave no trace in the traditional family system? Apparently, dependence on the family for psychological and physical security did offset the disruptive effect of increased mobility, propaganda, and war casualties. As Adamantia Pollis pointed out, the kinship system has shown an unusual ability to absorb new developments with few deleterious consequences.¹²¹

c. From the point of view of national stability, the Greek family was a source of both strengths and weaknesses. On the positive side, the sense of belonging, the absence of anomie, that grew out of the family was translated into an attachment for the Greek soil and nation, loyalty, and a pride in being Greek. Particularly in the movement from the country to the city, the network of interpersonal relations, consanguine and spiritual, eased the life of the young migrant and made his adjustment to the city life less difficult. To the extent that it satisfied the psychological needs of the individual, it contributed stability in a fluctuating political situation.

d. The visits between the city or town and country served a further purpose: rural values were reinforced in the city dwellers; new values and knowledge were transmitted to the village family. These shared values alleviated to some extent the growing cleavage between the country and the city.

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e. Another positive factor was the ambition of the average Greek family and its willingness to work hard as a corporate group to forward the interests of its members. Not all moved up the social ladder, but success was frequent enough to maintain a belief in the openness of the class system--not a small factor in the battle for the Greek mind.

f. Finally, the concept of the trustee family and the dowry and inheritance systems combined to encourage the exodus of "surplus" sons from the village. Some were unskilled, some went as operators of small businesses, others as professional men. Their presence in the city was not an unmixed blessing. Nonetheless, they were needed if Greece were to industrialize successfully.*

g. On the negative side, the family focused loyalty on itself and regarded the Government as an alien force to be circumvented when possible; its emphasis was on personalities rather than on party philosophies or principles; the patron system encouraged both nepotism and bossism. These traits contributed to political instability.

h. From an economic viewpoint, the dowry and inheritance systems led to fragmentation of landholdings which, in turn, made impossible the development of more efficient farming methods.

i. Finally, despite some need for labor, the movement to the cities increased the number of unemployed and was, at this particular time, a debit rather than an asset in the total political situation.

j. Additional background material on the Greek family is presented in annex B.

71. Social class. Marked variations in class structure are found between rural and urban areas. Some differences also exist between sheep-raising, farming, and fishing villages, but these are slight and do not merit separate consideration. In general, the larger the village or town, the greater was the degree of specialization, the wider the disparity in incomes, and the more complex the system of stratification.

72. Rural class structure. Greece is a country of small villages. Of nearly 11,000 settlements in 1940 (few people lived on isolated

*Writers on the industrialization of Japan stress as a great asset a family system which fed "surplus" sons to the city in an orderly way and provided a base for an entrepreneur class. The Greek system had the same potential but was not utilized by the Government.

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farms), half had populations of less than 300, and 96 percent had fewer than 1,500 inhabitants. Only 98 cities had populations in excess of 5,000 (although 24 percent of the population lived in Athens and other areas of over 20,000 population). It is, therefore, to the village that we must first look for a picture of the class structure. The class structure of the typical village was characterized by three significant traits: a notable lack of class consciousness; an open, as distinct from a closed, class system; and a close identification of family status with the behavior and accomplishments of its members.

a. "Foremost in the Greek's view of the self is his self-esteem."¹²² Every individual was conscious at all times of his philotimo, as an individual, as a member of a family, and as a Greek. Each felt himself to be equal in his philotimo to everyone else, neither superior nor inferior.¹²³ In the villages it was repeatedly said, "Everybody here is as good as everybody else. We have no class distinctions."¹²⁴ This did not mean that differences in status did not exist. They were, in fact, extremely important, and a major goal in life was to maintain or to improve one's position in the community.

But the Greek did not think in terms of class. It was with the individual family and the accomplishments of its members that he was concerned. If a man was "honourable in his conduct, a good neighbor, and legitimately born," he was entitled to be treated with a degree of respect and consideration that represented "a recognition of his social personality."¹²⁵ Class, in other words, did not exist in the mind of the average Greek citizen. The absence of landed aristocracy (the great estates had been broken up in the 19th century) and the general poverty of rural Greece, which prevented any great distinctions between the more prosperous and the poorer peasants, undoubtedly contributed to these egalitarian convictions.*

b. An open class system and a belief in social mobility was a second facet of the rural social structure. It was recognized that there were innate individual differences and that misfortune might strike anyone. But the conviction that a man of ability could advance his status through hard work or astuteness was firmly held. Most writers on Greece speak of the high degree of social mobility. "Any man can advance in status by his own accomplishments."¹²⁸ Although no quantitative research has been done on this point, the studies of village life consistently show mobility from the farm to higher prestige positions in the towns and cities or overseas. There was also considerable movement both up and down the social scale within the community itself.

*The typical Greek peasant is a small landowner who cultivates his own crops and who seldom hires any labor. Gibbard estimated in 1944 that 94 percent of the farmers had landholdings too small to guarantee a subsistence level.¹²⁶ In 1928, 90 percent of the country's 953,000 holdings were less than 12.5 acres.¹²⁷

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c. The chief avenues of advancement were the education of one's sons (education was valued both for itself and because it led to highly esteemed occupations), "good" marriages for the daughters, and the improvement of one's economic position. Money was not desired so much to raise the family standard of living as to promote status advancement through education and advantageous marriages. It also enabled a man to gain influence by granting favors; i.e., establishing patron-client relationships.* The more successful men added to their prestige by building libraries, clinics, and monuments in the villages of their birth.¹²⁹ Downward family mobility was a consequence primarily of economic disabilities: adverse agricultural conditions, poor management, the misfortune of having too many daughters whose dowries had first claim on family property, or the subdivision of the land among sons into plots too small to be economically viable.

d. The third facet of the class structure, the close identification of family status with the behavior and accomplishment of its members, is implicit in the entire Greek social system. It is virtually impossible for the Greek to think of himself apart from his family.¹³⁰

e. It is clear that, despite the lack of class consciousness, some families were at the top of the social scale, others were generally recognized to be at the bottom, and still others could be loosely placed in between according to the social values of the community.¹³¹ These criteria varied from place to place, but, generally speaking, they were (in order of rank) education, occupation, money, family name, approved achievements, community activities, and origin.¹³²

f. In the social hierarchy, the priest and the teachers were usually accorded a high position. Since other prestige occupations were practiced only in the towns and cities, few other educated persons remained in the village. Thus, the priest and the schoolteacher formed the primary link between the illiterate or semiliterate population and the written mass media.¹³³ The rural police chief and the owner of the local tavern or coffeeshop (with a radio) also gained status because of

*Greeks go in debt for subsistence and what they consider necessities. They do not like to borrow for luxuries or to create wealth. If they have enough for necessities, any rise in income is sheer surplus. As a rule, it does not raise the living standard. The Greek likes his life; he does not see why he should give up his lunch of cheese and bread just because he now can afford roast lamb every day. Such things belong to festive occasions. The surplus will be put back into the business, or saved intact for the family, or given in beneficence. The wealthy Greek "of good family" who has been properly brought up is not distinguished by luxurious living, since luxury is soft and ostentatious. He is distinguished by his gifts to his country or village.

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their function of passing information to the villagers.¹³⁴ Sometimes there were one or two outstanding families whose members were treated with great deference.

g. In most small villages, there were no tradesmen or craftsmen. Therefore, apart from the individuals named above, the population could be roughly arranged along a continuum of more or less successful farmers. Most owned some land. A very small minority formed a landless proletariat who lived by hiring out as day laborers on other farms. In some localities, as much as a third of the population subsisted in such a way, but this was not typical.¹³⁵ Those who had little or no land ranked low in the social scale.

h. The more successful farmers tended to be persons of influence. However, a well-to-do man was an "opinion leader" only if he was considered to have proved his ability.¹³⁶ "We respect a man more if he is honorable than if he is rich," stated several villagers. "Even an uneducated man who is a good farmer and has good judgment and is honorable can have influence."¹³⁷

i. One exception to the concept of equality stood out: the position in many villages of the Vlachs or seminomadic shepherds. For centuries, the Vlachs had led their flocks alternately down to the plains and up to the mountains according to the seasons. After World War I, the settlement of refugees from Asia Minor and more intensive farming techniques progressively reduced the area of grasslands available in the plains. This forced many of the leading shepherd families to reduce the size of their herds.* As lease rights became more and more difficult to obtain, the Government ordered the shepherds' names added to the rolls of either the summer or winter villages of their grazing grounds to guarantee them some rights to land. Traditionally, the Vlachs had built huts on the grounds they leased. Now, having the rights of citizenship, they bought houses in the village or built huts on its outskirts. The villagers resented the "uncivilized and uneducated" shepherds. Their open contempt and refusal to accord them the ordinary courtesies were a constant affront to the pride and sensitivity of Vlachs.¹³⁸ There were, at this time, in the neighborhood of 80,000 Vlachs in Greece, and, like true Greeks, they considered themselves inferior to none. The disappearance of the grazing lands, thus, had several effects on the Vlach's social status. By decreasing the wealth of the leading men, it created greater equality within the group; at the same time, the shepherds were severely conscious of a loss of status in their contacts with others.

*Before 1922, it was not exceptional for a man to own 2,000 sheep. By 1955, a flock of 500 was considered large.

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73. Urban class structure. Although Greece was a monarchy, it had no hereditary nobility. Traditionally, however, there had been a small group of aristocratic families who formed the core of an Athens-based elite; the "upper crust" of Greek society. These families traced their descent from distinguished forebears: the elite of the old Byzantine Empire; high civil officials of the Ottoman Empire; the Greek-speaking rulers of Rumanian principalities under the Sultans; the leaders of the War of Independence; and the great landlords who, when their estates were broken up by the land reforms of the 19th and 20th centuries, moved to the city and found new sources of income. Most of these families had substantial wealth based on industry, real estate, or shipping. Many had been educated abroad and were closely linked with the international society of the West. Associated with them were a few individuals of high political and military position and a small group of wealthy business families, a substantial number of whom had made fortunes abroad in shipping or Egyptian cotton.¹³⁹

a. From the establishment of an independent Greece until the early years of the 20th century, this class dominated the National Government. Some retained village ties and commanded the loyalty of the local peasants. Their power, however, had been gradually undermined by the breaking up of the large estates and by the development of a substantial urban population.¹⁴⁰ In 1923, they still formed one of the dominant political groups in the nation. As a group, they were class conscious and anxious to maintain their exclusive position. By 1946, another group of wealthy, socially aspiring families had appeared on the fringe of the elite. During the war they had amassed considerable fortunes as black marketeers or as collaborators. Most were of peasant stock, and few had as yet succeeded in reaching positions of influence.¹⁴¹ Their place in the hierarchy is difficult to ascertain.

b. The main challenge to the power position of the elite came from the upper middle class: public officials, the higher civil servants, well-to-do merchants, lawyers, doctors, Greek Orthodox clergy, educators, other intelligentsia, and military officers. These individuals exerted tremendous influence on public opinion throughout the country. They were listened to and accorded prestige because of their education and occupations. Also, many had been born in the Provinces, had established patron relationships with the villagers, and were able to control their votes in return for favors granted. Others were first or second generation refugees from Asia Minor whose education and training enabled them to achieve success in the professional or business world. This upper middle class had developed a degree of group identity but was by no means a closed circle. Most writers report a great deal of social mobility, though there are no quantitative studies on this point.¹⁴²

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c. At the next lower level of the class structure were the traders and shopkeepers, lower ranking civil servants, craftsmen, and skilled laborers. Many in this lower middle class were migrants from the rural areas. Their move to the city constituted for them a first step in upward mobility. The greater excitement of city life and the prestige accorded them by rural relatives was at least some recompense for the low income and austere living conditions which were their usual lot. Even those who were born in the city tended to maintain a close affiliation with the villages from which they came. People in this stratum of society had not developed a sense of close identity. Like their rural kinfolk, they emphasized the equality of all Greeks. At the same time, a sharp status line was drawn between manual and nonmanual labor.

d. The urban working class was comprised of unskilled workers, domestic servants, and the lowest grade of public and private employees. Because of low industrialization, this group was still comparatively small in 1946. Its most permanent element consisted of first and second generation Greek repatriates from Asia who had no rural ties, had not wished or had been unable to acquire land, and had remained in the city as a subemployed and destitute group.

e. The military did not comprise a special social class. Few members of the wealthier classes chose a military career, although some were attracted to the Navy. Most officers were probably from the lower middle class. However, many came from poor families both rural and urban. Some of these, such as Georgios Kondylis and Nikolaos Plastiras, attained the highest positions not only in the military but in the political structure of the country.

74. Class and social change. The three major events of the period under study were the integration of the Greeks from Asia Minor into the nation, the economic depression of the 1930's, and the occupation of the country by the Germans during World War II. What effect did these developments have on the class structure? Conversely, how did the class structure affect the Greek response to these events?

a. The incorporation of the Asiatic migrants into the body politic was accomplished more smoothly than might have been expected. In the rural areas, at least, such animosities as arose were, for the most part, of an ethnic rather than a class nature. The resettlement of the newcomers did, however, cause economic hardships and loss of status among the Vlachs. Thus, it may have contributed indirectly to the guerrilla activities of some mountain people.

b. In the cities, many refugees were successfully assimilated into the middle class. Their lack of identification with either

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the elite or the villagers added to the growing class consciousness of the middle strata and strengthened that group in the power struggle with the elite. The less successful migrants who were not absorbed into the economy swelled the numbers at the lowest end of the scale and became one of the more aggressively dissident elements in the city.

c. The depression and World War II sent thousands of rural people to the towns and cities in search of greater security and relief supplies.¹⁴³ Apparently, this had little effect on the rural social structure.* In the cities, on the other hand, the growing number seeking employment and housing increased the tensions and disaffection already existing at the lower working-class level. Many rural migrants were originally from property-holding families. They now found themselves "disclassed," destitute, and with little to look forward to. "Disclassed individuals in this social group of uncertain size" were "apt to be receptive to revolutionary and Utopian ideas."¹⁴⁴

d. The middle class, too, was adversely affected. Wartime inflation wiped out the savings of many families, made many pensioners destitute, and destroyed much of the capital of lenders and creditors. At the same time, the growth of a wealthy group of war profiteers aroused an open resentment not usually shown by Greeks toward those with money. The gap between the rich and the poor was now much greater than it had been,¹⁴⁵ and the danger of cleavage along class lines increased.

e. How did "class" affect the Greek response to these events? Throughout most of this period, at least until World War II, the Greek's lack of class consciousness, his belief in the opportunity for upward mobility, his philotimo, his sense of equality contributed significantly to the reduction of personal and intergroup tensions and was an asset to national morale; a stabilizing and unifying factor.

f. Lack of class consciousness did not, however, close either the rural or the city dweller's eyes to political and social issues. Nor did it prevent the development of a strong radical strain. Sir Reginald Leeper, the British wartime Ambassador, stated that there was a strong radical strain among the peasants "but it was a reform radicalism" not one "based on class."¹⁴⁶ Similarly, a team of American investigators reported that while the less prosperous peasants tended to move to the hills and the left, and the more prosperous to the plains and the

*On this topic there is a singular lack of information. Campbell, in his thorough study of the Sarakatsani, a shepherd group in the mountain community of Zagoni, does not mention either the war or communism. Other writers, including Sanders, McClellan, Gray, and Friedl, likewise ignore the question. McClellan discusses the effect of the war on urban but not on rural class structure.

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political right, this was more a matter of fear and location than of political dogma.¹⁴⁷ (The poorer farms tended to be in the more hilly sections; the better in the plains.) Absence of class and other Greek cultural traits did immunize some against Communist ideology--although by 1946 it was by no means clear that the struggle was ideological in nature. In any case, "feelings of equality" had become inconsequential, submerged by the realistics of the class structure. The extremes of wealth in Athens and poverty in the rural areas, the weakened economic position of the middle class, the impoverished and rootless state of the working class had become significant issues for agitation and social unrest.

Section III. Public Health Factors

by Thora W. Halstead, PhD

75. Introduction.

a. During the 1920's and 1930's, the Greek birth rate was one of the highest in Europe. Simultaneously, infant and child mortality rates and general death rates far exceeded those of western Europe; therefore, the net population increase was relatively modest. Nutritionally, too, Greece lagged behind most of Europe, and the average peasant diet was marginal even before World War II brought famine.¹⁴⁸ This section examines the remedial actions taken by the Greek Government and others to alleviate these problems and to ascertain the impact the problems and the programs had on the Greek people, particularly with regard to conflict.

b. Illness in the family was looked upon as a very social function. The patient was never left alone; family members and friends kept an almost constant crowd about the sick person. Human companionship was believed to be an absolute good by the Greek peasant, and it was especially important that a person not be left alone when he was in the vulnerable state of illness. Only if the illness continued for an unexpectedly long time or became extremely acute was the assistance of a doctor contemplated, and the doctor was viewed with suspicion as an outsider who might outsmart and take advantage of the family. Traditionally, hospitalization was viewed as a form of desertion of the sick person by the members of his family. The number of hospitals, especially small private hospitals, did not increase appreciably until after the end of the Greek war in 1949.¹⁴⁹

76. Birth rates. During the period 1921 to 1925, an estimated average birth rate of 23.0 and death rate of 16.5 per 1,000 inhabitants resulted in an approximate 0.7 percent average annual natural increase

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of population.* Records indicate the next 10 years brought an increase in the birth rate to approximately 30 per 1,000 (table XII), but this rise more likely reflects improved recording of vital statistics. The years 1935 to 1940 brought a steadily declining birth rate. In 1939, however, the Greek birth rate of 25 per 1,000 was one of the highest in Europe, exceeded only by Rumania, Yugoslavia, Albania, and Portugal. High infant mortality and death rates acted to control this overpopulation trend, but the average natural increase of population between 1926 and 1940 was still 1.3 percent. In 1951, World Health Organization estimates of birth and death rates for the years 1941-46 indicated a population increase that was unconfirmed by the 1951 census. Nevertheless, these estimative statistics have value, for they portray the yearly variation in both births and deaths during the troubled 1940's.¹⁵⁰

77. Social factors affecting birth rates. High infant mortality and death rates acted to check overpopulation. Malaria was a leading killer, and it remained so until a malaria control program, which included the use of DDT, was initiated in 1946.¹⁵¹

a. Government land programs unintentionally affected the population. In rural Macedonia in the late 1920's, children were compelled by their parents to marry at an early age, because farmland was assigned by the Refugee Settlement Commission according to husband and wife family units.¹⁵²

b. Conversely, scarcity of usable land provoked population control. It was the custom to divide the family possessions, including farmland, equally among all the children. Obviously, such a division among members of a large family reduced each member's lot to a life more poverty-stricken than that of his parents before him. The generation over 40 in 1947 still believed the traditional value of children outweighed the disadvantages, and some attempted to circumvent the problem by bequeathing all their land to the eldest son and educating the others to earn a living in the city.¹⁵³ This practice was still the solution for many even in 1965.¹⁵⁴ In 1947, the growing recognition and pressure of poverty had stimulated the younger generation to question the desirability of having many children.

c. Although mechanical birth control methods were generally unknown, the peasants apparently desired information. A birth control

*Vital statistics were not recorded from 1891 to 1920. In the latter year, civil registration was made compulsory; but the law was not enforced for births until January 1925. By 1927, records were fairly complete, and only an estimated 1.7 percent of the population was not covered by vital statistics. War precluded compilation of records in 1941-48, and only estimative data were used for those years.

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TABLE XII. VITAL STATISTICS

<u>Years</u>	<u>Birth rates per 1,000 inhabitants</u>	<u>Death rates per 1,000 inhabitants</u>	<u>Infant mortality rates per 1,000 live births</u>
1921-25	23.0	16.5	86
1926-30	30.2	16.6	96
1931-35	29.5	16.5	122
1936-38	26.9	14.6	112
1939	25.0	14.0	118
1940	24.0	12.7	101
1941*	13.4	24.4	---
1942*	14.1	42.3	---
1943*	22.8	13.9	---
1944*	29.5	18.7	---
1945*	31.6	12.8	---
1946*	31.0	12.3	---

Source: World Health Organization, Annual Epidemiological and Vital Statistics, 1939-46, pp 21, 25, 27.

*Provisional or estimative data.

information program conducted by an American nurse in Macedonia between 1938 and 1941 was received with growing enthusiasm. By 1947, these avenues had not relieved the population pressure on rural Greece, and the life of the peasant was noticeably poorer than it had been 30 years before.¹⁵⁵ Neither the Greek Orthodox Church, to which almost the entire population of the country adhered, nor the Greek Government took any position regarding birth control.¹⁵⁶

d. In rural Greece, the old mores had a decided effect on population growth. A wife was known in terms of her success as a housekeeper, a worker, and a bearer of children; while for men, children were a proof of virility. Offspring were considered a sign of God's blessing. A fear of childlessness had had a sound economic basis throughout the centuries, for numbers of family members were one another's sole reliance. Poverty placed strict limits on charity, and responsibility to one's kin outranked all other claims.¹⁵⁷ Marriage was expected of and by all the women. Throughout the 1930's, Macedonian girls married when 15 or 16 and boys when 20-25 years of age.¹⁵⁸ In other parts of Greece, village girls married between the ages of 17 and 22, and by the age of 25 social pressure made them anxious to marry anyone.¹⁵⁹

78. Mortality rates. The massive refugee settlement program of the 1920's disrupted agriculture, impaired living conditions, and exposed both the refugees and indigenous population to additional risks

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of disease. Epidemics of typhus and dengue and outbreaks of plague and relapsing fever resulted. In addition, the refugees were settled in the most malarious sections of Greece, in Macedonia and Thrace. Yet, the general mortality rates recorded between 1921 and 1935 remained virtually unchanged at approximately 16.5 deaths annually per 1,000 inhabitants, while infant mortality rates recorded in the 1920's were lower than in any of the subsequent years of the study.

a. The events of the 1920's suggest that deaths were incompletely recorded at that time. A life table computed in 1928 indicated the mean expectation of life at birth was 49.09 years for men and 50.89 years for women. These figures were similar to the life expectations in the United States and England in 1901-10.¹⁶⁰

b. The records of the 1930's, which are considered quite accurate, showed the general death rate had dropped throughout the country (tables XIII and XIV), while the infant mortality rate remained unchanged. It should be noted, however, that death rates remained consistently higher in Thrace, Macedonia, and Epirus. While large numbers of refugees had been settled in Thrace and Macedonia, Epirus had not been confronted with this problem.¹⁶¹ Only estimates are available for the 1940's.

TABLE XIII. DEATH RATES PER 1,000 INHABITANTS BY REGIONS

<u>Division</u>	<u>1925^a</u>	<u>1930^b</u>	<u>1938^c</u>
Thrace	20.7	20.8	15.4
Macedonia	15.9	19.9	13.9
Epirus	15.6	16.0	14.8
Thessaly	14.7	18.5	13.1
Ionian Islands	14.8	13.5	13.9
Crete	9.9	11.8	11.9
Cyclades Islands	17.2	13.2	11.0
Aegean Islands	13.9	13.1	11.7
Peloponnesus	14.4	14.9	12.8
Central Greece/Euboea	15.6	15.0	13.2
Rural	13.3	16.2	12.8
City	<u>19.3</u>	<u>16.7</u>	<u>14.3</u>
Total	15.2	16.4	13.3

Sources: ^aStatistique Generale de la Grece, Statistique des Causes de Deces pendant l'annee 1925.

^bStatistique Generale 1930.

^cStatistique Generale 1938.

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79. Diseases of principal significance. Morbidity rates were not recorded in Greece, therefore, the incidence of disease could only be estimated from the existing mortality data. These records indicated the level of health in Greece between 1926 and 1946 was below that of every other European country except Bulgaria, Rumania, and Yugoslavia.

a. Mortality rates (table XIV) indicated that pneumonia, tuberculosis, influenza, diarrhea and enteritis, and malaria were the most serious health problems in Greece. These diseases are all associated with poor and unsanitary living conditions and habits, but they especially reflect the Government's failure in the health field. Malaria responded to community efforts to eradicate mosquitoes, and intestinal infections to community effort to provide sanitary water and waste systems. Tuberculosis is a byproduct of poor crowded housing. The many deaths attributed to senility or ill-defined causes illustrated the scarcity of medical personnel and the number of people unattended at the time of death.

b. Although malaria was a leading cause of death, the amount of disability it caused was a greater problem in Greece. The regions of Thrace, Macedonia, and Epirus were the most severely affected, but

TABLE XIV. DEATH RATES FOR SELECTED CAUSES/YEARS
(deaths per 100,000 population)

<u>Cause</u>	<u>1921</u>	<u>1923</u>	<u>1930</u>	<u>1935</u>	<u>1938</u>
Malaria	76.1	136.7	88.8	53.0	40.0
Tuberculosis (all forms)	140.6	171.1	162.2	137.4	116.6
Pneumonia	189.6	150.6	152.5	206.0	200.1
Bronchitis	18.0	21.7	16.4	13.9	13.5
Influenza and other respiratory causes	135.6	155.3	171.2	100.1	69.4
Diarrhea and enteritis	69.7	105.9	125.5	128.5	91.1
Congenital malformation and diseases peculiar to first year	55.5	59.2	59.6	62.0	54.8
Senility	183.2	171.4	151.4	144.8	131.0
Ill-defined/unknown causes	294.9	254.8	152.4	132.5	98.1
Total	1,580.9	1,784.0	1,634.7	1,493.0	1,328.0

Sources: Statistique General de la Grece, Statistique des Causes de Deces pendant l'anne 1921, 1923, 1930, and 1938.

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Malaria occurred throughout the country with only a few insignificant exceptions.¹⁶² An estimated one-fourth of all the people had malaria in the 1920's. The settlement of refugees in Macedonia and Thrace had resulted in large outbreaks of the disease. Antimalaria work was conducted in the 1930's by the Greek Government, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Near East Foundation.¹⁶³ By the late 1930's, malaria mortality rates had been cut in half, but there were still an estimated 600,000 cases a year. During the years of occupation, mortality data were not collected, but a survey was carried out after an exceptional epidemic in 1942. It indicated the incidence of malaria that year was equal to or greater than in prewar years. It was not until 1946 that an effective overall malaria control program was initiated.¹⁶⁴

c. Medical statistics of the 1920's indicated that approximately 0.17 percent of the population died annually from tuberculosis. Surveys of the same time period further stated that the actual number of deaths per year from tuberculosis was really more than twice the recorded number, and in Athens alone 400 of every 100,000 people died annually from the disease. In addition, an estimated 220,000 people, or approximately 3.6 percent of the population, was tubercular. As in other countries, the rates were higher in urban than in rural areas.¹⁶⁵ The influx of refugees to Athens, Thessalonike, and other cities undoubtedly increased the urban incidence of the disease.

d. By 1938, tuberculosis death rates had fallen to approximately 200 per 100,000 people in Athens and Thessalonike and 116 per 100,000 of the total Greek population. It was believed, however, that these records understated the incidence just as the records of the 1920's had.¹⁶⁶ The malnutrition and overcrowding that accompanied and followed World War II increased the occurrence of tuberculosis and the resultant death rate. In 1947, an estimated 3 percent, or 225,000 people, had tuberculosis, and 25,000 died from it each year.¹⁶⁷ After World War II, UNRRA offered to establish a 4,000-bed tuberculosis hospital in a former US Army barracks. The Greek Government declined the offer, and by 1947 nothing had been done to relieve the tuberculosis problem in the country.¹⁶⁸

80. Diet. The staple Greek diet consisted of dark bread, olives, olive oil, goat's milk and cheese, and homemade resinated wine. This was supplemented with vegetables, fruit, rice, macaroni, honey, and occasionally eggs and fish. The wealth of the family determined the quantity of fruit and vegetables and especially meat that was eaten.¹⁶⁹ Even in prosperous years, meat was eaten only once or twice a week and usually was lamb, mutton, or fowl.¹⁷⁰

a. Agricultural practices were generally primitive, and most of the arable land was divided into small holdings, which were worked by the peasant owner primarily to provide food for himself and his

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family.¹⁷¹ Because transportation was extremely difficult, villages, especially those in the mountains, subsisted solely on what was raised in their immediate area. As late as 1963 there was little information on storage space and refrigeration for the preservation of perishables in Greece, and food sanitation was not satisfactory outside the larger cities.¹⁷²

b. In the late 1930's, out of a total of 2,600 calories per capita per day, local production covered only 1,824 calories or 69.8 percent.¹⁷³ This diet of 2,600 calories a day was one of the lowest in Europe; in addition, it was particularly deficient in milk, dairy products, meat, and other high-protein foods.¹⁷⁴ Thus, it can be seen that the land as it was farmed did not meet the demands of the population. Both the contents of the average diet and the contents of the national average food supplies (table XV) showed that carbohydrates supplied most of the calories, while proteins furnished far too few. Progress was made during the 1930's to alleviate the food shortages precipitated by the large influx of refugees in the 1920's. With the advent of war in 1940, however, conditions dropped to a level below that of the previous 20 years.

TABLE XV. CONTENTS OF NATIONAL AVERAGE FOOD SUPPLIES
(person/day)

	<u>1935-38^a</u>	<u>1948-50^b</u>	<u>1959^b</u>
Calories	2,600	2,490	2,900
Total protein (grams)	84	76	93
Animal protein (grams)	23	17	27

Sources: ^aFAO, Second World Food Survey, Rome 1952, p 51.

^bFAO, State of Food and Agriculture, 1961, pp 167-169.

81. Malnutrition. Greek health statistics made no mention of any deficiency disease, such as rickets, beri-beri, scurvy, pellagra, or nutritional edema, but the existence of malnutrition was recorded in other writings. Instances of malnutrition and starvation occurred in Macedonia in the early 1930's, when tobacco crops could not be sold.¹⁷⁵ Hundreds of cases of pellagra occurred before the war in northern Greece.¹⁷⁶ and malnutrition was especially evident in children in many rural areas throughout the country.¹⁷⁷ However, food was apparently available at a minimal subsistence level, and nutritional inadequacy was exposed primarily in the high mortality rates of the diseases it abetted.

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a. During the years of occupation from 1941 to 1944, farming was interrupted, and animals were commandeered.¹⁷⁸ The average daily per capita consumption was reduced to 900-1,400 calories.¹⁷⁹ Famine began in August 1941, and an estimated 300,000 deaths had occurred within 2 years due to starvation (1 in 25 of the population). Children were most severely affected, and infant mortality rates in some areas were 90 percent.

b. Shipments of food from other countries and philanthropic organizations offered some relief for the situation in 1943; and after the liberation in 1944, the UNRRA food shipments raised the daily per capita consumption to 1,800 calories. Malnutrition continued through 1946, however, fostered by civil disturbances. It apparently was most severe in the northern areas where the guerrillas were most active.¹⁸⁰ Even the massive US aid program initiated in 1947 failed to raise the national average food supply to the level that existed between 1935 and 1938.

82. Popular awareness. The refugees who came to Greece in the 1920's were, for the most part, accustomed to a higher standard of living than the peasants of northern Greece, and their more modern methods of farming set a standard for the rural area.¹⁸¹ The Near East Foundation and the Greek Government itself worked throughout the 1930's to arouse the people's desire for better agricultural methods, better sanitation, better health, and better living conditions. Their programs were conducted primarily in northern Greece. Simultaneously, however, population pressure--due in large part to the refugee influx--caused the settlement of much of the land to which the peasants of the hill villages had annually migrated to farm and graze or find temporary employment. Competition for temporary jobs became acute and available land scarce. The hill people who depended upon temporary salaried labor to supplement the meager living they made from their poor land found themselves faced with a life poorer than their fathers before them. When war came, these hillsmen formed the backbone of the resistance force.¹⁸² It was these discontented people and others who, seeing no prospect of raising their lowered standard of living, were attracted by the revolutionary slogans and appeals.¹⁸³

83. Water supply. Water played an important role in determining the location of the old rural villages. Before modern well-drilling techniques were known, it was difficult or impossible to obtain water throughout the year in the plains; in addition, the plains were the most malarious areas. With the influx of refugees in the 1920's, the plains were settled despite the malaria, and wells were located throughout the area. Wells were drilled in such profusion in Macedonia, in fact, that their uncontrolled flow produced unwanted swampland, until a method was found in the 1930's to control the water's flow.¹⁸⁴ The main objective,

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therefore, regarding water during the 1920's and 1930's was to provide an adequate supply rather than investigate the purity of existing sources.

a. The water supply for most of rural Greece appears to have followed a set pattern. The typical village was supplied with water by a stone water trough, fed by a well or spring, and located in the middle of the principal lane. The girls and women drew their families' water supply in pails and pitchers and carried it home.¹⁸⁵ Little effort was made to protect the wells or springs from contamination.

b. Although the water supplies of most of the cities were either contaminated or inadequate, very few improvements were made between 1923 and 1946. Athens was the only city to receive a new water supply. An exemplary reservoir was built in 1931; and the water, which was exceptionally pure at its source, was further filtered and chlorinated before distribution. Before the Marathon Dam and reservoir were completed, Athens had received its water supply via a repaired Roman aqueduct, and spring water had been sold in jars for drinking.¹⁸⁶

84. Waste disposal. Greece had no satisfactory waste disposal system. In 1946, even Athens and Piraeus had no system for sewage disposal, and soil was grossly contaminated with backing cesspools.¹⁸⁷ In rural areas, an outside privy was generally considered an unnecessary luxury by the average peasant family, and even schools were frequently without toilet facilities. In addition, garbage was promiscuously disposed of, open dump heaps were located in the middle of villages, and dead animals were only partially buried or not covered at all. Wells and springs were insufficiently protected from this contamination. All these practices resulted in widespread intestinal disorders, including much dysentery and frequent outbreaks of typhoid.¹⁸⁸

85. Sanitation programs. Although the standards of sanitation were deplorable throughout the 1920's and 1930's, the Greek Government, with the aid of the Rockefeller Foundation and the Near East Foundation, succeeded in developing an improvement program.

a. In 1931, the Rockefeller Foundation organized a School of Hygiene in Athens, where short intensive courses were given in the fundamentals of practical sanitation. Independently, the Near East Foundation established a rural sanitation "self-help" program in Macedonia in 1932. Both organizations applied themselves not only to improving water supplies and promoting sanitary waste disposal but to malaria control as well. By 1937, the Near East Foundation's pilot program had proved so successful that it was incorporated into the Ministry of Hygiene. Preparations were being made to expand the project when the invasion of Greece halted the entire program.

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b. The people who established these sanitary programs recognized that lack of community and home sanitation was one of the major contributing factors to the high incidence of disease in the country. Unfortunately, this knowledge was not shared by the general public, and sanitation was something almost entirely unknown.¹⁸⁹ Under these conditions, it is very doubtful that the average person felt the need for change; and the sanitation programs, or lack of them, probably did not influence his attitude toward the Government.

86. Malaria control. The only malaria control programs were the ones just mentioned, initiated and supported by the philanthropic foundations. Only a small area was affected by the programs, and very little was accomplished at that time in the late 1930's, because of a lack of DDT. In 1946, with the aid of UNRRA, a countrywide malaria control program using DDT was started, and it produced striking results within the first year.

87. Health facilities, personnel, and programs. In 1928, the Greek Government undertook the reorganization of its health services. It requested and received the aid of the League of Nations and a commission of experts, who elaborated a reform program which the Greek Government adopted. The program was followed until the Italian invasion of 1940, but it progressed unnecessarily slowly because of the clash of vested interest, frequent changes of administration, and even more frequent changes of the Minister of Health and Public Assistance. One of the main recommendations, a School of Hygiene in Athens, was established in 1931 with the assistance of the Rockefeller Foundation.

a. By 1940, the Ministry of Health and Public Assistance controlled the health services. Its Minister was advised by a Supreme Health Council, and the Ministry had three departments. A Department of Public Health was responsible for the prevention of infectious disease, port health, maternal and child welfare, supervision of hospitals and the medical profession, and medical treatment for the poor. The Department of Public Assistance was responsible for abandoned children, orphans, and the poor; the philanthropic organizations; public institutions; and pensions and assistance to war victims. The Department of Public Relief was concerned with unemployment, housing, and refugee care. A full one-third of the Ministry's 1935-36 budget of Dr733 million was spent on pensions and assistance to war victims.¹⁹¹

b. During the occupation in World War II, the Ministry was stripped of its welfare responsibilities, and a large share of the public funds expended for welfare services was spent by private agencies. UNRRA entered Greece in October 1944 and supplied the Greek Government, the Greek War Relief Association, and the Near East Foundation in their antimalaria and antituberculosis campaigns, rehabilitation of hospitals

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and nurses' training, care of the physically disabled, and welfare services.¹⁹²

88. Medical training programs and personnel. The University of Athens medical faculty had facilities in anatomy, physiology, pharmacology, and pathology. Its building and facilities were updated during the 1930's, and it was said to provide a fairly high standard of medical education by 1940. By 1938, the School of Hygiene in Athens had divisions of microbiology and serology, epidemiology and statistics, malariology and tropical diseases, public health, social hygiene, sanitary engineering, and meteorology and climatology in relation to public health. The school also held postgraduate courses for medical health officers and courses for sanitary inspectors. The Ambelokipi Health Center attached to the School of Hygiene provided practical training for health officers and public health nurses. Training schools for nurses were attached to many hospitals, but the most noteworthy were the Greek Red Cross Society Hospital and the Evangelismos Hospital, both located in Athens.¹⁹³ Greece had 5,084 doctors, 1,151 pharmacists, 589 dentists, and 487 midwives in 1929.¹⁹⁴ In 1938, there were only 6,500 practicing physicians, of whom 1,800 were located in Athens-Piraeus.¹⁹⁵ It is doubtful that the doctors increased in number during the 1940's.

89. Medical facilities and services. The Refugee Settlement Commission established 59 dispensaries throughout rural Macedonia in the 1920's. Each had a physician, pharmacist, and limited stock of drugs. Their major activity was the treatment of malaria by the distribution of quinine.¹⁹⁶

a. Hospital accommodations were provided by Government institutions, municipal health authorities, and philanthropic societies. In 1929, there were 120 hospitals in all, with a total of 10,967 beds or 1.76 beds per 1,000 inhabitants.¹⁹⁷ The number of hospitals dropped to 117 in 1939, but they contained 16,022 beds or 2.22 beds per 1,000 people. These figures, however, included all the specialized hospitals for tuberculosis, venereal disease, infectious diseases, leprosy, mental illness, etc. Therefore, the actual hospital accommodations for general patients were approximately one-half the given figures.¹⁹⁸

b. When the war broke out in 1940, the organization of local health centers was still in the developmental stage. Health centers had been set up in each "nomos," and they were or were to be responsible for all the health activities in the "nomoi." There were seven centers staffed by a medical hygienist, a deputy, three part-time medical practitioners, four visiting nurses, and three sanitary inspectors. The remainder of the centers were staffed by one medical hygienist and two sanitary inspectors.

c. The Ambelokipi Health Center served as a model health service, but it served only part of Athens. Its activities included

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prenatal work, maternal and child welfare work, school hygiene, dental care, control of communicable diseases, sanitation, vital statistics, health education, and propaganda. The port health service consisted of ship fumigation equipment at Piraeus.¹⁹⁹ The Hellenic Pasteur Institute conducted medical research and manufactured sera and vaccines, while bacteriology laboratories in Athens and Thessalonike were directed by the Ministry of Health.

d. School medical service was under the control of the Ministry of Education. In 1938, 52 medical officers and three nurses were responsible for the medical inspection of schools and the vaccination and health protection of the school children.

90. Public health education. Public health education was begun by the Near East Foundation in 1930 in Macedonia. The program included home welfare as well as sanitation. Home welfare was interpreted to include training in personal hygiene, child care, first aid, and disease prevention. When the impending war forced the Foundation to leave Greece in 1938, the director, Harold B. Allen, evaluated the accomplishments of the previous 10 years. The sanitation program had reached its goal. It had exposed the field of rural sanitation; demonstrated means of improving water supplies, waste disposal, and malaria control; and its methods had been incorporated into the health and welfare programs of Greece. The home welfare program, however, was "a little too far ahead of the times and the place." This was not because of the attitude of the common people toward improved home practices, but rather because of the failure of the Government to visualize home health education as an essential in rural development.²⁰⁰

91. Drug addiction and intoxicants. During the 1930's, small doses of opium were used to quiet young children in Macedonia, thereby freeing the mothers for work in the fields.²⁰¹ The origin of this practice, the extent of its use, and the time period it was practiced have not been well-documented. It can only be assumed that this dearth of information implied the insignificance of the problem. About this same time, the League of Nations found drugs not to be a problem in Greece, although hashish was raised locally in some areas.

a. In 1943, British Naval Intelligence reported that drug addiction in Greece was serious, and more than a thousand drugtakers were confined in public asylums. Hashish was used by the working classes, while the well-to-do preferred morphine and cocaine.²⁰²

b. Although the British report appears to have exaggerated the use of drugs in Greece, legislation was provided in 1949 for the establishment of a special institution for the treatment of drug addicts, and registration and treatment of addicts became compulsory.²⁰³ The use of drugs was never associated with either civil unrest or violence.

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c. The Greek people as a whole were temperate people; the yearly drinking per person was thought to be about 44 pints of wine. The wine drunk usually contained only about 10-11 percent alcohol.²⁰⁴

92. Summary and conclusions.

a. Population pressure reduced the landholdings of the individual peasants, and no Government program had been put forth or family custom changed sufficiently to relieve this pressure. The pressure for land had intensified so rapidly that the deterioration of living conditions was obvious to the average peasant. The people living in the hill villages of northern Greece were the ones most adversely affected, and they subsequently were the people who responded most avidly as war-time resistance fighters and later as Communist guerrillas.

b. Plans had been developed by the Greek Government, with the help of the League of Nations and philanthropic organizations, to improve medical services and sanitation. The few accomplishments that did transpire were initiated in the late 1930's and destroyed in the early 1940's. For the most part, the peasants were unaware of a need for these programs; therefore, the absence of such programs did not stimulate dissent.

c. Neither drugs nor alcohol had any impact on the Greeks, but food and the lack of it did. The average peasant's diet was less than adequate in the late 1930's and reached starvation dimensions in the 1940's. Again, the hill people were the most destitute and desperate. In 1935, the Greek Communist Party called the people to join the fight to defeat the "government of hunger."²⁰⁵ "In the wartime resistance movement the inhabitants of the hill villages found a sort of economic relief, inasmuch as the guerrilla bands lived by raiding the plains, taking by force a part of the agricultural surplus of those regions in order to feed themselves."²⁰⁶ Thus, lack of food, and population pressure which expressed itself in lack of food, were the most obvious signs to the peasant that his life was less than he expected it to be. The guerrillas drew their greatest numbers from those so disenchanted.

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CHAPTER 5

MILITARY FACTORS

by Colonel R. T. Tierno, Jr.

Section I. Military Forces

91. General. Greece's military forces consisted of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; with the King as the supreme commander. Although each arm functioned under a separate Ministry, General Jean Metaxas held the portfolios of all three from 1936 until his death in 1941. The Ministers of War, Air, and Marine constituted the Supreme Council of National Defense over which the Prime Minister usually presided. The council was responsible for all decisions on national defense matters in peacetime as well as wartime, but the degree of effectiveness of its decisionmaking depended on the amount of cooperation received from the separate Ministries.

92. The Army. The Greek Army was completely destroyed by the Germans in 1941 and was not reorganized during their occupation. A new Greek National Army was hastily formed in 1946, with the assistance of a British military mission, to counter the threat posed by guerrilla bands of the Communist-controlled National People's Liberation Army.

a. Under the Constitution, the Minister of War was the Commander-in-Chief of the Army in peacetime. In wartime, a Supreme Commander of the Army was selected by the King with the advice of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. The superior military council, composed of six division generals (including the Chief of Staff) and presided over by the Minister of War, established policy for the Army's organization, training, defense measures, and works only during peacetime. The Chief of Staff had a general staff (69 officers in 1939) modeled on the French system of four bureaus or departments: G-1, Personnel; G-2, Intelligence; G-3, Operations; and G-4, Supply. In 1939 there were 10 Inspectors General: two for corps and one each for military schools and the infantry, artillery, cavalry, engineers, supply, finance, and medical service branches. All had their headquarters in Athens. The Army was organized tactically into corps, divisions, and cavalry brigades without separate armies. Army organization was very similar to the classic European organization, with all efforts directed to meeting the external threat.

(1) The corps was both territorial and tactical. Peacetime corps organization called for a headquarters; one regiment each of

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field and heavy artillery, cavalry, engineers, and antiaircraft artillery; two air cooperative squadrons; one military hospital unit; one battalion of medical troops; one motor transport group; and two to four infantry divisions. Actually, no two corps were alike. The corps stationed at Athens did have a full complement of troops, but shortages existed along with unequal distribution throughout the Army. There were only two heavy artillery regiments and five air cooperative squadrons for the four corps: two corps had two cavalry regiments each, and one corps had none.

(2) There were 14 divisions, 13 of which were assigned to corps and one, an independent division, located opposite Albania. Peacetime division organization included one infantry regiment and one or two separate infantry battalions, one mountain artillery group (battalion), one military hospital unit, and two mobilization centers. The divisions also had shortages. There was no transport at division (it was concentrated at corps in one motor transport group), and at least two divisions had no artillery. The wartime transportation and supply systems of a division all had to be improvised. After war was declared, the division would become triangular (three infantry regiments of three battalions each), and engineers would be assigned to divisions from corps.

(3) There was no brigade organization, as such, in the infantry divisions, but at least four divisions were little more than reinforced brigades during peacetime. The cavalry was organized into brigades, each consisting of two two-squadron regiments and a machinegun section.

b. The Army was primarily defense-oriented, and the border areas were organized into defense sectors: frontier zones garrisoned by infantry troops organized, equipped, and trained to function as frontier guards. The garrison stationed in a defense sector usually was included in the territorial organization of the nearest division. There were nine defense sectors on the northern frontier from Albania to Turkey.

c. The Army had four combat arms: infantry, artillery, cavalry, and engineers. The Evzones, battalions of mountain troops of especially selected personnel of fine physique, constituted the Royal Guard in Athens and were included in the combat arms organization.

(1) Infantry regiments usually had a headquarters, a service company, and two battalions and contained approximately 50 officers and 1,600 men prior to World War II. Each battalion had three rifle companies and one machinegun company of 12 light machineguns. Each company had three or four sections. Regiments were expanded in wartime to a headquarters, a service company, a train, a howitzer company with six

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37mm guns, and three battalions; and total strength was increased to 93 officers and 3,643 men.

(2) The artillery consisted of regiments and separate battalions classified as mountain, field, or heavy artillery. Each regiment had two battalions in peacetime and three in wartime. The battalions had either two or three batteries, each with four guns or howitzers. Stocks of materiel were maintained for wartime expansion.

(3) The cavalry consisted of independent brigades, regiments, and squadrons. Each regiment usually had five squadrons (four rifle and one machinegun), and each squadron had two platoon-sized sections. Squadrons were assigned to corps. The cavalry was well-mounted; in a fair state of training; and superior to the infantry in appearance, cleanliness, and training. Peacetime organization was not changed for wartime. Regiments had 31 officers and 150 men; brigades had 68 officers and 1,100 men.

(4) The engineer branch had two pioneer regiments, one telegraph regiment, one railway regiment, and a pontoon battalion. All engineers received training as infantry, and branch organization was similar to that of the infantry. Each pioneer battalion was made up of two companies; those for the other regiments contained three companies.

d. The noncombatant branches of the Army provided both general and special services. General services included the Order to the King, the military schools, and the Judge Advocate General's department. Special services included chaplains, finance, trains, and medical services.

e. Two schools, the military academy and the noncommissioned officers school, were the sources of junior officers for the Army. The Military School of Cadets (Evelpides) in Athens corresponded to the US Military Academy. Its 4-year training prepared men to become officers in the Army. The other school, open to noncommissioned officers with 2 years of service in any arm, offered a 3-year course, and its graduates were commissioned in the regular Army.

(1) The branch schools (infantry, cavalry, engineers, liaison and communication, aeronautics, artillery fire, artillery materiel maintenance, sanitary service, quartermaster, and transport) provided a 5-month course for majors and captains in the combined use of the different arms and new equipment.

(2) The general staff school (Ecole de Guerre), for majors and captains, taught general tactics and tactics of the several arms. Its 2-year course also provided opportunities for theoretical

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and practical staff work. The Center of Higher Instruction was the Greek equivalent of the US Army War College and presented a 5-month course to train colonels and lieutenant colonels for high command.

(3) Reserve officers were selected competitively from young conscripts. Selectees were admitted to the school for Reserve officers after 3-months service and were made Reserve second lieutenants at the end of 6 months of instruction. After they served a year with a regiment, they passed to the Reserve with no further training.

f. Greek Army conscripts received little training, and morale was low after Greece's 1922 defeat by Turkey. There was little improvement until 1935. From 1935 on, there were definite improvements in both training and morale under the King's direction and during the Metaxas regime. Improvements included standardization of equipment, but the major achievement was the dissociation of the Army from political activities and influence. The King's energetic efforts during the Metaxas regime to remove the Army from politics did much to improve morale, which had been impaired by numerous revolts and disturbances which apparently were related to the political associations of the Army. Just prior to World War II, the Greek officer corps received French instruction, and the troops began to be trained in accordance with French military regulations. Acquisition of new German equipment and the use of French training methods improved Greek Army morale, discipline, training, and esprit de corps prior to the Italian invasion.

95. The Navy. The Constitution designated the Minister of Marine as Commander in Chief of the Navy. He had a rear admiral as Chief of Staff and controlled eight separate bureaus. The Chief of Staff had a General Staff of three divisions or directorates: Organization and Personnel, Intelligence, and War Plans and Operations. The separate bureaus (administration, hydrography, supply, naval justice, technical services, finance, mercantile marine, and lights) served the General Staff only in a coordinating and advisory role. Each staff section appeared to have had directive authority.

a. Greece always has been strategically important because of its geographic location and configuration. This strategic importance added emphasis to the naval arm. Although the fleet organization was not permanently fixed, it usually consisted of five squadrons, each with one cruiser and 20 destroyers. The historical Salamis Island Naval Base contained the naval arsenal. Other bases included one on Leros Island in the Dodecanese group and one on the mainland southwest of Scaramanga.

b. The Submarine Command was an independent command consisting of submarines, tenders, supply ships, the submarine base, and submarine stations remote from the base.

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c. Coastal defense was a function of the Navy under the Superior Coast Defense Command. The command's headquarters was in Athens, and harbor subcommands were located at Patras in western Greece, Canica on Crete, Piraeus in the south Aegean, Chalcis on Euboea, Thessalonike on the northern Aegean, and Drios in the east islands. A German commission was responsible for the details of organization, site selection, and design and construction of emplacements; consequently, the Germans had thorough knowledge of Greece's coastal defenses.

d. The Navy had four schools during the preconflict period: the naval School of Artillery, the Naval School of Torpedo and Signal Service, the Naval Submarine School, and the Naval War College.

e. Purges among high-ranking officers after each revolution usually resulted in policy changes, led to generally low performance among commissioned officers, and certainly must have had an adverse effect on the training of Navy personnel. Very little is known about the character and efficiency of the training during this period. It is probable, however, that poor training can be blamed for the total ineffectiveness of antiaircraft fire directed against Air Force planes by rebel naval units in 1935. After this revolution, 158 officers, including an admiral and 26 captains, were court-martialed, severely crippling the Navy as a combat force and impairing its efficiency. Changes among the higher ranks also were caused by political upheavals, and the inevitable feelings of uncertainty lowered morale. The Navy as a whole also was adversely affected by officer participation in politics, and its equipment was obsolete and not always maintained in good repair. Greece obtained a British naval mission to provide scientific instruction for Greek Navy personnel to attempt to raise its level of morale, training, discipline, and esprit de corps. Greek naval units under British command during World War II served with distinction.

96. The Air Force. The Air Force came into being as a separate service during the period under study. Previously, the Army and Navy each had its own air arm.

a. The Air Minister was the Commander in Chief of the Air Force. His assistants included the Under Secretary for Air and the Bureau of Ministers. The General Staffs of the Army and Navy Air Forces had followed the usual pattern of intelligence, operations, and training. When the Air Force became a separate service, the main change in organization was that the Air Minister acquired an officer of the British air mission as an adviser.

b. The Air Ministry established a 10-year program to develop an Air Force with three separate directorates. Two were designed to support missions of the other services, and the third was to provide for home defense. Only the first two were in operation by 1941.

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(1) The first directorate was designed specifically to cooperate with the Army in observation and fighter missions. It consisted of a headquarters and staff and three regiments. Each regiment, primarily a tactical command, had approximately 50 officers, 450 men, and fighter or observation squadrons. Each squadron had 10 aircraft and was to be increased to 12, with two in reserve, during wartime.

(2) The second directorate was assigned to Navy missions. It consisted of a headquarters and staff and two squadrons with sea-plane reconnaissance and torpedo capabilities.

(3) The third directorate was to consist of fighter units for home defense.

c. The Air Force had mostly obsolescent British equipment. All aircraft were equipped with racks to carry 440-lb demolition and personnel bombs. At least half the aircraft were allocated to training, and at least two squadrons were using training aircraft. Just before World War II, Greece ordered new British aircraft. It had a repair and maintenance depot but no aircraft manufacturing capabilities and was totally dependent on outside sources for resupply.

d. The Military Aviation School in Athens trained all pilots for the Army and Navy. When the Air Force was created, Army and Navy officers were given a year's training in the pilot's school and then transferred to the Air Force. The civilian Aviation School of Technology at Athens was a Government-subsidized school for technicians in civil aviation which also trained enlisted Army and Navy technicians. The Flying School at Tatoi, just north of Athens, was a combined military and commercial school which provided cadet and NCO programs. The cadet program was a 4-year scholastic and flying course, and the NCO program was a 2-year scholastic and technical course. The final year of training in both programs was a "school of application." Graduates received both pilot and observer ratings. The Ecole technique de l'Aeronautique in Paris trained all Greek Army and Navy officers who specialized in aeronautical engineering or in mechanical and technical ground activities.

e. Greek naval personnel were as distinctly British in ideas and training as the Army was French. The training regulations of the Air Force were a mixture of French and British tactics; and organization, tactical training, and operations were patterned after the British. The shortage of qualified Greek officers for command, staff, and administration delayed considerably the actual organization and development of the Air Force. In addition, expansion programs faced budget constraints during the late 1930's, and plans were continually revised under the dual influence of the British air mission to the Air Ministry and the French military mission to the Army. This situation did not

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improve morale. Most of the Air Force officers had been transferred from the other services, and their efficiency and morale matched those of their parent organizations. Both efficiency and morale were expected to improve as fiscal constraints were lifted.

97. Military equipment. The Greek military services had adopted a mixture of British, French, and German equipment, undoubtedly because Greek officers had been trained in French schools, British missions had assisted each of the services, and Greece had been able to purchase German equipment with credits established through trade arrangements. Most equipment that was not obsolete in 1936 was obsolescent. George II and Premier Metaxas actively supported reequipping the services within budgetary limitations from 1936 on, and military equipment was being standardized and improved by the end of the preconflict period. The elite Evzone units were especially well-equipped, just as they were better trained.

a. Almost all supplies except food had to be purchased outside Greece. Although it had reserve supplies for at least 300,000 men in 1939, shortages in aviation and artillery units were reported prior to the Italian invasion. Greece also lacked the support services needed to keep its equipment operational. Maintenance of major items of equipment was wholly dependent on agreements with and purchases from other countries. The War Ministry apparently had central control of such activities. Greece did have several powder plants, one shell and arms works, and one aircraft factory under license, which assembled aircraft and only started building them late in the period. The results of standardization appeared late in the period in improved maintenance.

b. Prior to the Italian invasion of October 1940, the Greek Army had been passively defensive in nature, deployed in defensive sectors to protect the northern borders from Albania to Turkey. Improved equipment capabilities coupled with an immediate national response enabled the Greek forces to drive the Italians back into the Albanian mountains. However, the 6 months spent in pursuit of a larger and more heavily armed opponent depleted Greece's already weak logistic position and set the stage for the 1941 German spring offensive.

Section II. Paramilitary Forces

98. General. The paramilitary forces constituted the police system and contained three major elements: the Gendarmerie, the Cities' Police, and the Rural Police. The Gendarmerie, established in 1833, was the only law enforcement body in Greece until after World War I. The large postwar increase in population necessitated expansion of law enforcement capabilities, and the Cities' Police and Rural Police were organized in 1920 and 1938, respectively.

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
99. The Gendarmerie. The Gendarmerie is responsible for law enforcement and internal security throughout Greece, except in Athens, Piraeus, Patrai, and Corfu, which are under the jurisdiction of the Cities' Police. The Gendarmerie has the special duty of protecting the royal family and Government officials in addition to law enforcement, traffic control, and protection of both native and foreign VIP. Its civil defense duties include supervision of customs operations, and it is responsible for surveillance and apprehension of Greek Communists and other subversive entities and for investigation and interrogation of suspect non-Greek individuals. The Gendarmerie is responsible during wartime for security of main supply routes, traffic and straggler control, and general internal security.

a. Prior to 1938, the Gendarmerie was under the Minister of War. Since then, it has been under the Minister of the Interior primarily but at times apparently under the Minister of Public Order in peacetime. Internal security functions were performed through national security stations under the Chief of National Security Headquarters in Athens as well as through the chiefs of the military commands, when the Gendarmerie was under military control. The Gendarmerie organizational structure in 1938 is shown in figure 3.

b. The strength of the Gendarmerie is estimated to have increased from about 11,000 in 1928 to about 25,000 by 1940 and to have remained near that figure since. The Gendarmerie is not organized into units of specific sizes, such as companies or battalions; its units vary in size by the districts in which they are located. It is assumed that the preconflict organization was similar to that of the 1960's: 13 high commands, 64 commands, 272 subcommands, and about 1,500 stations and posts. Units assigned to stations operate as small mobile patrols and have a maximum size of battalion strength.

c. The Gendarmerie was and is a carefully selected and well-trained force, trained along military lines and equipped as light infantry. Recruits are volunteers who enlist for a term of 3 years. During the preconflict period, many reenlisted. Voluntary enlistees between 19 and 25 who held a certificate from a secondary school or a law diploma became noncommissioned and commissioned officers. Volunteer enlistment for career purposes was small, but a relatively large number chose the Gendarmerie as an alternative to regular military service to satisfy the compulsory service requirement.

d. Professional standards and efficiency were fairly high, particularly in the national security stations. Schools with formal training programs and permanent staffs provided comprehensive training. All recruits were given a 6-month course in military drill, criminal law, and regulations and duties before they were assigned to duty.



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100. The Cities' Police. A British police commission was brought to Greece in 1916 to study the needs for special forces to deal with the problems of an increasingly large population. The Cities' Police force, modeled on the English police system and originally trained by UK police, was established as a result of the study.

a. The Cities' Police was responsible for law enforcement and internal security in certain cities. Originally, it was to have taken over the duties of the Gendarmerie in all principal cities; however, commands were established only in Corfu (1921), Patras (1922), Piraeus (1923), and Athens (1925). Thessalonike was to have been included but was left to the Gendarmerie, because it was close to a hostile border. The Cities' Police performed the same functions in those cities as the Gendarmerie did in other parts of the country. It has not extended its control to other cities or beyond the limits of those in which it holds jurisdiction, primarily because the Gendarmerie objected to encroachment on its areas of responsibility. The Cities' Police is administered by a general directorate under the authority of the Minister of Public Order. The four commands are organized into sub-directorates, stations, and posts and beats.

b. Initial strength was about 4,000. The force became more powerful under Metaxas and reached a strength of about 8,000 by 1966. The largest part of the force is in Athens. The Piraeus unit had a harbor station and was responsible for patrolling the harbor area and docks, guarding stores, and supervising the civilian guards it employed. Naval police were responsible for the harbor itself. Corfu, a summer resort, required little policing.

c. Personnel generally were unmarried high school graduates between 21 and 28 and were required to have completed compulsory military service in a military service or in the Gendarmerie. A small number of conscripts have been allowed since World War II to serve 5-year terms in the Cities' Police in lieu of serving in the Armed Forces.

d. The first training college for the Cities' Police was at Corfu and was organized on British lines. Each recruit now receives 3 months of basic training at the Cities' Police school in Athens and must pass written and oral examinations to qualify as a constable. Once qualified, he is placed on probation for not more than a year before receiving permanent appointment.

101. The Rural Police. The Rural Police was under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Agriculture. Its members were appointed by the King, and many were part-time farmers. This force was responsible for settling such problems as field boundaries; claims for straying animals; and disputes about damages to vines, olives, and the like. Its members made

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suggestions to the agricultural councils, which supervised their work closely, and were given time and authority to carry out their duties.

Section III. Defense Policy and Strategy

102. Background. The peace settlement following World War I resulted in the Treaty of Sevres with Turkey, signed by both parties in August 1920. By the terms of the treaty, the northeastern frontier of Greece was established just 20 miles from Constantinople, and Adrianople and the Peninsula of Gallipoli became part of the Greek kingdom. Nearly all the Aegean Islands became Greek territory, except the Dodecanese, which were left in Italian hands. A separate treaty with Italy gave these islands to Greece, but they never were turned over to Greek administration. The most important item in the treaty gave Greece the Smyrna district and borderland. These were handed over to Greece, although nominal Turkish administration was allowed. Basically, provision was made for incorporation of this district into the Greek kingdom if, after a 5-year period, the elected parliament in the district were to demand this action.

a. One of Greece's most prominent statesmen, Premier Venizelos, had championed the cause of the Allies in World War I and had resigned from office in 1915 when the pro-German King, Constantine, opposed him. At this time, Venizelos was instrumental in establishing a provisional Government at Thessalonike which was officially recognized by the Allies. When Constantine was forced to abdicate in 1917, his younger son, Alexander, succeeded him and entrusted Government administration to Venizelos. Greece entered the war on the side of the Allies. Venizelos was able to safeguard Greece's interests at the Peace Conference in Paris (1919), and he returned to Greece a hero. In his absence, however, a strong opposition faction had developed, and when the elections went against him in 1920, Venizelos again resigned and left Greece. King Alexander died in 1920, and Constantine returned to Athens. The next 15 months set the scene for the disaster caused by Turkish repudiation of the Treaty of Sevres. Had the treaty not been repudiated, Greece's claims against Turkey might have been satisfied. However, Mustapha Kemal, President of the provisional Turkish Government, organized forces in 1920 to prevent the occupation of former Turkish territories by the Greek Army. The Greeks in Asia Minor were under threat from Kemal's forces, and both the Greek people and the Greek forces were imperiled. The new Greek administration decided to land forces in Smyrna. Despite initial successes, the offensive was doomed, primarily because the big powers (France, Britain, and Italy) were unwilling to support it, and also because the Greek Army was ill-equipped and the politically appointed officers were not sufficiently trained. The Turks withdrew and allowed the Greeks to achieve initial successes,

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then inflicted a terrible defeat, followed by the sacking of the Greek and Armenian quarters in 1922. The Greek people fled to the sea in panic and horror. All who could find boats made their way to the islands and then to the mainland. A group of Greek Army officers who landed on the Island of Khios formed a revolutionary committee and demanded the abdication of Constantine and the trial of the Ministers responsible for the expedition. Constantine acceded, and six Ministers were convicted and executed. The Greek position was placed in further disrepute by the British, who broke off relations with Greece. The Treaty of Lausanne (1923) settled the situation between Greece and Turkey; Greece gave up all territorial gains and abandoned all territorial claims in Asia Minor, and the Turkish frontier was set at the Maritsa River.

b. Constantine's eldest son became King George II in 1922. The republican opposition, supported by elements in the Armed Forces, obliged George to leave Greece in 1923 and proclaimed Greece a republic in March 1924. Venizelos again returned and became Prime Minister in 1928, remaining in power until 1932. Then the Populist Party, under Tsaldaris (who had opposed Venizelos), regained political control in 1933, and a 1935 plebiscite returned George II to the throne. General Metaxas, who had been Minister of War under Tsaldaris and later Prime Minister, executed a coup d'etat in 1936. From that time until his death in 1941, Greece, in theory still a constitutional monarchy, was ruled by Metaxas' authoritarian regime.

c. Greece's most pressing problem in the 1920's was the sudden increase in population. Great numbers of refugees had poured into Greece from Asia Minor. In addition, following the Greco-Turkish agreement to exchange minorities, approximately 1.3 million Greeks were uprooted from Turkey and returned to Greece; only about a tenth as many Turks were returned to their homeland. A similar exchange took place between Greece and Bulgaria, worsening the problem. Greece suffered serious economic difficulties in 1923-46 which were aggravated by the problems of absorbing the large refugee population into a never-flourishing economy that was burdened by financial problems and facing increasing difficulties in the world markets. During the reign of George I (1863-1913), Greece's population had increased greatly; but foreign trade and merchant shipping tonnage had more than trebled, and roads and railways had been built. After the economic and financial setbacks caused by the First World War, Greece again attempted to increase agricultural and industrial production and to reduce imports, in an effort to offset the falling market for its two main crops: tobacco and currants. Agreements were made with Germany to sell these crops at favorable prices, allowing the profits to remain in Germany as a credit fund (in Reichsmarks) with which Greece bought German industrial products and armaments.

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d. As a result of the exchange of minorities with Turkey and the abandonment of territorial claims and gains in Asia Minor, there was no large group of Greek citizens outside Greece except in the Dodecanese and Cyprus Islands. Cyprus was 80 percent Greek and 20 percent Turkish. It had been occupied by Britain in 1878, by agreement with Turkey, and had been offered to Greece for joining the Allies in World War I. However, Britain, after formally annexing Cyprus in 1914, made it a crown colony in 1925. The Cypriots desired the end of British rule and initiated an uprising in 1931, but Premier Venizelos failed to support the rebels, and the revolt failed. The British restored order, imposed penalties, and withdrew the measure of self-government which Cyprus had enjoyed.

e. Over the years, Greece's relations with neighboring States were improved by a series of treaties with Italy, Rumania, and Albania in 1928; Yugoslavia in 1929; and Turkey in 1930. The rapprochement with Turkey, made possible by the gradual absorption of refugees after the minorities exchange, was cemented by a protocol on naval armaments and a commercial convention signed at the same time as the treaty. Relations between Greece and Turkey continued to improve. Greece supported the admission of Turkey to the League of Nations in 1932, and the two countries signed a 10-year treaty of friendship in 1933. The first of a series of Balkan Conferences was held in Athens in 1930. In 1934, a Pact of Balkan Understanding was signed by Greece, Turkey, Rumania, and Yugoslavia; later in that year, these States adopted statutes for a Balkan Entente. During the next few years, the policies of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy caused the various Balkan States to enter into a series of defensive agreements. This phase culminated in 1938 in the signing of the Pact of Thessalonike by Greece, Rumania, Turkey, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria; a pact designed to restore the common front of the Balkan States.

f. By the spring of 1939, following the German occupation of Czechoslovakia and the Italian seizure of Albania, it became apparent that the Axis Powers had further territorial ambitions in eastern and southeastern Europe. On 13 April 1939, in recognition of this threat, the UK Government gave a unilateral guarantee that it would aid Greece and Rumania if the independence of either should be threatened. The French Government offered a similar guarantee at the same time. Greece at first remained neutral after the outbreak of the Second World War in September 1939. However, after the entry of Italy into the war in June 1940, Axis demands on Greece became increasingly heavy. On 28 October 1940, an Italian ultimatum requiring passage for Italian troops was delivered to the Greek Government. Even before the period of the ultimatum had expired, Italian troops crossed the Albanian frontier into Greece. General Metaxas, refusing the Italian demands, mobilized the Greek forces. Their magnificent resistance under the leadership of

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General Papagos in the face of powerful odds drove the invaders from Greek soil within 3 weeks and kept them at bay throughout the winter. In February 1941, after the Germans occupied Rumania and Bulgaria, the Greek Government asked the United Kingdom for help. In response to and in fulfillment of the guarantee, a British Commonwealth Expeditionary Force began to arrive in Greece on 7 March 1941.

g. The German Army began its attack on 6 April 1941. The Allied forces inflicted heavy losses but, fighting against hopeless odds and facing overwhelmingly superior forces, were forced to retreat. The Greek Army of Epirus was surrounded, and the Commonwealth troops were evacuated to Crete and then to Egypt. An armistice was signed on 23 April, and the Germans entered Athens on 27 April. In a proclamation issued on 23 April, King George of the Hellenes announced the removal of King and Government to Crete to enable them to carry on the war for the liberation of Greece. When the Greek Government subsequently moved from Egypt to London, the service Ministries remained in Egypt, where the Greeks set to work to rebuild their fighting forces. Supplied and trained in modern tactical methods by the United Kingdom, they soon were in action again. These forces played an appreciable part in driving the Axis forces from the Mediterranean. The Greek Navy and Merchant Marine made a notable contribution to the war effort. The Germans established a puppet government in Greece, headed by Tsolakoglou. They allowed the Bulgarians to occupy eastern Macedonia and western Thrace and permitted the Italians to administer most of the rest of the country, retaining in their own hands only the postal service and main lines of communication.

103. Objectives. The Greek military officers had an exceptionally strong voice in political decisions on governmental matters. Table II, Chronology of Salient Preconflict Events in Greece, provides ample evidence of this situation. The Greek armed services were concerned primarily with two major problems: the security of overseas Greek communities and the defense of Greece's northern frontiers; and the internal political structures and activities of Greece which would shape the country's destiny. Annex C, The Involvement of Military Officers in the Politics of Greece, contains an analysis that provides at least a partial explanation of the political involvement of the military.

104. Major threat perceptions. The Balkan wars prior to the preconflict period typified the kind of threat perception held by the Greek administrations.

a. The major threat was posed by Turkey, and the next most serious by Bulgaria. As a result of various alliances, Turkey and Bulgaria had been defeated, and Greece stood to gain much territory. Thus, in the Greek overseas communities (as in Smyrna), Turkey again appeared

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as the arch foe. Much of the antagonism in the Balkans was caused by problems of territory and various aspects of major European power politics. The threat was lessened by the organization and disposition of the Greek Army along the northern frontiers facing Albania, Yugoslavia, and Turkey and by a series of Balkan conferences. However, as the Axis powers began territorial acquisition, it became evident that one or both of these countries posed a major threat.

b. Internal conditions appear to have been extremely unsettled from the time of the Smyrna disaster to the period of the much greater disaster of the Axis invasion. The various factions, especially those in the Army and the Navy, could not agree on a form of government, and the types favored ranged from a monarchy to a republic. The Communist element was strengthened by this situation to the extent that the two main parties had almost exactly the same number of members in Parliament in 1936, with the balance being held by the 15 Communist members. General Metaxas persuaded the King to suspend the Articles of the Constitution and to proclaim martial law. Metaxas became dictator in August 1936 and remained so until January 1941. The iron grip he held was described in the British Survey Handbook as follows:

Parliament was dissolved, the press rigidly censored, free trade unions were no longer allowed to function. In short, all the features of a democratic state were suspended, even to the expunging of the funeral oration of Pericles from the textbooks of the schools. There were also innovations on a German model, such as secret police and a uniformed organization of a semi-military character.¹

With the dictatorship of Metaxas came the machinery of resistance; the opposition underground organization which later was to become the basis for resistance to the German occupation.

105. Appraisal of Greek forces. The roles and missions of the military forces, the Gendarmerie, the Cities' Police, and the Rural Police were clearly defined. The Gendarmerie was the law enforcement agency for all the country except Athens, Piraeus, Patras, and Corfu, which were the responsibility of the Cities' Police. The Rural Police were charged with settling disputes among farmers. The Gendarmerie had the additional duties of counterintelligence, including surveillance and apprehension of subversives, and customs operations and civil defense. Military forces, especially the Army, were concerned with the external threat and were primarily defense-oriented toward the threat to the northern boundaries. The defense sectors were manned with forces that were required to function as border guards and yet as military forces in their areas. The distribution of forces, including elite troops in and around Athens, appeared to give the officer corps of the Army a distinct advantage in influencing the course of government. Both Army

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and Navy officers attempted coups at various times but were unsuccessful. However, control of all the military forces was tantamount to control of Greece.

a. Differences arose among the services during the preconflict period, but no real service rivalries were apparent. The existence of the three services with distinct roles and missions and the Air Force requirements to support elements of the Army and Navy indicate clearly the joint nature of the Greek military establishment during the 1930's. Each service functioned under a separate Ministry, but General Metaxas' holding of all three portfolios gave him control of all the Armed Forces. Whether this control influenced Metaxas' effort to thwart the Italian invasion from Albania is unknown. Obviously, the improved equipment position of the military by 1940 affected Greece's ability to meet and repel any invasion within the limits of logistic support.

b. The organizational structure of the Armed Forces was mission-oriented with decentralized execution depending on the assigned mission and the level of command. British, French, and German influences on the Greek forces is apparent in the British police system used by the Cities' Police, the conventional French organization of the Army, British aspects of Air Force and Navy organization and systems, and some German aspects of the organizational structures. Modernization of the Greek forces during the 1930's was influenced by the necessity for the Government to depend on foreign equipment and logistic support. Greek forces in World War II were equipped solely by the Allies and functioned in Allied commands. The underground organization to resist German and Italian occupation grew during the war and adopted unconventional warfare concepts that still are used. The growth of Communist efforts after liberation in 1944 led to the use of civilian homeguards to free military forces to pursue the guerrillas.

c. The Greek Armed Forces performed well against the Italian forces, crumpled under the superior strength of the German forces, and reorganized under the Allies, fighting both as resistance forces and as conventional forces in Allied commands. The flexibility of the Greek forces was exemplified by their ability to meet requirements with Allied assistance, in the absence of logistic support from within, under an Allied command structure during World War II.

Section IV. Environmental Factors

106. Geography. The greatest military asset of the Greek nation is its geographical position. It does not have any other element that might be considered valuable by any foreign power. Its natural resources are limited in variety and are largely underdeveloped, and its industrial capacity is small and, by Western standards, technologically

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backward. Its land area of about 50,000 square miles (about the size of Illinois) is only one-fourth arable and is insufficient to support a population of almost eight million. In normal times, about 40 percent of the populace lives in the mountains which cover more than two-thirds of the mainland. The rest of the people are concentrated in cities, with about one-seventh in the Athens-Piraeus area. There are widely separated villages but no large towns in the mountains. Few mountain areas are habitable, and the soil is poor; but there is grazing for sheep and goats, and mountain dwellers eke out a bare existence. The mainland has several plains, chiefly Thrace and Macedonia to the north and Thessaly to the east), separated by mountains. The natural regions of Greece include, in addition to the mainland, the islands that dot the Aegean Sea and skirt the western coast of the mainland.

a. The islands are an important part of the country. Each has its own peculiar character and resources. Most of them, being peaks of submerged mountains, are relatively barren and semiarid. Three of the Islands--Mitilene, famous for its olives; Crete, where oranges and olives flourish; and the Islands of the Ionian Sea--are larger and more fertile than most. Seafaring and fishing provide important sources of income, and most Greek seamen probably come from the islands.

b. In the south and along the coasts as far north as Volos and Arta, a Mediterranean climate prevails. In these regions, there is mixed farming with wheat, olives, grapes, and currants as the main products. Cultivation is intensive, carried on largely with hoe and mattock. The value of the products partially compensates for the small size of the individual farms. The people of these regions, long attached to the soil, tend to be conservative in temper and intensely local in outlook.

c. To the north, on the plains of Thessaly, Macedonia, and Thrace, the climate is continental and drier than that of most of Europe, with cold winters and hot summers. In these regions, the plains are wider and the soil is deeper than in the south, and cultivation is less intensive. Primitive plows turn the soil; in some areas, combines are used to reap and thresh, but elsewhere the ageless sickle is used. Here, most villages produce a surplus of food for sale. The chief crops are grain, beans, and tobacco. Severe winters make it impossible to raise olives, but hardy types of grapes flourish and such fruits as apples and plums are grown. Most of the farmers are newcomers (particularly in Macedonia), having settled on the land since 1922, and the conservative spirit of the south is less common among them. A main highway from Athens to Thessalonike leads north from Athens over a low mountain range to the plain of Thebes, formerly a shallow lake. Much cotton grows on this plain, enough in normal times to satisfy Grecian demands for cotton cloth. From the plain of Thebes, the road winds through more mountains, dips past Thermopylae to Lamia at the

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mouth of the narrow Sperchios Valley, then climbs again to the wider plain of Thessaly and on into Macedonia.

d. The plain of Thessaly appears as a vast green floor, and the circling rim of mountains, with the jagged peaks of the Pindus Mountains on the west and the isolated grandeur of Olympus to the northeast, can be seen from anywhere on the plain. Near the center of the plain is shabby dusty Larisa, the main town. Traffic is relatively heavy in Thessaly, and there is little drainage, with the result that the roads become soft during rains and are churned into ruts and holes, and travel is difficult even in a jeep with aircushion tires. When the Germans withdrew from Greece, they destroyed the railroad paralleling the road. However, a domestic airline connects the chief provincial towns with Athens, and air travel is available to those who can afford it. More mountains, even more rugged than those of the south, separate the Thessalian plain and the next most fertile district, Macedonia.

e. Greek Macedonia consists of three separate plains. On the west is a high plateau that stretches northward into Yugoslavia and offers an unimpeded avenue of invasion. This was the route the Germans used when they invaded Greece in 1941. On this plateau and in the mountains to the west, the Slavo-Macedonians live in a compact group adjacent to the border. Political feeling in this region is particularly high. Distrust between the Slavs and their Greek neighbors is acute, and the mountains which border the plateau on east and west are strongholds of guerrillas. Eastward from the plateau is the sealed plain of central Macedonia, formed by the merging deltas of the Aliakmon (Vistritsa) and Axios (Vardares) Rivers, which flow into the Gulf of Salonika. Until the 1920's, nearly half this plain was swamp and lake, but drainage ditches and embankments to control river floods have brought extensive new areas under cultivation. The plain supports cattle and grass, as well as wheat, beans, cotton, and some vineyards. The city of Thessalonike lies on the eastern edge of the plain.

f. Greek territory extends eastward from Thessalonike along the Aegean Sea to Thrace. The third major plain, western Thrace, is merely a narrow strip between the mountains and the sea; but the area is an important one, for it is here in the deltas of the Strymon and Nestos Rivers that nearly all the Greek tobacco crop is grown. A peculiar combination of soil and climate permits a special type of small-leaf tobacco to flourish on these plains. Called Turkish, from the time when the region was under Turkish rule, this tobacco is used as an ingredient in all American cigarettes.

g. The alpine regions are much poorer than the plains of Greece. These regions include the mountains which run down west central Greece like a backbone, extending onto the central part of the Peloponnese, the peninsula that forms the southern part of the mainland.

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There is little cultivable land in the mountains, and usually that little is relatively infertile. Herding sheep and goats is the main occupation of the mountain people; and, in fact, nomadic communities have not vanished entirely from the highlands. Most of the farming villages in the mountains do not produce enough food to support their inhabitants and must purchase supplies from the richer villages of the plains.

h. A key to much of the recent history of Greece lies in the geographical differences between hill and plain, between villages with food deficits and those with a surplus. Before the war, mountaineers obtained money for purchases by working for wages, often helping with the harvest or laboring on Government construction projects. During and after the war, when this source of income was interrupted, the mountain villages provided a fertile recruiting ground for the guerrillas. Thus, in another way, many continued to depend on the surplus of the plains villages, requisitioning or seizing by force the supplies which they had been accustomed to buying in more peaceful times. The need for the poorer villages either to buy or obtain by other means their needed supplies from richer villages provides a good reason to study the local situations in Greece by geographical location.

i. Greece has two major urban areas: the Athens-Piraeus area and the city of Thessalonike. Modern Athens was built after 1922, when hundreds of thousands of Greeks fleeing from Asia Minor established a ring of shabby suburbs around the city. In these suburbs, few streets are paved, and the dirt and smells are like those encountered in provincial towns. In the center of Athens, there is a small district of thoroughly modern and luxurious apartments and imposing Government buildings. Here live the fortunate few, the families of wealth who have been able to afford a foreign education and who, by all outward signs, might be cultured Europeans.

j. Piraeus, one of the leading ports, is only 5 miles southwest of Athens on the Salamis Gulf. In both Piraeus and some of the suburbs of Athens there are factories, and more than half the industrial production of Greece is concentrated in the capital area. Products include textiles (the most important), cigarettes, wine, cement, fertilizer, glass, and a host of others. Factory life itself is an importation from more highly developed countries, and it has not taken root in Greece. Nevertheless, the Greeks have been shrewd and successful traders for centuries.

k. Thessalonike is the second largest city in Greece. Its population exceeds a quarter of a million, and its location and geography make it an obvious port for most of the central Balkans. Unfortunately, national hostilities and its nearness to the borders (only 30 miles north of the city) have isolated it from its natural sources of supply. Typical of its uncertain commercial prosperity and future is

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the fact that this ancient Turkish and Byzantine city has never been rebuilt, since it was mostly destroyed by fire in 1917, despite plans for its reconstruction. Its growth has failed to keep pace with that of Athens since 1947, and it is a raw unattractive town.

107. Manpower (military assets). The 1928 census showed a population of 6,402,684. Assuming a growth rate of 1.42 percent, the population was estimated to have increased to 6,750,000 by 1934.

a. If 49.58 percent of the population were male, then the total male population in 1934 would have been 3,350,000. Table XVI shows an estimated 830,000 men available for service during the period under study, based on statistics for 1928 and 1934, extrapolated.* This figure is 65 percent of the men of military age. Apparently US intelligence estimates were conservative and constrained by the knowledge that the men in the 35-49 age bracket either still were in service or had been rendered unfit for military service as a result of having served in World War I, the Asia Minor War, or the Balkan Wars.

b. Commissioned officers were drawn from graduates of the military academy or the noncommissioned officers school. Military service was universal and compulsory. Periods of service ranged up to 24 months; but, for purposes of economy, the last 4 months were not served. Male citizens, on reaching the age of 18, could volunteer to serve for 18 months and receive credit for full conscript service. Special classes of citizens were permitted to serve only 4 months by paying a fee of from Dr1,500 to Dr2,500 (US\$15 to \$25). The draft age was 21, and men were considered first-line troops for the next 19 years and second-line troops for another 10 years, until they reached the age of 50. The total quota of about 40,000 a year was called in semiannually, half on 1 March and half on 1 September. Recruiting districts (recruit enrollment districts), each containing a regiment of infantry or a battalion of Evzones, furnished the quotas for new units, corps, or division troops.

c. The Premier was responsible for issuing the order for mobilization of the Armed Forces under a royal decree, which also gave him the authority to mobilize the industrial and civil sectors. The procedure merely called for the Premier, as president of the Supreme Military Council, to present to the Council a motion calling for such mobilization. The call for mobilization would fill all units to wartime strength.

*Table XVI indicates the necessity for observing carefully the manpower resources from which estimates of sustained capability can be measured. This same technique, used in 1934, is applicable in measuring insurgency potential.

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TABLE XVI. GREEK MANPOWER OF MILITARY AGE IN 1928 AND 1934

1928

<u>Age</u>	<u>Number of men</u>
20-24	253,000
25-29	250,000
30-34	180,000
35-39	172,000
40-44	155,000
45-49	<u>160,000</u>
Total military age (38+ percent of total male population)	1,170,000
Number trained at least 18 months	608,500
Number untrained (some partly trained)	561,500

1934

Estimated total male population	3,350,000
Estimated total military age (38+ percent)	1,275,000
Estimated untrained	666,500
One-third untrained available for military	222,000
Estimated trained (from above)	<u>608,500</u>
Total manpower available for military	830,500

An excess of recruits would be formed into new units. Changes in organization, formation of new units, and other such actions could be authorized only by law. An exception was made in the case of urgent necessity and when the Chamber was not in session, and the War Ministry could take the necessary action.

108. Political and legal constraints.

a. Two types of internal threat are evident during this period in Greece; one based on the growth of communism, the other concerned with the involvement of the military in the control of politics.

(1) Decrees passed following the collapse of Greek forces in Asia Minor were considered drastic, especially those enforced under Kondylis' dictatorship, which preceded the restoration of the King in 1935. A new law was enacted in 1938 to assure the safety of the social order and the protection of the citizens. According to US Department of State Dispatch 2214 from Athens (15 April 1938), "Its provisions almost completely subordinate the inalienable rights of man to his safety and protection as defined by the authorities"

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This law (annex D), even more drastic than the earlier ones, reflected the Government's concern over Communist activities (actual or imagined). It is true that, as a result of the 1936 general elections, the two major parties had exactly the same number of members and the 15 Communist members thus held the balance of power. However, the Communists never had an opportunity to profit by this situation. First, Parliament was prorogued for 5 months, and then General Metaxas persuaded the King to suspend those articles of the Constitution which provided for the liberty of his subjects and to proclaim martial law. Metaxas himself became dictator. This he justified by reference to industrial disorders and a threatened general strike.

(2) That situation in itself is an example of the second type of threat: the ability of the military to control and manipulate politics throughout the period. Table II, Chronology of Salient Pre-conflict Events in Greece, lists the changes in administrations and identifies those directed by the military. Support for either a monarchy or a republic was a popular cause during this period. There is ample evidence from the beginning of the 20th century of the activities of the military league, "an association of higher officers in the Army who bound themselves by an oath to protect the republican regime" (US Legation Dispatch 2227, 29 August 1932). The political opposition often referred to Venizelos' long-standing association with the league. The first mention of Venizelos' involvement with the league of officers was when he was summoned by the league to advise it in the early 1900's. At the end of 1920, he became Prime Minister. Considerable emotion was generated in the 1930's over the existence of the league and its avowed purpose; the opposition posted accusations of affiliation with the military league and Prime Minister Venizelos posted denials. As the controversy over military intervention became more heated, Venizelos proposed that all parties refrain from expressing opinions about the regime for 10 years and stated that the administration would consider any member of the party who raised such a question to be an enemy of the peace of the country. The events leading to the establishment of the dictatorship that followed restoration of the monarchy clearly define the predominant cause of the turmoil that involved the military, the party in power, and the opposition.

b. The history of the Greek Constitution is complex. Ever since the bloodless revolution of 1843, the Greeks had wanted to achieve a democratic form of government. The first written Constitution, that of 1844, was designed to free the country from the evils of absolute monarchy. The main provisions of this Constitution and those which followed it are listed in figure 4.

(1) Both the 1844 Constitution and the one which superseded it in 1864 provided for a constitutional monarchy. However, the 1864 version had two defects. One, it was difficult to pass laws,

Constitution	Main provisions
Constitution of 1844	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Constitutional monarchy. 2. Independence from Constantinople of Orthodox Church of Greece reasserted (as in 1833). <i>[The Ecumenical Patriarch did not recognize the position until 1850.]</i> 3. Bicameral National Assembly. Senate and Chamber of Deputies.
Constitution of 1864	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Constitutional monarchy. Executive power vested in King, exercised by Ministers appointed by him. 2. Independence of Orthodox Church of Greece reasserted; practice of any religion permitted. 3. Unicameral National Assembly. Chamber of Deputies elected for 4 years by direct manhood suffrage. 4. All Greeks declared free and equal in the eyes of the law. 5. Freedom of the press established. 6. Local authorities to be elected.
Revision in 1911 of 1864 Constitution	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 7. Quorum of Chamber reduced from half plus one to one-third. 8. Serving soldiers and sailors to be ineligible as deputies. 9. Security of tenure established for judiciary/civil servants. 10. Primary education declared free and compulsory (as in 1833). 11. "Purist" Greek (Katharevousa), language of text of Constitution, declared official and school language.
Constitution of 1927 (first drafted in 1925)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Republic. Executive power exercised by President through his Ministers. President elected for 5 years by Senate and Chamber jointly. 2. Independence of Orthodox Church of Greece and permission to practice any religion reasserted. 3. Bicameral National Assembly. Senate: 120 members; over 40; serving soldiers, sailors, public servants ineligible. Chamber of Deputies: elected for 4 years by universal manhood suffrage; serving military/public servants ineligible; quorum one-fourth of all members. 4. All Greeks declared free and equal; liberty of person inviolable. 5. Freedom of speech and press and right of public meeting affirmed. 6. Local authorities to be elected and their powers increased. 7. Security of tenure established for judiciary/civil servants. 8. Primary education free and compulsory for all children for 6 years; education to be conducted in "purist" language. 9. Council of State of 21 life-members, appointed by Council of Ministers, for matters of administrative law.
Restoration of 1911 Constitution (as consequence of restoration of monarchy on 10 October 1935)	Provisions of 1864 Constitution as revised in 1911, pending revision.
August 1936 (Metaxas' coup d'etat, 4 August)	<p>Articles of 1911 Constitution securing liberties of subject suspended.</p> <p>Government by decree-law, pending replacement of parliamentary by corporative institutions.</p>

Figure 4. Constitutions of Greece

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because more than half the deputies were needed to make a quorum. Two, because military men could serve as deputies, political measures favored by the military establishment could be backed by threat of force. Frequent changes in the administration prevented development of a consistent foreign policy and caused general dissatisfaction with the method of government. This situation, plus the Cretan problem and the constant desire of the Army to achieve Army reform, led to formation of the military league in 1909. Consisting of the discontented elements of the Army and Navy, the league became a focus of opposition to Ministers; and, with a foothold in the Chamber of Deputies, it became sufficiently powerful to coerce the Chamber. Free constitutional government existed in name only.

(2) The 1864 Constitution was revised in 1911. The quorum was reduced from one more than one-half to one-third, and soldiers and sailors still in service were declared ineligible to serve as deputies. The 1911 modifications were calculated to stabilize the Government, and the 1864 Constitution, with these modifications, remained in force until the establishment of the Republic in 1924.

(3) A new Constitution, promulgated in 1925, was passed in 1927, making the Hellenic State a parliamentary republic. In theory (but not in practice), the President of the Republic was the head of the Army and the Navy. The National Assembly included a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies. The 1844 Constitution had provided for a Senate, but this one was reestablished on a broader basis to represent the conservative element. All military personnel were ineligible to hold seats in either body, and an additional proviso prohibited Army and Navy officers from returning to their military profession if they resigned to become deputies. Provision was made for revision of nonfundamental articles, if necessary, after 5 years, and a group of Senators and Deputies met in 1932 to consider revision. The most important proposal was an article permitting the President to suspend certain fundamental rights and to resort to the use of armed force if security and public order were seriously threatened. This provision was an example of the then-current opinion and set the pattern for what was to come. However, while the Constitution was in the process of revision, its fundamental basis was destroyed by the restoration of the monarchy in 1935.

(4) The rising tide of monarchist and anti-Venizelist sentiment became quite apparent while the work of drafting constitutional revisions was in progress. A deadlock existed between the Populist (moderate royalist) majority in the Chamber and the Venizelist (liberal) majority in the Senate. Extreme royalists, like Metaxas, wanted to suspend the 1927 Constitution. The extreme republicans, under Plastiros, attempted a military coup in March 1935 in an attempt to forestall a restoration of the monarchy. The collapse of the attempt

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(the attempted coup was momentarily supported by Venizelos) followed by the republican abstention from the election in June 1935 helped discredit the republican cause. The moderate royalist majority, yielding to the extreme royalist minority, declared in favor of a return to monarchy and the Constitution as it was in 1911. The monarchy was restored without a plebiscite. However, when the republicans disputed the validity of the proceedings, a plebiscite was held on 3 November 1935, in which an overwhelming majority declared in favor of the monarchy. George II hoped to preclude further strife by offering amnesty and achieving a nonpartisan government by revising the Constitution of 1911. At Metaxas' request, the evenly divided Chamber was adjourned for 5 months, during which the Prime Minister was to govern by decree, along with a permanent parliamentary commission which represented all parties in proportion. Metaxas did have a committee working on revising the Constitution to make it fit the existing conditions, but the scene was set for dissolution of the Chamber, proclamation of martial law, and suspension of the 1911 articles which had guaranteed the liberty of the individual. On 15 August 1936, new laws brought the press under control, and in September 1939 severe penalties were imposed on anyone attempting to propagate communism.

c. In response to several crises for which military support was required, either those in power used the Armed Forces to attain a desired objective or the military leaders themselves offered their services to that end. The Armed Forces, especially the Army garrison in Athens and its commanding general, were in readiness to obtain the results desired by the military. In one instance, the Army was prepared for a military coup to force the Premier to abandon his stated position of neutrality at the beginning of the German and Italian campaigns. In another instance, when the monarchy was restored in 1935, George II demanded and promptly received pledges of loyalty from General Papagos, commander of the Athens garrison. Furthermore, when the Army organized on a regional basis, security and control were assured for those who desired to participate, either legally or illegally, in Greece's destiny. Annex C provides a more detailed discussion of the participation of officers of the Armed Forces in political activities. Obviously, the use of the Armed Forces to further the ends of the proponent of a form of government or a policy was the rule, rather than the exception. Equally obvious is the fact that no political faction could hope to achieve control or continue in power without the support of the military.

109. Economic factors. The Greek defense budget appears to have been open-ended during the preconflict period. At times it was allocated as much as 60 percent of the Government's funds. Since this happened in times of little or no threat, it is likely that the military was being readied to assure success in actions contemplated against groups or individuals then in power. The Government also was forced

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to obtain its major military equipment from other countries, and the maintenance of such equipment was totally dependent on agreements with and purchases from other countries. This situation created a sizable drain on monetary resources. Toward the latter part of the 1930's, extensive public works were undertaken, such as building roads, bridges, railroads, and airstrips and installing communications facilities. These undertakings went far toward opening the mountainous areas of Greece, but they also had military implications. In addition, because of the quality of the military officers (the intellectual elite), military men of known abilities were used to administer these public works and to fill administrative posts in the Government.

110. Internal social factors. Generally speaking, the participation of the Greek people in their Government was limited to paying taxes and serving in the Armed Forces, and their influence on the political life of the country was negligible. However, the influence of the military was a different story.

a. Military careers offered both prestige and rapid ascension in the social scale to aggressive young men. Military officers were chosen from or became part of the best educated and most cultured class in the nation. Under Greece's compulsory military system, the Armed Forces had access to trainable personnel, and Reserve officers were chosen competitively. The training was good, and the professional school system which advanced the top military men from branch schools through the general staff school and the war college assured professional competency. Because officers and men represented a cross section of the nation, the Army's political interests and activities were often a reflection of the popular sentiment of the times. Officers were apt to retain the attitudes, values, and aspirations of the social class from which they were recruited and to identify with the regime whose leaders came from the same class. The rulers and their administrators depended on the Army to supply support and military force, and many experienced officers were drawn into Government service as administrators. Military officers, particularly the generals, enjoyed a reputation in public life that few civilians could hope to attain, and there were few political parties which could not boast of prominent military names on their rosters. Thus, because of its power and influence, the Army was not so much the servant of society and the Government as an integral part of them.

b. As a result of political conditions in the Balkans and past nationalist revolutions, the prestige of the military remained at a high level. Greece was no exception, and the Army became identified historically with both progressive and reactionary movements. The internal political conditions at that time left much room for organizations which were not parties in the strictest sense of the word but which were able to exert powerful pressures and to conduct their own

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kind of politics. Small-scale militarism had a real place in the Balkan--and the Greek--social scheme. A military junta is comparable to a political party but is far stronger, because, in addition to being effectively organized, it is armed. Certainly military juntas and dictatorships appear to have been more in harmony with the national tradition of the Greek Government than constitutionalism. In the presence of a latent threat of civil violence, the Army was the only force that could protect the regime and yet retain the freedom to rise against the regime itself. In Greece, the military appears to have had both a contempt for the professional politician and a justifiable fear that internal weaknesses might endanger the country's independence. When a government succumbs to corruption, the pay of both officers and men, along with the salaries of civil officials, may be held up for months. Moreover, under such a government, promotions may be dictated entirely by a self-assured politician in power. Such a strain on Army loyalty produces that discontent which has been a contributing factor in many Balkan revolts, a discontent fanned by the proverbial contempt for the politician and fears for the nation's independence. Despite evidence of purges of proroyalist (monarchist) and republican (constitutional) military officers, the political indoctrination of the officer corps remained a key force in Greek politics. Historical precedents of the Army's incursion into politics, beginning in 1843, continued to have appeal; and, as the chronological list of political changes shows (table II), even during the short period under analysis, the military had a predominant role to play in Greek national life--a role which continues to exist even today.

111. External factors and influences. The main problems in the Balkans prior to World War I concerned the dissolution of the Turkish Empire and the rise of Balkan statehood. These problems constituted an important concern of the major European countries and figured large in their international relations, resulting in conflicts of interests among the great powers..

a. The Germans dreamed of a great empire, with the establishment of the "transversal Eurasian Axis" and the achievement of hegemony in the Balkans; Britain, in an effort to keep Russia out of Constantinople, was endeavoring to protect the gateway to India; and France considered itself the defender of Christianity in the Mediterranean. Each major European power had a Balkan protege, and their conflicts of interests lit the fuse that ignited World War I. Balkan history following World War I can be divided into three specific periods. The first was characterized by Italy's attempt to replace the influence of the British and the French. During the second, attempts were made to develop cooperation among the Danubian States, with French and British encouragement. During the third, the world watched the ascendancy of Germany, beginning with the Munich Pact of 1 October 1938. The very nature of the influence

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exerted by the European powers and the USSR in the Balkans added to the turmoil of a region already seething with enmities among its States. Greece was the center of much outside influence, because its geographic location was strategically critical--both as a Balkan and as a Mediterranean State.

b. Greece's military conquests from 1912 to 1918 had gathered the bulk of the Greek people within an enlarged Greek State, but an attempt to create an empire in Asia Minor met with disaster in 1922, when Turkey defeated the invading Greek forces. As a result, Greco-Turkish relations continued at a low ebb, aggravated by the problems caused by the forced relocation of thousands of Greek nationals from Asia Minor. By 1930, however, friendship was being cultivated between the two nations, using conciliation, arbitration, and treaties.

(1) Greece had become involved in actions of the Balkan countries and their attempts to cooperate for their collective security. The Little Entente (Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia) was formed in 1921 with French support, to maintain the status quo. Events in which Greece took part and which led to the formation of the Balkan Entente in 1934 included the 1928 treaty of nonaggression and arbitration between Rumania and Greece; the settlement of Greco-Yugoslav differences over Thessalonike in 1929; the Greco-Turkish treaty of neutrality, conciliation, arbitration, and friendship of 1930; and the Balkan Conferences, the first of which was held in Athens in October 1930.

(2) The Balkan Entente signed on 9 February 1934 by Greece, Turkey, Rumania, and Yugoslavia was formed against a background of the eclipse of the League of Nations, disintegration of collective security, a worldwide economic crisis, and the creeping fear that the Balkans would be the diplomatic pawns of the big powers. Its immediate purpose was to counteract the aggressive attitude of Germany.

(3) The value of cooperation among the statesmen was obvious, but the hopes generated by the Entente never matured. What was intended to be far-reaching military guarantees was whittled down to a simple pledge of assistance against an unprovoked attack by another Balkan State. As Italy's territorial ambitions became apparent in the 1930's, Greece slowly freed itself from these entanglements and renewed amity with the United Kingdom, hoping to avoid the consequences of Italian (Axis) expansion.

c. Germany's dream of securing hegemony over the Balkan region and of establishing the Transversal Eurasian Axis became a reality with the takeover of Austria and the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. By the spring of 1939, following Germany's occupation of

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Czechoslovakia and Italy's seizure of Albania, the threat of further territorial ambitions of the Axis Powers in the rest of eastern and southeastern Europe was obvious. Both the United Kingdom and France gave unilateral guarantees of aid to Greece and Rumania, should the independence of either country be threatened.

(1) When Italy entered the war in June 1940 and the demands of the Axis became increasingly heavy and unacceptable, Greece abandoned its position of neutrality and was able to drive Italian troops from the country and to keep them outside the borders. With Germany moving against Greece, the United Kingdom backed its guarantee to Greece with all the arms, munitions, and transport capabilities that could be spared. The UK guarantee was implemented initially by dispatching a Royal Air Force contingent from the Middle East Command. The Greeks refused the offer of British troops made in January 1941 but asked for such help in February, following the German occupation of Rumania and Bulgaria. In response, the United Kingdom assembled the British Commonwealth Expeditionary Force in Egypt, at grave risk to operations in North Africa, and sent it to Greece in March to defend against the invading German forces. When Germany conquered Greece in April, this force was evacuated first to Crete and then to Egypt. This withdrawal was costly to the British, for it resulted in the disablement of a large part of the British fleet in the Mediterranean. Greek forces, many of which had escaped along with the Commonwealth forces, remained in Egypt. Here they were armed, equipped, supplied, and trained in modern tactical methods by the British, enabling them to return to action and to play an appreciably large role in driving the Axis forces from the Mediterranean.

(2) The financial assistance given to Greece by the United Kingdom was generous. In 1940 the UK Government granted Greece a credit of £5 million, the first of many. By 1941 the credits had reached a total of £46 million. Greece and the United Kingdom signed a mutual aid agreement in March 1942 (over and above the previously granted credits), under which arrangements were made to supply military equipment to Greece. The total amount of aid to Greece by 1945 under this agreement has been estimated officially at £34 million.

(3) When Germany invaded Greece, King George and the Government moved to Crete and, thence, after the fall of Crete, to Egypt. While Greek forces remained in Egypt and were being trained there by the British, the Greek Government moved again, this time to London. During this entire period, the UK Government used its good offices to broaden the Greek Government and make it more responsive to and representative of all sections of Greek opinion, both inside occupied Greece and among the free Greek forces. For this purpose, the British helped to promote and set up a conference for the formation of a new

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Government, which was held from 17 to 20 May 1944 in the new Republic of Lebanon. Delegates from all political parties attended, including many from occupied Greece. All delegates agreed on a new national program, and a new administration was formed. At first, members of the National Liberation Front, the left-wing resistance group under Communist control, and the Communist Party refused to participate, but later six members of these groups joined. The new Greek Government then moved to Caserta, Italy, where another conference was held on 24 September 1944. At this time, an agreement was signed by which all resistance forces in Greece were placed under the orders of the Greek Government, which, in turn, placed them under the orders of General Scobie, the British General Officer in Charge (GOC) in Greece.

(4) In occupied Greece, the people began to form guerrilla bands to resist the enemy. (The Germans had established a puppet government and retained only the postal service and the main lines of communication.) Here again, the United Kingdom assisted the country, parachuting British Military Liaison Missions, with arms and equipment, into Greece to help organize the guerrilla bands into efficient fighting forces. When political differences led to fighting among the resistance groups (chiefly the Greek Democratic National League under General Zervas and the National People's Liberation Army, the fighting arm of EAM), Allied liaison officers were able to persuade the guerrillas to cease hostilities with each other and concentrate their efforts on the common enemy.

(5) When the effects of military campaigns fought on Greek territory and of the exploitation of resources by the occupying forces resulted in famine conditions in Greece, the UK Government arranged for 50,000 tons of food to be bought in Turkey and shipped to Greece (August 1941). Other Governments also contributed to help alleviate this situation. In the spring of 1942, an emergency shipment of food was allowed passage from the United States to Greece in a Swedish ship. At this time, also, the US and UK Governments sought to relax the blockade restrictions to permit importation of essential civil supplies into Greece. Canada offered a gift of 15,000 tons of wheat per month. In August 1942, further arrangements permitted shipment of supplies in Swedish vessels under a safe conduct from both sides. The supplies (chiefly food, medical supplies, and some clothing) were distributed by a Neutral Commission under the International Red Cross Committee. Altogether, the Canadian, Swedish, Swiss, UK, and US Governments contributed a total of almost US\$41.4 million between 1941 and 1944 to provide these supplies to Greece. Canada and the United Kingdom provided \$18 million of that total.

d. British air- and seaborne troops landed in Greece in October 1944, and the Greek Government returned to find political chaos

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and the economy in ruins. The provisional government was disrupted by the resignation of the EAM Ministers on 1 December, following the Government's refusal to demobilize its only regular forces, and fighting broke out when ELAS tried to seize power by force of arms. Again, British aid was needed, and British troops intervened to help restore order. On 25 December, Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden flew to Athens to attend a conference of all parties to end the strife. The conference decided in favor of a regency for Greece. Archbishop Damaskinos was appointed Regent on 30 December, and a new cabinet was formed on 11 January 1945 under General Plastiras. A truce was concluded with the rebels, and hostilities ceased on 15 January. After peace talks between the Greek Government and the EAM/ELAS factions, an agreement was signed at Varkiza on 12 February 1945.

(1) The Varkiza Agreement provided for the repeal of laws limiting free expression of political views, the lifting of martial law, amnesty for political outlaws, formation of a national Army, immediate demobilization of armed resistance forces, and a plebiscite on the monarchy during 1945, with elections to a constituent Assembly to be held as soon as possible thereafter. In September 1945, it was decided that the elections should precede the plebiscite; and the Sophoulis government, which took office in November, arranged for them to be held on 31 March 1946. The elections were supervised by the Allied Mission for Observing the Greek Elections (AMFOGE), which consisted of French, UK, and US personnel. The USSR had refused to take part, and the EAM had abstained from voting. The AMFOGE report, published on 10 April 1946, stated that the elections had been, on the whole, free and fair and that the results represented, in the judgment of Allied observers, a true and valid verdict of the Greek people. The Populist Party gained the greatest number of seats, and Tsaldaris formed a new government on 18 April. At the request of the Greek Government, the UK and US observers remained in Greece to observe the plebiscite on the monarchy on 1 September 1946. The results showed a large majority in favor of the return of King George, and he returned on 27 September.

(3) Throughout the entire period, the UK Government made every effort to encourage formation of a broad, popular-based form of government, which would be able to establish conditions of political stability under which the tasks of economic rehabilitation could be accomplished successfully. The attitude of the United Kingdom was summed up in a statement by Mr. Churchill to the delegates attending the all-party conference in Athens in December 1944:

We do not desire an inch of your territory. We seek no commercial advantages save those which are offered by Greece to all the nations of the world. We have not the slightest intention of interfering with the way in which a normal,

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tranquil Greece carries out its affairs. Whether Greece is a monarchy or a republic is a matter for Greeks and Greeks alone to decide²

(4) One additional British contribution to the stability is evident in the part the UK mission played in the organization of the Greek Armed Forces and the police system. After the liberation, a UK military mission was sent to Greece to help the Government build up and train the Greek Armed Forces. Up to October 1945, the value of the equipment alone supplied to those services and to the Gendarmerie by the UK Government amounted to £11 million. At the request of the Greek Government, a British police mission arrived in July 1945 to help reorganize the police forces. A force of 20,000 police and gendarmes was raised, organized along British lines and equipped with British help. On 14 September 1945, the military authorities relinquished control, and this force assumed the responsibility for maintaining law and order. A British legal mission also was invited to come to Greece to study Greek legal methods and propose needed improvements.

e. Following the disarming and disbanding of the ELAS in accordance with the terms of the Varkiza Agreement and the proclamation of a general amnesty, many members of ELAS and EAM crossed the frontiers into Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia, where they re-formed and rearmed. During the spring and summer of 1946, small bands of Communist guerrillas began to be active in northern Greece. In August, the Government made formal complaint to the UN Security Council, stating that these groups of rebels were trained on foreign soil (assisted by Bulgaria and Yugoslavia) and that Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia were permitting the rebels to cross from their territories into Greece to carry out guerrilla operations against the Greek Government. The tactics of the rebels normally were to harass and interfere with the Government's forces and lines of communication from mountain bases which could be moved easily when assaulted, but to avoid attacking strongpoints or regular formations. The rebels' lines of communication led across the country's northern frontiers. Thus, Government troops, after mopping up one area, found that the rebels were able to retreat across the frontier, refit, and reappear in another sector. During much of the winter of 1946-47, much of central and western Macedonia was virtually controlled by the Communists, and the main Athens-Thessalonike road was constantly threatened. The Greek Army's offensive was unsuccessful, partly through lack of military strength but also because of the assistance given to the guerrillas by the now Communist-controlled neighboring States.

Section V. System of National Defense After World War II

112. Military forces. At the end of World War II, the only remnant of the Greek Army of prewar days consisted of two units: the 3d

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Brigade of 2,000 men and the "Sacred Squadron" of from 600 to 800 officers.

a. The United Kingdom took over the responsibility for equipping and training the new Army. The initial objective was to have an effective force of 100,000 by 1948. However, by 1947, the need for a large enough Army to permit its use against the "bandits" resulted in raising Army strength to 120,000 and shortening the training program. The strength was increased again by 1948 to 132,000. With the replacements needed for the casualties projected for the campaigns against the guerrillas, the figure was more like 147,000. The inclusive character of the 1948 campaign for the Greek Government and the British Military Mission forced the realization that further increases would be needed to meet additional requirements.

b. After World War II, the Greek (Royal Hellenic) Navy returned to Greek control after operating as an arm of the British Navy. Those elements of the Greek (Royal Hellenic) Air Force which had not been subdued during the German invasion escaped to Egypt and formed the nucleus of the new air arm. The reconstruction of the Air Force after the war was retarded considerably by financial and technical difficulties. One major problem was that the retreating Germans had systematically destroyed the Greek airbases.

113. The Gendarmerie and the civil police. The Gendarmerie was an armed police force which, under the Ministry of Justice, was designed to maintain law and order throughout Greece except in towns having municipal police. This organization had fallen into disrepute, because it had continued to function under the German occupation authorities; and, following the liberation of Greece, it was necessary to build it from the ground up. The Greek Government was aided by the British Police and Prisons Mission in this effort. Under its guidance, the Gendarmerie was reestablished and resumed its duties in 1945. As the threat to public order grew, the strength of the Gendarmerie was increased to 32,000, but even this was considered insufficient. Efforts to use the Gendarmerie in Army types of operations were doomed to failure because this force was not equipped or trained to function in that manner. Normally, a policeman's knowledge of the locale and a familiarity with its people and their nature and attitudes enables him to detect the unusual, making him highly skilled in regular local police roles. Police units can be organized into larger units, moved from place to place, and used successfully in military types of operations only if they are adequately trained and equipped for such activities. It was only after the National Defense Corps had been organized that the Gendarmerie could be reduced in strength and its activities confined to police work. Thereafter, its strength remained at about 25,000.

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114. Irregular forces. Greek rightist bands had been formed to combat ELAS troops, but control of these bands was poor, and they often were guilty of excessive criminal acts, which only helped to swell the ranks of those who opposed the Government. When fighting broke out, the British, and later US, advisers objected to arming civilians. This objection, however, did not preclude formation of paramilitary civilian components or equipping them with obsolete weapons available to the Government. Later, when it was realized that even the combined efforts of the Army, the Gendarmerie, and the National Defense Corps could not protect all villages against guerrilla attacks, distribution of arms to certain civilian components was approved. These civilian units (the most famous of which was called MAY, formed by local political leaders) were made up of volunteers. They collaborated with the Army, but actual Army control was limited. Refugees were organized and equipped for home defense prior to their departure from refugee camps, and the men were assigned to National Defense Units (MEA) before the women and children returned to their home areas.

a. The first units for local self-defense were formed in October 1946. Commanders were carefully selected local leaders who were placed under the direct control of the military commander in each area. Weapons and ammunition were war booty or were purchased from civilian authorities in villages or cities. As the tempo of the guerrilla war stepped up, and it became more evident that the insurgents were receiving support from outside (certain Iron Curtain countries), these original units were reorganized into National Defense Units. The MEA, a forerunner of the National Defense Battalions (TEA), was organized along military lines, and individual units were assigned to the major tactical command in the area. This plan required that greater numbers of civilians be mobilized and armed. The command structure was filled by Reserve officers. The original mission of the local units, simply stated, was to destroy all Communist guerrillas, but this was now expanded to include keeping law and order in cooperation with the Gendarmerie (when it was available) and protecting the villages from which the Army had routed the Communists. In this manner, the regular military establishment was freed to pursue the Communist guerrillas. These MEA units proved to be effective in providing patrols, raiding teams, and guides for use in conjunction with Army units. However, in spite of this reorganization, the inadequacies of MEA were clearly evident in the final phases of the guerrilla war. The National Defense Corps (NDC) was established in 1947 and the National Defense Battalions in 1951.

b. The problem of providing civic security which faced the Army during the summer and fall of 1947 suggested the need for an organization specifically designed to defend towns and villages. The civilian guard had been formed in 1945 to combine the functions of the police and the Army. The civilian guard was the forerunner of the NDC. However, hastily organized units, poorly controlled and given to excesses,

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(probably because of poor training and lack of adequate command, control, and communications capabilities) had to be replaced by the Gendarmerie in that same year. Then, in 1947 the National Defense Corps was formed under Army control. The initial authorization was for 40 battalions of 500 men each--a total of 20,000--with the cadres drawn from the Army and fillers from ex-servicemen. Men from the same locality were assigned to the same battalion. After a short training period, the battalion was posted at the locale from which its members came, the theory being that the men could live at home and function on a minuteman basis. The expectation was that, when these NDC battalions became operational, this organization could provide better protection for the civil communities, the poorly organized civilian guard units would be deactivated, the Gendarmerie would be reduced to its normal strength, and the Army would be freed to pursue the guerrillas without disrupting the national life and economy. By January 1948, the NDC had been enlarged from 40 to 100 battalions of 500 men each--a total of 50,000 men. Ninety-seven of these battalions eventually were formed. The minuteman principle was abandoned gradually. More and more NDC battalions were reinforced and redesigned as light infantry battalions and, as such, became indistinguishable from other units of the Army.

c. The National Defense Battalions (Tagmaethnikis Astralios or TEA) were made subordinate to the Ministry of National Defense, with the Army being responsible for direct supervision and operational control. In peacetime, the battalions were under the control of the nearest major Army unit, but in wartime they fell into the wartime Army commands. TEA was responsible for providing intelligence by means of TEA nets; planning and conducting patrols and ambushes in the forbidden zone (within 5 km of the borders), apprehending border crossers, and protecting critically important installations; keeping known and suspected Communists under surveillance; reporting the presence of strangers; and conducting, in conjunction with civilian authorities, a program designed to develop national pride in all Greeks and to combat Communist propaganda. Wartime missions included providing tank and rear area security, antiguerrilla activity, and patrols. The battalions also were trained in unconventional warfare. TEA was a home-guard type of organization and contained some 85,000 individuals. There appear to have been more than 100 of these battalions located in the rural areas and concentrated (as would be expected) in the northern sectors of the country. The battalions generally were commanded by a regular Army major, and company units were manned by Reserve officers on active duty. Each company was composed of four platoons commanded by Reserve noncommissioned officers. All other members of the TEA were civilians, individuals who generally were engaged in civilian pursuits. The men assigned to TEA fell into two categories: those who were 18-20 who had no previous military training and those who had completed their tour of duty in the Army and had been released. The maximum age was 50, but a member could serve under a waiver until he was 60. Service in the TEA was mandatory

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for those residing in the TEA areas. The term was 6 months, and each term of service was renewed every 6 months. Obviously, villages with small populations required repetitive service. Regular Army personnel were used to train TEA units, primarily because of the shortage of qualified instructors. Training was mandatory and was held on Sundays and holidays to avoid interfering with civilian pursuits. Those with previous military training attended only on alternate Sundays. Training included reconnaissance of the area, close order drill, weapons firing techniques for guerrilla fighting, observation, patrol and ambush, night action, and the handling of explosives. Rifle marksmanship training was a semiannual affair. Night exercises were required every 6 months. Within the area of responsibility and in conjunction with the Gendarmerie, especially in the northern border areas, the TEA patrolled the villages and surrounding areas and participated in ambushes.

Section VI. Resistance During the Occupation

115. Conditions during the occupation. The strategic importance of Greece to German war plans made it impossible for Greece to avoid the hardships of occupation; however, it is obvious that the hardships imposed during the German occupation were unduly severe. The German economic minister stated that Greece had suffered more than any other country from the effects of World War II. The Greeks stubbornly refused to look on the invaders as anything but enemies. German reprisals against the Greek people for their resistance were severe, especially those against Crete for the part its people had played in an earlier battle. The Italians had taken over the Ionian Islands, and Bulgaria annexed the best and largest area of farming land, driving 100,000 Greeks out of western Thrace. The economic plight of these people was appalling. In addition, Greece already had been weakened by the sacrifices exacted by 6 months of bitter fighting prior to the occupation. The structure of the Greek economy and its dependence on foreign trade made it extremely vulnerable, and the economic policy pursued by the Germans during the occupation wrecked the Greek economy completely.

116. Resistance organizations. The beginnings of organized resistance took place in Athens and other large cities. Three organizations became politically and militarily significant: an Organization for National and Social Liberation (EKKA), the Greek Democratic National League (EDES), and the National Liberation Front (EAM) and its National People's Liberation Army (ELAS).

a. The EKKA (Ethneki Kac Koinoniki Apeleftherosis), formed in July 1941, represented the political center. Militarily, it opposed the occupation, and, politically, it opposed both a monarchical and a Communist government.

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b. Later in the summer of 1941, the Ellinikas Demokratikos Synlesmos (EDES) was organized in opposition to the occupation authorities. Originally, it stood for restoration of a measure of republicanism and advocated holding a plebiscite on the question of the monarchy. The group was headed by Napoleon Zervas, an officer who had been dismissed from the Greek Army in the 1930's because of political activities. By 1942, Zervas had fielded a 150-man force and eventually built a highly centralized force capable of survival.

c. By far the most powerful of the resistance groups was the Ethnikon Apeleftherotikon Metapon (EAM) and its military arm, Ethnikos Laikos Apeleftherotikis Stratos (ELAS), founded during 1941-42.

(1) EAM was made up of five parties. The Communist Party of Greece controlled the group, and two of the other four parties were KKE satellites. The remaining two, considered to be truly independent, were the Socialist Party and the Popular Democratic Union. The stated objectives of EAM were to provide resistance to the occupying forces and to achieve a postwar Government based on the people's will as expressed in free elections. These objectives were couched in the most appealing terms that camouflaged the Communist connections. Classic Communist organizations were set up, headed by a control committee, and ranged from units designed for work in the villages to a terrorist and disciplinary organization that carried out secret EAM assignments. EAM efforts went toward perfecting the organization itself through 1941 and 1942, but EAM, along with EDES, had guerrilla forces in the field by the fall of 1942.

(2) The Communists, quick to take advantage of every opportunity (such as British support to guerrilla groups), organized ELAS. Military leaders for ELAS were carefully selected to make it acceptable to respectable Greek elements and entice them to support it. The military leadership raised approximately ten 4,000-man divisions and a naval component, all of which were designed to take over Greece, not just to fight the occupying armies. Although Communist members were few in number, with the system of control set up for the blossoming organization and given the opportunity, these few were quite capable of maximizing Communist control over the country.

117. Conflict between EAM/ELAS and EDES. As had happened in the Philippines, as the military arm (ELAS) became more powerful, it directed its attention to rival guerrilla organizations instead of to the occupying troops. A British Military Mission was introduced in 1942. This became the Allied Military Mission in 1943, with the addition of a US component. The British mission used supplies and money as levers to control guerrilla behavior, and the growth of the guerrilla bands was due partly to the psychological advantages gained by British and Soviet successes and partly to the presence of the mission and its economic

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assistance. EDES numbered only 5,000 members, and ELAS had 20,000 in 1943. ELAS had grown to between 30,000 and 50,000 by 1944, but EDES had more than doubled its size to 12,000 members. The British were aware of the armed strength of ELAS, and the objectives (stated and unstated) of EAM/ELAS had become unmistakably clear. The latent Communist threat within the guerrilla movement also was recognized by the British and accepted as a condition of the times, but the military objectives of the Allies at this time outweighed any future political challenge of EAM for the postwar period. The main object was to get EAM/ELAS to fight against the enemy instead of against other guerrilla groups.

a. The British sought to offset the superior strength of ELAS by assigning specific areas to the various groups. All of them agreed to cooperate with a joint general headquarters consisting of representatives of all the recognized guerrilla bands and the British Middle East Command. EAM/ELAS signed the agreement, along with EDES, EKKA, and the British, but soon sabotaged it. The Italian armies in Greece surrendered their arms when they capitulated. The Pinerole Division, stationed in the ELAS sector, gave its arms and ammunition to this guerrilla group. Now, with an independent source of supply and freed from British control, ELAS began the attempt to destroy its strongest competitor, EDES. However, to offset the advantages held by ELAS, the British gave strong support to EDES, particularly in resupply, and EDES managed to survive.

b. When the Germans took over Greece from the Italians, they began a series of drives that threatened the heart of the guerrilla movement. Cooperative resistance efforts on the part of the guerrilla bands was essential. British attempts to get the guerrillas to accept a truce resulted in an agreement for a ceasefire early in 1944. ELAS set the conditions for the agreement. Those conditions specified that Zervas, leader of EDES, was to repudiate the collaborators, the guerrillas were to remain in their present positions, and a conference of the guerrillas and the Allied Military Mission was to be held to discuss the formation of a unified guerrilla army and a government of national unity. Zervas did repudiate the collaborators, thereby giving ELAS a propaganda point (by acknowledging the existence of collaborationists within EDES); and ELAS, EDES, EKKA, and the Military Mission documented the fact that the Axis-sponsored puppet Greek Government was an enemy of Greece. Although these efforts resulted in a ceasefire (the PLAKA Agreement), the territorial distribution agreed upon in the second condition resulted in ELAS controlling most of the Greek mainland, with EDES literally blockaded along the western coast. A united guerrilla army and a government which would achieve national unity were beyond the scope of topics that the Allied Mission was prepared to discuss, but Colonel Woodhouse, the British Adviser, did secure a secret agreement for the full cooperations of the guerrilla groups in harassing the Germans during their withdrawal.

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118. Underground apparatus to challenge the Greek Government-in-Exile. Having failed to produce any political arrangement that would allow it to control the country, EAM unilaterally set up its own political organization to run the part of Greece it controlled. This was the Political Committee for National Liberation (Politike Epitrophi Ethnikis Apeleftheroseos, PEEA), established in March 1944. PEEA attracted a large number of highly respected Greeks. The challenge to the Government-in-Exile became real, especially when units of the Greek Army and Navy in the Middle East rebelled. EAM and the Government-in-Exile agreed to hold a conference in London. However, even though prospects for EAM assuming control of the new government looked promising, the opportunity never developed. The British and the anti-EAM politicians who had escaped from Greece during the occupation closed ranks with Georgios Papandreou to force the acceptance of an eight-point political program. The EAM "Suolos" group returned to Greece and turned to military means, ordering the final destruction of EDES. It was unable to accomplish this objective, because EDES, under Zervas and heavily supplied by the British, began to harass ELAS, and the Soviet Union failed to supply ELAS for operations against EDES. Also, British and US irregular units began to harass the Germans during their withdrawal operations, and German mop-up operations were directed against ELAS. These actions resulted in the dissipation of the threat to EDES. ELAS appeared to have lost its nerve in the summer of 1944 and entered into an agreement with the British which put the British in command of its forces and required ELAS not to attempt to seize power, not to enter Athens, and to cooperate with EDES.

119. Wartime guerrilla operations.* To this point, the discussion has centered on political events, and the military achievements of the guerrillas have been obscured by the fact that these groups were more deeply engrossed in the form the postwar Government was to assume than in the military problems.

a. The primary military target of the guerrillas throughout the war was the highly vulnerable transportation system. They were particularly effective in the Italian zone of occupation, where they ambushed road parties, convoys, and trains and demolished culverts, bridges, and other road and rail installations. In most cases, when the ability of small Italian garrisons to move safely had been reduced, the garrisons were removed. ELAS benefited from these withdrawals, for it was able to assume control of large sections of the country. Two operations especially helpful to the Allies were "Animals" and "Noah's Ark."

*Care must be used to differentiate between wartime guerrilla operations (referred to in US Army doctrine as unconventional warfare operations) and insurgency (the use of guerrilla operations in cold war or stability operations).

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Operation Animals had two specific purposes, one of which was to attack transportation targets and small outlying troop garrisons. The primary objective, however, was to make the Axis think that Greece, rather than Sicily, would be the target of the Allied invasion in July 1944. The British credit the Greek guerrillas with holding at least two German divisions in Greece that might otherwise have been diverted to Italy. Operation Noah's Ark was designed to force the Germans to fight their way north in their withdrawal from Greece. Greek guerrilla operations may not have been overly aggressive, but they had definite nuisance value for the Allies.

b. Although the German occupation is considered as an interruption to the preconflict period, the resistance offered by different Greek factions is important, because it exemplifies the Communist technique and methodology for takeover. Counterguerrilla operations will be the subject of the research on the conflict period.

120. Setting for 1946 insurgency. The return of Nikos Zachariades, the Greek Communist leader, from the German prison at Dachau on 30 May 1945 set the pattern for things to come. The following day, the paper "Rizospastis" carried his statement:

There is no solution--either we go back somehow to the regime of the Monarchist-Fascist dictatorship of the Fourth of August, in a form more severe than ever, or EAM's struggle for national liberation will find its completion in the establishment of a People's Democracy in Greece.³

The term "people's democracy" was neither clearly defined nor understood. It is unlikely that Zachariades, at that moment, meant establishment of a people's democracy in Greece as a result of free and genuine elections. Yet, it would seem at this time that the left had little chance for gaining an electoral victory.

a. EAM and PEEA, its political committee, began to disintegrate during the December revolution. The PEEA re-formed into a new party, the Popular Democratic Union/Socialist Party of Greece (ELD/SKE). As the left was dissolving, the anti-Communist forces were gaining, and their emphasis was shifting from anticommunism to the royalist cause and passionate support for the King. British influence in the Greek political scene was a dominant factor, and the British were placing their hopes on the Regent, the capable Archbishop of Athens. At the same time, they were promoting pioneer personalities from the prorepublican liberal center. This British experiment came to an end with the election of the prorightist parties to power in 1946. In the midst of political and economic instability, the far left and the extreme right joined forces, creating the kind of chaos needed to permit a Communist

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takeover. What was strictly a constitutional issue was seen by the ordinary people as a struggle of democracy against communism. Records indicate that the objectives of the Communists were to gain time, to undermine their opponents, and to gather the forces they needed to permit them to attack. The Communists' challenge took the form of espousing the republican cause as their own, with the result that the values of the genuine republicans were drowned. The question of achieving success in establishing a people's democracy through elections appeared to be impossible, and armed confrontation was in the making.

b. Zachariades described the situation as being ready for an armed confrontation:

What was the situation in 1946? First of all, domestically: on this there was no disagreement. We all agreed that the situation was ripe, that we should take up arms and fight. But we had also to examine the external factors. What backing did we have? The People's Democracies were behind us. But we had to start the struggle under British occupation. Therefore, we had to take into consideration the fact that we should not provoke the British into intervening immediately. Our policy ought to be ostensibly defensive in order to unmask the reaction, to unmask British policy. Our effort in this area was directed towards isolating the British, to prevent their immediate armed intervention, while relying on the People's Democracies--in order to begin the attack on domestic reaction.⁴

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ANNEX A. DATA ON GREEK INCOME, PRODUCT, AND SECTOR SHARES

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ANNEX A

DATA ON GREEK INCOME, PRODUCT, AND SECTOR SHARES

1. General. National income estimates for prewar Greece have been produced by a variety of official and private sources; they are contradictory, confusing, and too general to permit meaningful comparisons. Since the record of Greek internal prices and of foreign exchange controls is equally confused and complicated, there is almost no value in an attempt to adjust shaky output estimates to take account of inflationary price changes or to make international comparisons. This annex discusses and compares the various major sources of Greek data, to provide some guidance to the conflicting claims made by Greek economic analysts.

a. National income estimates were first prepared by the Greek Supreme Economic Council during the late 1930's; these are cited by Henry Hill in his 1943 survey. After 1945, UNRRA specialists and the Greek High Board for Reconstruction made a careful study of the 1938 "net geographical product," setting it at Dr67.3 billion, and this official estimate has been used by the United Nations. The well-known Greek economist, Chr. Evelpides, prepared historical data for the 1927-38 national incomes in 1949. Further historical work was carried out by the private National Bank of Greece and Athens during the postwar recovery period, which provides the most detailed data and estimates available for 1946-53. Two private efforts to detail the national incomes for 1927-38 were those by Mousmoutes in 1949 and by Bandaloukis in 1951; these are discussed by Pepelasis.¹

b. During the postwar reconstruction period, the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) also prepared an estimate of the 1938 gross national product, setting it at Dr86.6 billion. The difference between this estimate and the Greek High Board's GNP estimate was large, some DR 19.3 billion, due to the very high proportion of the "market-price product" which was created by prewar indirect business taxes. By contrast, depreciation estimates and 1938 foreign income "from abroad" were calculated by ECA to be relatively a minor party. It is not clear from official Greek data whether this ECA estimate was accepted or used in any Greek estimates, or whether postwar Greek indexes of national income refer to a 1938 net geographical income or to a 1939 "national income" base.²

c. Postwar national income figures are greatly confused by the continual inflation which prevailed through 1945-51. An official index to incomes for these years is provided in table XVII. It shows 1945 and 1946 income as measuring 31 and 51 percent of the prewar 1938 level. Due to the exchange controls prevailing during these postwar

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TABLE XVII. NATIONAL INCOME AT FACTOR COSTS--HISTORICAL SERIES
(in billions of drachma)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Current prices</u>		<u>Index</u>
1928	46.1 ^a	46.13 ^b	
1932	43.7	43.47	
1936	59.4	59.27	
1938	72.3	64.93	67.3 ^c 100 ^c
1945		655.0	31
1946		6,231.0	51
1947		9,206.0	68
1948		14,529.0	72
1949		19,146.0	80
1951		30,308.0	na

Sources: ^aEvelpides estimates. ^bBandaloukis estimates. ^cHigh Board of Reconstruction estimates.

years and a succession of exchange devaluations, it is pointless to attempt any conversion into dollar equivalents; the results would tend to exaggerate Greek national income.* The only constant-drachma estimates for applicable postwar years are for 1948 and later. The National Bank of Greece and Athens estimated 1948 national income at Dr22,607 billion, or 75 percent of the 1951 level. This is in 1951 constant prices which were 370 times those of 1938. This result matches the official incomes index of 72 percent rather closely.³

2. Economic growth. Growth rate calculations for the overall economy over the interwar period have not been attempted, save by Pepe-lasis, who used a 1914-based price index to deflate interwar estimates by Mousmoutes and Bandaloukis.⁴ He reached the depressing conclusion that growth between 1927 and 1938 had been extremely slow; not more than 2.1 percent in real terms and only about 1.8 percent after the "natural" population growth rate of about 1.33 percent had been subtracted. But this slow growth pattern would apply to any European nation, using the given peak base year and covering the period of worldwide depression. It seems more realistic to accept the idea attributed to Evelpides that the interwar growth rate of Greece was near 5 percent, presumably in real terms and for normal periods such

*In 1953-54, the Greek drachma was devalued 50 percent to 30,000 per US\$1 and later "reformed" by eliminating three zeros to make a "new drachma." Thereafter, the trillion-drachma data for 1946-53 is often reported by Greek sources as billion-drachma "current prices." Great cautions must be used in reading Greek statistics in money or real terms.

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as 1924-29 and 1932-39.⁵ Not only is this highly respectable growth, by comparison to other interwar economics, it also closely parallels the real growth rates achieved during the 1950's in Greece.⁶

3. Structure. The details needed to describe sectoral shares in the 1928 output are not available. However, using the 1938 sector proportions reported by the National Bank, agricultural crops accounted for 23.6 percent of net domestic product, while livestock provided some 13 percent in addition. Manufacturing, with 16.5 percent, wholesale and retail trade with 11 percent, and ownership of dwellings, 7.7 percent, ranked next in order. The net product of Government services, including health and education, amounted to 5.7 percent of the total or some Dr4.1 billion. These relative shares suggest a rather modern economic structure. The total share of agriculture, livestock, forestry, and fisheries was only 38.9 percent of net domestic product at factor cost, whereas Hill and others have estimated that prewar agriculture represented over 50 percent of Greek incomes and perhaps 60 percent of the employed population.⁷

a. An interesting contrast with 1948 and 1951 output proportions is possible, using Papandreou's collection of 1948-61 official data on gross domestic product.⁸ This shows 1948 net output shares as follows (in percent): agriculture, 31.4; manufacturing, 14.6; trade, 11.7; and public administration, 13.0 (of which defense took 8.2 percent). By 1951, which represented a roughly "normal" year without internal disruption, the GDP shares shown by this table (in percent) were agriculture, 34.5; manufacturing, 16.7; trade, 12.2; defense, 34.5; and public administration, 4.1. One conclusion which these output shares suggest is that 1938 net output was very similar in structure to 1951 shares of gross product. This does not support the picture of prewar Greece as a backward economy.

b. Another source provided corroboration for the high manufacturing (including handicrafts) sector share in 1928-30 output: Coutsoumaris shows that 16.6 percent of gross output came from this sector, almost identical to the 1938 proportion and closely similar to 1950-52 shares.⁹ This represents a near-constant proportion for output from the "modern sector," over a very long period and despite a devastating foreign occupation and civil war. Such national income figures probably tend to undervalue rural and agricultural product, when expressed in more recent drachmas; also, it must be recognized that Greek economic data before 1951 are rather unreliable. But the overall conclusion is inescapable that Greek economic structure has remained very stable.

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ANNEX B

BACKGROUND DATA ON THE GREEK FAMILY

1. Patriarchal authority. The family was organized along patriarchal and patrilocal lines. The authority of the father over his wife and children was clear at all times. He alone handled the money (including the earnings of his sons and daughters), negotiated with officials or other outsiders, and made the decisions on all important questions, such as the marriage alliances of his children. It was thought important for a man's self-respect that other men should know him as master of his own house.

a. In actuality, there was a marked difference between the public and private behavior of most couples. In public, the wife was expected to show only deference and respect, not to express an opinion, and certainly not to contradict her husband. However, Dr. Lee speaks of the wife and mother as a powerful and dominant figure who upholds the fortitude and "philotimo" of the family and trains her children in moral strength. She was respected by her husband and within the home usually was consulted on matters of consequence. In fact, family matters were discussed by the whole family, and children (over 10) often participated in decisions as important as whether to buy or sell a field.

b. The father's authority over his sons usually lasted as long as they remained under his roof. In some villages, it was thought that once a son became a father, he should be head of his own house. In this case, he usually moved after his first child was born.

c. Finally, the authoritarian character of the Greek family was tempered by benevolent affection and a deep respect for the individual. It welded the family into a tightly knit unit which, with the father as spokesman, faced the outside world as a single corporate entity.

2. Patrilocal residence. Residence was usually with or near the husband's father. In some villages, it was customary for the married sons and their wives and children to live with the father until his death or retirement, at which time the property was divided and a separate home established by each son. In others, the division of property occurred much earlier, possibly when the youngest son married. Sometimes the newly married couple stayed in the father's home only a short time before moving into their own house (or hut). Frequently, economic factors encouraged the maintenance of the extended family, for when landholdings were small, it was more efficient and profitable to farm them as a unit.

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a. Sons who left the farm to follow a trade or occupation, or to continue their education, usually lived with a close relative. Only if one had no uncles or other relatives did he rent a room. After marriage, the young couple established its own home, or perhaps, if the wife were from the city, lived with her parents. In urban areas, separate homes for the nuclear or elementary family were more common.

b. In any case, the city family maintained close ties with relatives in the villages. Frequently long summer months were spent in the country, and, in return, relatives from the village paid extended visits to the city.

c. The cooperative work and material assistance growing out of patrilocal residence served a valuable economic function. Equally important, its mutual aid and shared activities created a community of interest and strengthened family ties. The devotion of its members to one another was not an artificial enforced relationship. It grew out of working, sharing, and being together.

3. Family and kinship. For the average Greek, the world was sharply divided into two groups of people; those with whom he had a personal relationship and the impersonal "others." Only the former could be trusted. One had always to guard against the trickery and exploitation of the "others." The most important of the personal relationships were encompassed in the term "kinsman"; the consanguinal kin group into which he was born, the affines (in-laws), and the spiritual kinsmen (which were voluntary relationships entered into by individuals and families).

a. The smallest unit of organization was the elementary family; that is, the husband, wife, and children. The next larger unit, the extended family, consisted of a man and wife; their unmarried sons and daughters; and married sons, their wives, and children. It was usually a joint economic group; acted as trustee to conserve, accumulate, and transmit wealth from one generation to another; and was responsible for caring for those members of the family who were not able to care for themselves.

b. The largest family unit was the kin group. It comprised all the relatives, both maternal and paternal to the degree of second cousin. More distant relatives were sometimes included, but this was not the norm, unless closer kinfolk were few or unless a relative was wealthy and it was advantageous to stress the relationship. The kin group usually assumed responsibility for aiding its members in time of need, but this assistance, unlike that within the extended family, was not given freely. The recipient was obliged (by custom and his sense of honor) to repay the favor. Wealthy individuals had a greater responsibility than did others. They were expected to help the kin group (to

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the degree of second cousin) in many ways, including financial assistance, aid in finding employment, and provision of food and shelter. To fail to give this help reflected upon the family honor.

c. With the exception of a few "modern" urbanities, arranged marriages were the norm throughout Greek society and were one of the major avenues of upward mobility for an aspiring family. Parents were genuinely concerned about the welfare and happiness of their offspring, but, beyond this, alliances were sought to enhance prestige and provide influential contacts. The marriage was more than a union of two individuals. Not only did the bride become a member of her husband's kinship group, but all members of both elementary families assumed a special relationship toward each other. This did not involve specific rights and duties but did widen the personal, as distinct from the impersonal, category and enlarged the group to which one might look for special consideration and nonmaterial aid.

d. Spiritual kinship resulted when a man agreed to act as a wedding or baptismal sponsor. In the former case, he was considered to bear a special relationship to the groom, known as kumbari; in the latter, the sponsor became the "nonos" (godfather) of the child and the kumbari of the child's father. Sponsors, like marriage partners, were carefully chosen to extend the network of personal relationships and to improve the prestige of and establish influential contacts for the family. Almost invariably, sponsors were of a higher social status than the family issuing the invitation. A young shepherd might have asked a prosperous farmer to serve as kumbari, whereas an aspiring farm family would have chosen an urban merchant or professional man. Traditionally, the wealthy landlords (or descendants of former landlords) had served as sponsors of village families. By 1946, this was not always true. A sponsor, if from the city, was just as likely to be a successful first or second generation migrant from the village. Neither Campbell or Friedl reports the traditional arrangement in the villages they studied.

e. In accepting an invitation to act as kumbari, the sponsor and his elementary family automatically became a part of the groom's kinship group entitled to the same rights and owing the same duties and obligations as the biological kin (kin, not family). This included the prohibition against marriage in the same degree as that forbidden to blood relations.

f. Kumbaros was usually viewed as a patron-client relationship from which each party received significant benefits. A man's prestige was enhanced when others indicated their dependence on him. He also gained political strength by having "clients" whose loyal support he could guarantee. The client family in its turn could usually

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count on assistance with such problems as finding educational or employment opportunities for younger sons. It also gained access to various levels of officials whose regulations affected family affairs. The patron-client concept is accurate as far as it goes. However, its real role and significance within the Greek social structure can be grasped only if it is viewed as an integral part of the kinship system.

4. Dowry and inheritance. According to Greek law and custom, each child was entitled to an equal share of the family property. Sometimes sons received their portions through gifts while the parents were still alive; sometimes no division was made until after the father's death. A daughter was invariably given her share as a dowry when she was married.

a. Since a family's most compelling obligation was to arrange "good" marriages for its daughters and no girl could hope to marry without at least a token dowry, the girls, in actual practice, had first claim on the family property. Indeed, it was not unusual for young men to delay their own marriages so they could contribute their earnings to a sister's dowry. Customarily, the dowry involved a transfer of land from the parents to the daughter and through her to the jurisdiction of her husband.

b. After the daughters had received their shares, the land remaining was frequently inadequate for subdivision with any expectation that the sons could maintain a decent standard of living for their families. Villagers were keenly aware of the dangers of too-small parcels and tried to make some adjustments to avoid the threatened poverty. One solution was to educate one or more of the sons for nonfarming occupations, probably for white-collar or professional positions in the city. In fact, the Greek civil code provided that educational expenses beyond those to be expected from the economic position of the family could be counted as part of the inheritance. This plan had the additional advantage that, if he were successful, the son brought added prestige to the family and could be counted on to help with the education of younger brothers and nephews.

c. Problems growing out of fragmentation of landholdings also led to a conscious regulation of the size of the family. A trend in this direction apparently started in the 1920's.

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ANNEX C

THE INVOLVEMENT OF MILITARY OFFICERS IN THE POLITICS OF GREECE

1. Introduction. The political history of Greece from its fight for independence against the Ottoman Empire in the 1820's to the end of World War II is one of almost constant, heavy, and direct involvement of the Greek military establishment in the politics of the country. During this period, the extent of military involvement ranged from the threat or use of force to influence the existing administration to the direct assumption of governmental powers. The reasons for this history of involvement are to be found in the military tradition and in the political, economic, and social circumstances which prevailed in Greece at that time. The Greek experience is not at all unique; the history of its Balkan neighbors shows similar military involvements for generally similar reasons. Certain parallels also can be found among many of the developing nations in the 1950's and 1960's.

2. History. The Greek War of Independence began in 1821 amid an increasing sense of nationalism, spurred on by similar movements among neighboring countries and by the experience of Napoleonic France. Despite intense sectional feuding, much savagery and cruelty, and lack of discipline and organization, the revolution began to make some headway against the Turks and their Egyptian client army. The movement was led by elements of the clergy, landowners, local magistrates, and the armed chieftains throughout the countryside. The Greeks proved to be good soldiers at this type of warfare, and their excellent seamanship gave them ready access to means of transportation and supply. However, the war was a long and bloody one and ended in 1832 only after the combined intervention of the great powers--France, Britain, and Russia--on behalf of the Greeks. The southern portion of the Ionian Peninsula was given its independence. However, without prior consultation with the Greek armed forces leaders which had emerged from the war and, seemingly, against much popular feeling, the great powers also selected a monarchy as the form of government for Greece. They placed Otho, a Roman Catholic and son of King Louis I of Bavaria, on the throne. Gradually, the Greek Government administration took shape, making heavy use of Bavarians and European-oriented Greeks.

a. The first military intervention took place in 1843, when, in a bloodless coup (by an Army group who were orthodox and Russian in sympathy), the King was forced to accept a Constitution. Continued failure by Otho to recognize his constitutional limits forced another military revolt in 1862, which obliged him to leave the country. In 1863, the three great powers again agreed on a monarch for Greece and, despite a rising tide of Greek nationalism and republicanism, placed the Danish Prince Alfred on the throne as King George I.

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b. Increasingly, throughout this period, the political energies of the country were absorbed by quarrels over the form of government and by the rising desire to liberate Crete, Thessaly, and other neighboring areas where sizable Greek populations were to be found. The serious economic problems of the country, overburdening foreign debt, and the poorly educated populace were problems for which neither the republican nor the monarchist forces had a program; and they tended to be forgotten in the controversies over constitutionalism and irredentism. Finally, in 1909, popular discontent gave rise to an insurrection by the Military League which forced George I to accept Venizelos, leader of the Greek revolutionaries against the Turks on Crete, as head of the Government. Venizelos set about revising the Constitution and promised to do something about the extraordinarily serious social and economic problems of the country.

c. However, the tide of nationalism and irredentism would not wait for progress on domestic problems. In 1912, the first of the Balkan Wars broke out, giving Greece the opportunity to divide the last of Turkey's European holdings with Bulgaria and Rumania. Crown Prince Constantine became King in 1913 but was deposed by Venizelos in 1917 over the question of whether Greece should remain neutral or join the Allies against the Central Powers. World War I increased the Greek-held overseas territories and, together with the Balkan Wars, increased appreciably the strength and popularity of the military. But Greece was having trouble with its newly acquired holdings in Asia Minor; war broke out with the Turks, who were determined to drive the Greeks out of Smyrna and Asian Turkey. Venizelos lost the election in 1920, and the victorious royalists brought back King Constantine, who was deposed again in 1922 by the Greek forces returning from their bloody and hopeless defeat at Smyrna. It may be supposed that there is a close parallel here with events in Egypt in 1952, when the Egyptian Army under Nasser, unwilling to take responsibility for the defeat at the hands of the Israelis in Palestine, chose to blame the administration in Cairo and thus justify a revolution. George II ascended to the throne in 1922, only to be deposed in 1923 by an Army colonel, Nicholas Plastiras. Admiral Konduriotis was proclaimed provisional President of the new republic which was confirmed by plebescite in 1924. General Kondylis took over as Prime Minister in 1924 but was soon pushed out by military intervention and replaced by General Pangalos, who ruled as a dictator until 1926.

d. Having grown tired of monarchist-republican strife, economic and refugee problems, and dictatorships, the Greeks once again called for Venizelos to return as Premier in 1928. However, Venizelos failed to heal the political rifts, and a succession of coups and counter-coups took place between Generals Plastiras and Kondylis until 1935, when Kondylis succeeded in establishing himself in power and asked George II to return to the throne. Soon thereafter, George dismissed

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Kondylis and appointed General Jean Metaxas as Premier. Metaxas attempted to form a government; after 3 months with no success, he assumed dictatorial powers with the tacit approval of the King. This dictatorship lasted until the outbreak of World War II.

e. The common factor among these increasingly numerous changes in administration in this 100-year period, whether motivated by royalist or republican sentiment, is the power of the military and the prominence of military men in each regime. No political faction could last long without military membership or support.

3. Greek military tradition. The Greeks had the makings of a strong military tradition before the War of Independence. They had never been fully disarmed by the Turks; in many areas, tribal chieftains exercised considerable local autonomous influence, and seminomadic brigands (klephts) undertook the preservation of native justice independent of Turkish authorities. The Turks were often obliged to come to terms with the stronger chieftains and warriors and make them responsible for local administration (armatoles). The daring exploits of these people, often in the face of Turkish power, provided the foundation of general popularity and tradition of leadership for later Greek Armed Forces. Similar exploits by Greek sailors, who had established their superiority to the Turks in the island waters around Greece before independence, also provided a powerful popular attraction and contributed to subsequent tradition. In addition, several thousand Greeks had gained experience in modern warfare as mercenaries in Italy; in Egypt under Napoleon; and in the Ionian Islands campaigns under the British, French, and Russians. These mercenaries also held high popular esteem and, with the klephts and armatoles, distinguished themselves in the War of Independence.

a. The War of Independence further increased the prestige of the military forces in the eyes of the people and attracted the brighter, more aggressive young Greeks into its service. Although regional and sectional rivalries remained intense in the military and were eventually to develop into various monarchist vs republican rifts among military factions, the prestige of the Armed Forces and their leaders remained high. These rivalries were to remain a constant factor in Greek politics until 1935, when the monarchist Metaxas effectively disposed of the republican-oriented military factions.

b. After Greece had achieved independence, the great powers had imposed a monarchy on the country without prior consultation with the Greek military forces. Therefore, even if modern Greece's first King had been a popular one, which he was not, the situation already had been created in which active political influence by one military faction or another was a likely outcome. Otho's early disbanding of the Army and heavy use of Bavarian administrators set the pattern for

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subsequent alienation of many officers from the monarchy and created a willingness within the military to intervene as time and circumstance were appropriate.

c. In other Balkan countries at that time, the monarchies had established control over or working relationships with their Armies and were able to cooperate with them in maintaining the status quo. No such working relationship developed in Greece, until Metaxas emerged to create his dictatorship. Antimonarchist attitudes continued to exist through the 19th century and culminated at the time of the 1922 defeat by Turkey, when the Army forced Constantine to abdicate. Further coups were executed with increasing regularity in 1925, 1926, 1933, and 1935. During this period, the major issues were the form of government and, until 1922, the desire to increase the territory of Greece and reabsorb the Greek populations in neighboring countries. The first issue provided the rationale for military intervention; successes in the second kept the popularity of the military high enough to enable them to intervene.

d. In independent Greece, as in Russia in the 19th century, military officers were drawn from or became part of the best educated and most cultured class of the nation. A military career offered high prestige and rapid social mobility to aggressive young Greeks. Many experienced officers also were drawn into Government service as administrators, which also contributed to the ease with which the military could seize power when internal troubles or external threat appeared to justify it.

4. Political, social, and economic circumstances. Severe social and economic problems have plagued Greece since its independence. Also, in the hundred years of this period, the political gulf between the rightist-monarchist forces and the leftist-republican forces gradually widened and hardened, culminating in the extreme positions of dictatorship vs communism in the 1930's and 1940's. Relative lack of progress in the social and economic spheres, in such areas as modernization, industrialization, population control, and resettlement; chronic deficit trade balances; overdependence on agriculture; overburdening foreign debt; lack of education; the urban-rural split; and other factors created the environment in which the forces willing to make change and able to impose their will emerged to contest for the powers of government. In Greece, these forces were to be found almost exclusively in the military.

a. Serious cleavages in Greek society became apparent during the War of Independence. Greek fought Greek as well as Turk, Peloponnesians were against the continentals, and the Islanders were against both. Ideological differences set the cosmopolitan Phanariotes against the guerrilla chieftains, high prelates against village priests, merchants and shipowners against unemployed sailors, administrators and

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landowners against the landless peasants. Many of these social cleavages could be viewed in the microcosm of the military forces and continued to exist well into the 20th century. The only difference was that these forces in the military were organized and armed and, therefore, prepared to back the political efforts of their respective leaders.

b. Woodhouse highlights the social and economic problems that were chronic in Greek society and summarizes the rationale for the Metaxas regime thus:

. . . was designed to rescue Greece from the chaos to which the abuse of democratic processes was reducing it The task was to create the Greek state, to give it the stability, the cohesion, the self-respect which characterizes an independent state and which, despite one hundred years of freedom, Greece had not yet secured.¹

c. Although as many as 60 political parties took the field during elections, no one had devised a program to deal with the country's economic and social problems. In addition, there existed an ever-widening gap between the urban areas and the rural sections of the country, where Greeks lived in conditions similar to those in western Europe 200 years before. Metaxas intended to suspend experiments in modern political systems until a modern State had been created; he argued that modern systems of government cannot be imposed on a partially primitive society.

¹G. M. Woodhouse, Apple of Discord.

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ANNEX D

A RECORDED LAW OF MISSIONS FOR THE SAFETY OF THE OFFICIAL ORDER AND THE PROTECTION OF THE CITIZENS

EMERGENCY LAW NO. 1075

Measures for the Safety of the Social Order and the Protection of the Citizens.

On the proposal of our Council of Ministers we have decreed:

We modify and complete the provisions of the laws concerning the protection of the social order, which we codify in a single text, as follows:

CHAPTER I

Offenses and Punishments

Article I

1. Shall be punished with at least 3 months' imprisonment and 6 months' to 2 years' exile from the district of his domicile as well as from the district where the offense was committed:

a. Whosoever, either in writing or orally, or in any other way, either directly or indirectly, may try to spread, to develop and to apply theories, ideas, or social, economic and religious systems tending to overthrow the social order established in the country, or to detach or make independent a part of the state, as well as anyone who may propagate these ideas, theories and systems in any way whatsoever.

b. Whosoever, to attain the above-cited subversive ends, may provoke the declaration of a lockout or incite workers to declare a strike, or, a strike having been declared, may advise or incite the strikers or any other person to commit illegal acts, without affecting their liability for more serious punishments imposed by law for such reprehensible acts.

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c. Whosoever takes part in the actions cited in paragraph b.

d. Whosoever knowingly attends meetings either in the open air or in a closed place, at which may be developed or explained the systems and the ideas mentioned in the preceding paragraphs.

2. Shall be considered as a particularly aggravating circumstance the perpetration of the above-mentioned acts:

a. By means of the press or by proclamations and printed matter in general.

b. In a public place or in factories, and, in general, in places of meeting of workers.

c. By attempting to convert students or minor workers.

d. If the guilty persons and their accomplices are public employees or servants, either national, municipal, communal or ecclesiastical, particularly employees of public instruction and of the clergy, or organizations of public law or of workers' corporations, or directors, chiefs and members of the council of administration of agricultural cooperatives, or persons belonging to the army of the land, the sea, or the air. In such cases the punishment cannot be less than a third of the maximum limit provided for in the preceding paragraph.

3. The penalties provided for in the first paragraph may not be reduced to less than half of the maximum in the case of persons recognized as being chiefs or leaders in the case of collective infraction of the law, or of organized groups, of nuclei or branches or of unions of any kind or of sections of such unions, or anyone who may have received special instructions tending to the overthrow of the social order of the country.

4. The Under Secretary of State for Public Safety shall assign to the condemned person the place of his residence during the exile.

Article II

1. Persons condemned for the infractions set forth above by decisions not subject to appeal, shall be subjected, ipso facto, even if it is not so stipulated in the decision, to the privations and disqualifications provided for by Articles 21 and 23, paragraphs 2-7, of the Penal Code, during at least 5 years, and they shall be removed from office for the same period from cooperatives or corporations during this period being forbidden.

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2. The condemnation of public employees and servants in general as well as of persons belonging to the army of the land, the sea, or the air, ecclesiastical employees, municipal and communal employees as well as employees of corporations of public law, for one of the offenses provided for in the present law shall entail, ipso facto, dismissal from service, even if that is not stipulated in the decisions, regardless of the penalty inflicted; also, they shall be forbidden for life from assuming any authority or public service. In addition, the Court may deprive them of the right to a pension or any other allocation from the treasury, either partially or totally, for life or for a fixed time.

Article III

1. It is forbidden to publish, to sell, or to cause to circulate in general all books or printed matter, the content of which counter-venes the provisions of the present law. Likewise, it is forbidden for anyone to keep such printed matter in his possession if this is for the purpose of the propagation and disclosure of theories, ideas and systems as set forth in Article I.

2. In public libraries and in those of public corporations the said printed matter may be given out for study always in the halls of the library under the responsibility of the Director of the library and only to persons who have need thereof.

3. In case the possessor of printed matter has any doubts concerning the legality or illegality of the sale thereof, a commission of 5 members composed of the Prefect, the President, and Prosecutor of the Court of First Instance, of the President of the Council of the Association of Attorneys and the Director of the Police or the Gendarmerie of the district will decide in the matter, irrevocably and without appeal.

4. Those countervailing the prohibition provided for in paragraph 1 will be subject to two years' imprisonment and to exile for the same time from the district of their domicile and from that in which the offense was committed; during the period of suspension of Article 14 of the Constitution the printed matter seized shall be immediately destroyed by fire and a report thereon prepared.

5. The provisions of paragraph 4 of Article I shall be applied in such cases.

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CHAPTER II

Provisions Concerning Procedure - Renewal of Provisional Commitment

Article IV

1. In the course of the investigation and judgment of the offenses cited in Articles I and III the provisions in force concerning civil jurisdiction shall not be applied, and in the case of complicity of members of the army of land, sea or air or of the Gendarmerie with private individuals, such military persons shall be subject always to the competence of military and naval courts, the proceedings being separate so far as they are concerned.

2. Flagrant offenses will be judged in conformity with the provisions of the decree law of November 22, 1923, concerning the judgment of certain flagrant offenses.

3. Whenever, in ordinary offenses provided for by the present law, the Prosecuting Attorney prefers direct charges before the Correctional Police Court, he shall do so within 20 days from the date of the denunciation or of the investigation, the time limit provided for by Article 163, paragraph 1 of the Penal Procedure being reduced by half. Under such direct citation the accused cannot introduce the appeal provided for by Article 163, paragraph 2 of the Penal Procedure.

4. In the course of the instruction and judgment of offenses provided for by the present law, the provisions of Articles II-IX, XI-XIII of law 4458 concerning the instruction and judgment of offenses involving brigandage and the theft of animals, and Article II, paragraph 4 of the decree of December 16, concerning the judgment of offenses by the Court of Appeals shall be applied.

Article V

1. Provisional release subject to revocation may be granted, after a joint decision of the Minister of Justice and of the Under Secretary of State for Public Safety, to anyone condemned for infraction concerning the safety of the social order, etc., in conformity with the provisions of law 811 as amended, on the basis of a duly supported report of the competent commission, provided that the delinquents have undergone a third of their punishment. To this effect the following conditions must be fulfilled:

a. A request of the condemned person.

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b. A written declaration (or oral if the person is illiterate) before the Director of Prisons that he repents and will not in any way conduct himself contrary to the present law.

c. A report of the Director of Prisons on his conduct during detention, establishing whether in prison he engaged in Communist propaganda or, on the contrary, proved his repentance.

d. A report of the Under Secretariat of State for Public Safety on his Communistic action in the past and on the advisability of his release.

2. In case of the granting of such provisional release, the penalty of exile will be likewise suspended.

Article VI

1. Evidence of all kinds seized under the present law as well as articles of value seized in investigations of infractions of the pertinent law which were used for the purposes indicated in Article I, shall be confiscated and sold after the condemnation in last instance by the police authorities, by sale at public auctions in conformity with the provisions of Article 898 of the Civil Procedure; the amount received from the sale will be deposited in the Bank of Greece or a branch thereof, in the special account of the Under Secretariat of State for Public Safety. In the same bank shall be deposited the sums of money seized in similar investigations. Such sums shall be drawn upon by the Under Secretary of State for Public Safety and shall be used for the national struggle against Communism in accordance with the provisions of Article XII of the present law.

2. Articles seized by the authorities prior to the entry into effect of the present law which are connected with the propagation of ideas, theories, or systems tending to the overthrow of the established order or to the conversion of such ideas, theories, and systems, shall be confiscated, their quality as such being proven. The confiscation will be ordered by decision of the Police Correctional Court on the proposal of the Prosecuting Attorney attached to the said Court, within 2 months from the entry into force of the present law. Against the decision of the Court an appeal may be introduced by the Prosecuting Attorney and by any person interested, within 10 days of the publication of the decision. If the confiscation is not approved the Court will order the restitution to the owner of the seized articles. Confiscated articles will be sold and the amount will be used in accordance with the provisions of the preceding paragraph.

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CHAPTER III

Safety Commissions - Renewal

Article VII

1. Against any person becoming dangerous to the public safety by reason of his Communistic activity or for any person suspected of an infraction of Article I of the present law, excepting officials and soldiers on active duty, who shall be subject to special provisions, the police authority will submit a detailed proposal for exile to the commission of public safety, provided for by Article I of the decree law of April 19-21, 1924, composed of the Prefect, or of his legal delegate, as President, of the Prosecuting Attorney attached to the Court of First Instance, and the Commander of the Gendarmerie; for Athens, Piraeus, Patras, and Corfu, of the Director of the Police or the Director of Public Safety, as members, if proposals submitted by them or by their legal delegates are involved.

The commission for Attica and Boeotia shall have jurisdiction over all of Greece in the case of individuals of unknown domicile or operating throughout the country.

The Commission will decide by majority vote on the exile, which may not exceed one year but which may be renewed, and will decide at the same time the place of residence; it can order police agents to its meetings to obtain information of a strictly confidential nature.

Likewise, the Commission may, for individuals less dangerous to the public safety, assign districts or localities where the delinquents may not reside or from which they may not depart. Any infraction of this decision will involve up to 6 months' imprisonment.

Article VIII

1. The Under Secretary of State for Press will designate each time by decision the places to which Communists should be removed by the Commissions of Public Safety.

2. Persons removed by decisions of courts and of Commissions of Public Safety may, on decision of the Under Secretary of State for Public Safety, be concentrated in a special place, organized into disciplinary sections, "Concentration Camps," and may be obliged to labor in conformity with the more detailed provisions of a Royal Decree to be issued. Persons thus employed on public works shall receive a double allocation.

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3. Persons removed under the present law shall be under the surveillance of the police and must present themselves every day to the police authority of the locality of their residence; in case they leave without authority they shall be punished by at least 6 months' imprisonment.

Delinquents will be denounced by the police authority of the place where they are undergoing punishment, to the Prosecuting Attorney of the Police Correctional Court within three days after their absence, and an action will be opened by direct summons in the first session of the Police Correctional Court without previous instruction, the summons being served by a bailiff in conformity with Article 145 of the Penal Procedure. The domicile of the persons who have been exiled will be the locality where they last were subjected to the punishment of exile.

4. Exiled persons summoned for court action shall be brought under escort before the Court and if they are condemned they shall be imprisoned, and the remaining period of exile will be postponed until after the present sentence. For persons exiled by application of Article VII and condemned by the Court to exile for infraction of the present law who may have been exiled already as a precaution, the period of exile prior to the condemnation shall be deducted from the length of exile pronounced by the Court. In all other cases exile inflicted by the courts or Commissions of Public Safety shall be served without combination of penalties.

5. Exiled persons may not be summoned as witnesses before a Court outside the place of residence assigned to them but shall make depositions in good time and under authority before the local authorities and through the efforts of the competent Prosecuting Attorney.

Article IX

1. The Under Secretary of State for Public Safety, in cases where the decisions have been made by Commissions of Public Safety, may, at the request of the exiled person, modify a decision, interrupt the exile, postpone sine die the beginning or the balance of the exile, or reduce the length thereof, or finally, change the place of residence of the exiled person.

2. In the case of a sentence of exile rendered by a Court prior to the entry into effect of the present law, change of the place of residence may be made by the Court which will take cognizance of the matter at the request of the police authorities or of the Under Secretary of State for Public Safety.

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3. In cases provided for by the present law, Article VII, paragraph "a" of Emergency Law No. 130/36 concerning the competence of Prefects shall not be applied.

4. In the case of exiles ordered by one of the Commissions of Military Safety provided for by Article VIII of Emergency Law No. 376/36 concerning measures for the safety of fortified places, the right provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be exercised in common by the Ministers of War and of Public Safety or by the Ministers of Marine and of Public Safety, if the case in question was handled by a Commission of Maritime Safety.

CHAPTER IV

Recognition and Dissolution of Associations

Article X

Social Opinions of Public Employees and Servants

1. During the period of suspension of Article XI of the Constitution no association or union of any nature whatsoever may be recognized except on the basis of a report of the competent police authority or of local labor inspectors if it concerns professional corporations coming under the jurisdiction of the Secretariat of State for Labor.

2. Associations deviating from their initial purpose shall be dissolved by decision of the competent Court of First Instance regardless of the date of their recognition. Such decision of the Court shall be provoked by the Prosecuting Attorney, or on the request of the police authorities, submitted through the Prosecuting Attorney, and must be accompanied by the necessary proof. The Court shall judge freely on the basis of the evidence furnished or it may order a further investigation, fixing, at the same time, the date of the new hearing so that another convocation of the Court will be unnecessary. The request of the Prosecuting Attorney shall be communicated by copy to the representative of the association at least 5 days before the hearing set by the summons; in case the representative of the association should not be present in its offices the summons shall be affixed to the door of the offices of the organization or of the domicile of its representative. The request shall be discussed at the hearing fixed by the Prosecuting Attorney and the judgment shall be rendered within 10 days after the hearing. The Court shall decide by the same decision and even though the provisions of the statutes of the dissolved association provide otherwise, on the attribution of the property of the association to a welfare establishment. Against

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this final decision no appeal or recourse will be permitted and it shall be executed, on the order of the Prosecuting Attorney, by the police authorities.

Presidents of associations or of unions of any kind must submit the address of their offices to the police post, submitting a copy of the statutes as well as a complete list of the directors. Any infraction of this paragraph will entail a fine against the President of the association or the union.

Article XI

1. No one shall be admitted to take part in a competition and no one shall be engaged as an employee or servant of the State, of a district, a community or a public institution, or receive a grant of the State unless he presents a certificate from the Under Secretariat of State for Public Safety certifying as to his social opinions.

2. The same certificate shall be demanded of the personnel engaged by corporations, the capital and reserve funds of which exceed Dr20 million, or by companies having contracts with the State and the works of which interest directly or indirectly the safety and economic life of the country. The limit mentioned above may be increased or reduced by Royal Decree on the proposal of the Under Secretary of State for Public Safety.

Any infraction of this provision shall entail imprisonment up to 3 months and a fine up to Dr100,000 for the person engaging an employee without observing it.

3. Among the nominations sent in group by the competent Ministers to be published, there may be published separately in the Official Gazette the names of those for whom exists the certificate required by paragraph 1.

By Royal Decree, at the proposal of the Under Secretary of State for Public Safety, the above provisions may be extended to other enterprises.

4. The exile of an employee or servant of the State or of public institutions by Commissions of Public Safety shall entail their appearance before the Council of the service to which they belong, which may suspend them provisionally or discharge them definitely, depriving them of any right to a pension or other allocation from the Treasury, partially or entirely. During the period of the exile and up to a decision of dismissal, payment of their salaries shall be suspended.

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Article XII

1. An appropriation may be entered in the budget of the expenses of the Ministry of Interior for the expenses necessary for the fight against Communism. This appropriation shall be put at the disposal of the Under Secretary of State for Public Safety by payment orders made out in his name on the basis of decisions of the Council of Ministers which will fix the destination and the amount; these sums may be employed by the Under Secretary in conformity with the decision of the Council of Ministers without further accounting.

Article XIII

1. The exact meaning of Article XII of Law No. 117/1936 is that the provisions of Law 4229 concerning the matters regulated by Law 117 are abolished, but not the provision of paragraph 4 of Article IX, as modified by Article I of the Decree Law of July 12/16-7-32, ratified by Law 5595.

Article XIV

1. Emergency Law No. 21/1936, Article I to XI of Emergency Law No. 117/36, Emergency Laws 227/36 and 624 of October 4, 1937, as well as any provisions contrary to the present law are abolished. The present law will enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Gazette.

Athens, February 9, 1938.

GEORGE II, KING

The Council of Ministers

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